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Figure 18: Targets 13 January 1993 
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Figure 19: Targets 17 January 1993 
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Figure 20: Targets 18 January 1993 
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CHAPTER 8: JANUARY 1993 
In late December 1992 and early January 1993, Iraq began to harass 
the coalition while defying the UN. The coalition attacked air defence assets 
in southern Iraq in order to reduce the possibility of coalition casualties during 
the SNFZ enforcement and after that, a WMD production site to coerce the 
Iraqi government into compliance with SCR 687. Facing a choice where it 
could be disarmed and monitored either forcefully (i. e. with violently imposed 
costs) or peacefully (without violently imposed costs), the Iraqi government 
chose the latter. 
Chronology 
27 December 1992 One Iraqi MiG-25 was shot down after 
two incidents where Iraqi MiGs 
challenged coalition aircraft in the 
SNFZ. Iraq deployed mobile SAM 
batteries in the SNFZ. 
2 January 1993 The Iraqis fired a SAM at a U-2 
supporting UNSCOM. 
6 January 1993 The US, UK, France, and Russian 
Federation issued a demarche to Iraq 
demanding the movement of the mobile 
SAMs north of the 32nd parallel. 
7 January 1993 Iraq announced that it was suspending 
UNSCOM's overflight and landing 
rights. 
8 January 1993 Iraq announced it would comply with 
the demarche. 
10 January 1993 An Iraqi mob broke into the former 
Iraqi naval base at Umm Qasr and stole 
some munitions. 
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11 January 1993 Iraqi SAM batteries were deployed in 
the NNFZ. 
13 January 1993 A series of airstrikes was conducted 
against targets in southern Iraq. 
15 January 1993 The UN time limit for the removal of 
the Iraqi police posts in the DMZ 
expired. 
16 January 1993 While harassing coalition patrols over 
the NNFZ, the Iraqi government 
offered to guarantee the safety of 
UNSCOM flights only if they 
approached from Jordanian airspace. 
17 January 1993 The Iraqi government announced it 
would withdraw the police posts in the 
DMZ, and offered to allow UNSCOM 
flights from Bahrain to enter only if the 
coalition did not fly over the SNFZ 
during UNSCOM's flights. 
The USS Cowpens, USS Hewitt, USS 
Stump, and the USS Caron launched a 
series of Tomahawk cruise missiles at 
the Zaafaraniyah Advanced Engineering 
Facility in suburban Baghdad. 
18 January 1993 The Iraqi government reiterated the 
previous day's offer. 
A second series of strikes was 
conducted against the southern Iraqi air 
defences. 
22 January 1993 President William J. Clinton assumed 
the American presidency. Iraq offered a 
goodwill cease-fire and it was refused. 
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Catalysts/ Causes for Coercion 
At issue were Iraq's lack of compliance with SCR 687 and opposition 
to the NFZs. There were three specific areas of contention with regard to 
SCR 687. These were the Iraqi police posts on Kuwaiti territory, the incursion 
into UNIKOM's headquarters and seizure of munitions by an Iraqi mob on 
10 January 1993 and Iraq's denial of overflight rights to UNSCOM on 7 
January. 
Iraq and Kuwait were responsible for law and order on their 
respective sides of the DMZ, meaning that each state needed to maintain a 
police presence in the zone. Between June and September 1991, Iraq moved a 
series of 14 police posts into the DMZ, and five were in Kuwaiti territory. 
UNIKOM asked the Iraqi authorities to move them, only to be told that they: 
`... had been in place before 2 August 1990 and that pulling them back would 
prejudice Iraq's position regarding the demarcation of the border. Once the 
demarcation had taken place, Iraq would comply with the "reasonable 
distance" principle... " The UNSC approval of UNIKBDC's findings on the 
land boundary in November 1992 meant that the forts had to move by the 
UNSC's assignation of a deadline: 15 January 1993.2 
UNIKOM headquarters was housed in the former Iraqi naval base in 
the town of Umm Qasr. Its security was a concern, as a number of Iraqi anti- 
ship missiles and other munitions remained in the base. The UN Secretariat 
and UNSC were well aware that these munitions posed a security threat and 
'Report of the Secretary-General on UNIKOM', S/23000,3 September 1991, VtýL p. 297. 
2 `Letter dated 8 January 1993 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary- 
General', Annex I to `Special report by the Secretary-General on UNIKOM', S/25085,10 January 
1993, uN, p. 514., and 'Statement by the President of the Security Council concerning general and 
specific obligations of Iraq under various Security Council resolutions relating to the situation between 
Iraq and Kuwait', S/24386,23 November 1992, LI, p. 487. 
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were exploring options for their destruction .3 
On 10 January 1993, the 
Secretary-General reported that 
... this morning at about 0700 local time, a party of some 200 
Iraqis with trucks and heavy loading equipment forced entry 
into the six ammunition bunkers located in a former Iraqi 
naval base at Umm Qasr, on Kuwaiti territory, and took away 
most of their contents, including four "HY-2G" anti-ship 
missiles ... up to 500 Iraqi personnel continued today to dismantle prefabricated buildings in the former naval base, 
also on Kuwaiti territory, and to remove the parts and other 
items. This activity is in violation of the procedure established 
by the Security Council ... 4 
This was a violation of the arms embargo that rendered UNIKOM 
headquarters literally homeless. 
Iraq's interference with UNSCOM was more troubling. On 7 January 
1993, the Iraqi government, citing reasons of sovereignty, informed 
UNSCOM that it should be using Iraqi aircraft instead of UN aircraft .5 It 
seemed that Iraq sought to play the UN and coalition against one and other. 
The American government and military were very concerned about 
the risk of taking casualties over the SNFZ. During late 1992, it became 
apparent that the Iraqi armed forces were trying to challenge the coalition's 
`command of the air' over southern Iraq .6 There was other evidence that 
supported this conclusion. The Iraqi air force began to send its fighters into 
the SNFZ when coalition aircraft were not present as a form of challenge.? 
On 2 January 1993, an Iraqi air defence battery fired a SAM at a U-2 
3 `Letter dated 3 November 1992 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary- 
General', Annex III to S/25085, JL& p. 515. 
4 `Special Report by the Secretary-General on UNIKOM', S/25085 (10 January 1993), 11S, p. 513. 'IN- 
2G' are Chinese-made anti-ship missiles popularly called 'Silkworm'. 
s `Statement by the President of the Security Council concerning United Nations flights into Iraqi 
territory', S/25081,8 January 1993,111, pp. 512-513. 
6 See: CIS I1380-11, p. 1, and joint Chiefs of Staff Briefing on Current Military Operations, C 1-9 
29 January 1993, pp. 47-48, and 59 for details. 
7 White, p. 16. 
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conducting an overflight of Iraqi territory on behalf of UNSCOM 8A 
number of Iraqi mobile air defence systems, such as SA-2 and SA-3 missiles, 
moved into the SNFZ in late December and early January. 9 General Hoar 
recalled that: 
Intelligence had revealed that the Iraqi Air Force had been 
making provocative attempt[s] to `trap' individual aircraft. For 
example, an individual coalition plane might run across a 
single Iraqi fighter violating the zone. If he pursued, the Iraqi 
would cut and fly low. Meanwhile, two or three other Iraqi 
fighters would be waiting at a much higher altitude to trap and 
shoot down the Coalition plane. It appeared that a 
confrontation was looming, with their attempts to trap and the 
sudden activity with their air defence system. The latter was 
also dangerous, because their integrated system allowed them 
to lock the target with one radar, and pass the information to 
the others. This meant that it only took a second of lock for 
them to be able to fire on a plane ... Their next step would have been to* shoot down one of our aircraft in the 'Box' or a 
successful use of the 'MiG trap', which was the enticement to 
fight with others waiting. The provocations did not come so 
much from the air defence sites, but the intent was to prevent 
their use in support of the provocative use of aircraft. 1° 
The JTF-SWA came to realise that the Iraqi air force was capable of 
sophisticated tactics that required the co-ordination of both air defence 
assets and aircraft. 11 It was more concerned about the Iraqi air force than 
the air defence assets as the former were more mobile and less predictable. 
What was Iraq trying to achieve? There appeared to be three 
interdependent objectives. By creating situations where casualties could be 
inflicted on coalition forces or UN forces along the Iraqi-Kuwaiti frontier, the 
Iraqi government sought to force a withdrawal or curtailment of the activities 
of such forces. By harassing UNSCOM and UNIKOM, the Iraqi government 
8 CIS S201-9_ p. 48. 
9 M. Gordon, `Iraq Is Reported to Move Missiles Into Areas Patrolled by U. S. Jets', N, 5 January 
1993. 
10 Hoar interview, pp. 2-3 and 3-4. 
11 White, p. 25. 
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sought to compel the coalition to use force, therefore, placing coalition forces 
at risk. 
The US, in concert with its coalition partners and the Russian 
Federation, initially tried to defuse the situation with an ultimatum. All four 
governments demanded that the SAMs be removed from the SNFZ: 
... the Perm Four -- that is, France, Russia, the United 
Kingdom and the United States -- delivered the warning 
yesterday afternoon [6 January 1993] to Nizar Hamdoon, the 
Iraqi Permanent Representative to the United Nations. After 
that, the message was also given to the head of the Iraqi 
Interests Section here in Washington 
... 
It was a clear 
warning that told them to stop violating the "no-fly" zone. It 
asked them for specific actions, and it asked them to comply 
right away ... "Remove the missiles beyond the 32nd Parallel" 12 
This gave the Iraqis 48 hours to move the missiles out of the SNFZ. This 
meant that by 2230 GMT on 8 January, the missiles had to be back in 
central Iraq. 13 The coalition threatened to use force if Iraq failed to comply 
with the demarche. 
The Iraqi government argued its sovereignty was at stake. Nizar 
Hamdoon stated: `Iraq does not recognise the no-fly zone because it is not a 
U. N. job. It was imposed by three Western powers and, based on that, Iraq 
reserves its right to move whatever it wants at the time it deems necessary. '14 
He argued that Iraqi sovereignty could not be compromised without Iraqi 
consent; this was an argument consistent with paragraph three of SCR 688 
and the 1991 MoU on humanitarian relief in Iraq. 15 However, Iraqi actions 
and its government's refusal to cooperate with UNSCOM suggested that it 
12 DoS DPB, 7 January 1993, p. 12. 
13 M. Gordon, 'Iraq Is Reported to Move Missiles Into Areas Patrolled by U. S. Jets', hDM 5 January 
1993. 
141lamdoon cited in 'US Press Release: Iraq Ignores Allied Warning, 7 January 1993', in Weller, Ed., p. 
735. 
15 See p. 161 above. 
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would not comply with UN resolutions, including the aforementioned MoU. 16 
This weakened the Iraqi argument about sovereignty. 
The coalition had two aims during the January 1993 crisis. First, it 
wanted to secure Iraqi compliance with SCR 687 and all of its programs. 
Marlin Fitzwater, the White House spokesperson, stated after the Umm Qasr 
incident that: 
This episode should make clear to Iraq that interference with 
U. N. and coalition operations, including humanitarian relief 
operations, Operation Provide Comfort, United Nations 
Special Commission (UNSCOM) and International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections of Iraq's weapons of mass 
destruction, and the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer 
Mission (UNIKOM) force on the Iraq-Kuwait border, will 
not be tolerated. In this regard, we fully support the U. N. 
Security Council presidential statement of January 6 that 
demanded that Iraq comply with its obligations. We 
underscore the Security Council's warning of serious 
consequences if Iraq fails to do so. 17 
If Iraq was successfully coerced into compliance with SCR 687 and its 
antecedents by the coalition, the worrisome threat to regional stability posed 
by Iraq would be reduced. 
Second, the coalition wanted to reduce the possibility of casualties 
stemming from Iraqi resistance over both NFZs. The demarche obtained the 
desired concession in word but not in spirit. After the missiles were moved 
from the SNFZ, some SAM batteries appeared in the NNFZ. 18 The 
American government saw this as a renewed attempt at provocation. In a 12 
January television interview, Marlin Fitzwater remarked that: 
16 Graham-Brown, pp. 298 and 309. 
17 `Iraq Apparently Accedes to Coalition's No-Fly Demands', White house Press Release, (henceforth 
M= 12 January 1993, p. 1. 
18 M. Gordon, `Iraq Is Said to Shift Missiles Into Excluded Zone in North', NIr, 12 January 1993, and 
D. Usborne and C. Richards, Border raids by Iraq fuel anger in US', Inýcndcnt, 12 January 1993. 
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We're very concerned about this third incident because it 
continues the pattern of cheating on the U. N. resolutions that 
we've been seeing over the last several weeks. Saddam has 
obviously picked up this activity in the last many [sic] days. 
He's tried to get around the resolutions in any number of 
ways. So the U. N. condemnation last night really put the 
world community on record as saying this is not acceptable 
and we're now in a position of watching to see how he may 
proceed from here. It is a matter of extreme concern. 19 
If a threat to the planes enforcing the NFZs existed, then the coalition was 
less able to control the skies with impunity. The coalition's ability to 
monitor the situation would be jeopardised. In a Department of State press 
briefing, it was stated that: - 
There's a threat to U. S. forces and to allied forces as long as 
Iraq maintains its aggressive posture down there. I mean, they 
have repeatedly violated the "no-fly" zone. They've 
augmented their surface-to-air assets, their missiles, in the 
"no-fly" zone. Those actions or violations are covered with -- 
coupled with -- other actions that suggest an aggressive intent. 
That circumstance has made it necessary for the coalition to 
take measures to ensure the safety of its aircrews, and to 
discourage further Iraqi attempts to evade the "no-fly" regime 
in both the north and the south. Until Iraq changes its 
attitude basically, that sort of aggressive posture and intent will 
not have dissipated. 20 
The aim of any use of force was to prevent coalition casualties and 
demonstrate the American and coalition preparedness to use force. 
Constraints 
The political context was derived from the policy positions and 
reactions to the use of force in a number of key states. The list included those 
states that played host to coalition forces (Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and 
Turkey), the members of the coalition, and the UNSC. International law was 
another constraint. The military constraints that limited the options for action 
19 DoS DPB, 12 January 1993, p. 9. 
20 DoS DPB, 7 January 1993, p. 15. 
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included intelligence, the availability and limitations of the coalition's in- 
theatre assets. 
The coalition enjoyed the support of the Gulf States at the outset of 
the crisis, and this was largely due to the attempt to find non-violent solutions 
before the use of force. Saudi papers contained criticism of Saddam Hussein's 
regime and its disregard for the UN 21 Naturally, the Kuwaiti government was 
the most supportive, as it perceived a direct threat from the Iraqi actions with 
regard to the DMZ22 Both the Saudi and Kuwaiti media showed more 
concern over the border violations than other issues. 
All the coalition members agreed that force was to be employed as a 
last resort. While still the President-Elect, Bill Clinton strongly supported the 
Bush Administration's approach to the crisis23 This endorsement prevented 
the use of force from becoming a domestic political issue, potentially' affecting 
the decision of when and how force should be employed. The British 
government also saw the Iraqi actions as threatening and defiant, and was 
prepared to use force if required. 24 The French government showed itself to 
be like-minded. A French communique dated 14 January 1993 stated that: 
`The refusal of Iraq, in spite of the warnings, to comply with our demands has 
brought the allies to intervene. '25 While the coalition felt the need to deal 
harshly with Iraq, it hoped that this would be unnecessary. 
Most UNSC members, including the Russian Federation, found the 
coalition's initial approach acceptable. The Russian government shared the 
view that Iraq's actions posed a problem. Its Foreign Ministry stated that: 
21 `Press Views Iraqi Violations on Border', 12 January 1993, FBIS-NES-93-007. 
22 S. Bhatia, 'Saddam's bulldozers flatten UN', Observe 
, 
17 January 1993, and 'Kuwait Puts Air Force 
On Alert', jam, 8 January 1993. 
23 'US Press Release: Iraq Warned to Stop Ilarassment of U. N. Operations, 28 December 1992, in 
Weller, Ed., p. 733. 
24 'Interview with Malcolm Rifkind, UK Secretary of State for Defence, BBC Radio 4, on 8 January 1993', 
in Weller, Ed., p. 735. 
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`Russia had repeatedly, i. a. [sic] through her Embassy in Baghdad, urged the 
Iraqi side to display wisdom and readiness to cooperate with the UN Security 
Council, to refrain from steps leading to escalation of tension in the region. '26 
Iraq's actions in the DMZ and its lack of co-operation aroused the ire of the 
Council. 27 The Council wanted the crisis and the tensions to end quickly, 
thus ensuring support for the demarche. This widespread consensus about 
the use of force as a last resort encompassed the view that any use of force 
should not be disproportionate and acted as a powerful restraint on the 
coalition. 
There were three legal issues during this crisis. First, the question of 
Iraq's right to enforce its sovereignty by challenging the forces over the NFZs 
led to the possibility that force might be used in addition to the erosion of 
Iraqi sovereignty. The international community seemed to feel that the 
situation warranted both. Second, Iraq's actions with regard to UNSCOM 
and the DMZ were clear violations of SCR 687. By refusing to move the 
police posts, the Iraqi government tried to influence UNIKBDC's 
demarcation of the land boundary. The seizure of the Silkworm missiles and 
the pre-fabricated buildings at the former naval base in Umm Qasr by Iraqi 
nationals were a violation of the sanctions and the arms embargo. Last, the 
refusal to allow UNSCOM's overflights was a breach of SCR 687? 8 
Violations were punishable by force. However, it is at least arguable that by a 
quirk of the wording of the relevant resolutions, aircraft that flew over Iraq 
25 Tress statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France, 14 January 1993', in Weller, F. d., 
p. 744. 
26 `Press Release: Statement by the Russian Foreign Ministry, 14 January 1993', in Weller, Ed., p. 745. 
27 `Statement by the President of the Security Council concerning United Nations flights into Iraqi 
territory', S/25081 (8 January 1993), 11N, pp. 512-513, and 'Statement by the President of the Security 




28 For a list of the agreements, see: 'Report of the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM transmitting an 
account of the Commission's operations in connection with the events since Iraq first informed the 
Commission that the Commission would not be allowed to use its aircraft to transport personnel and 
equipment into Iraq', S/25172 (29 January 1993), IN, p. 520. 
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had the positive right to engage if violations of the resolutions were manifest, 
but strictly had no right to be there until infringements had in fact occurred. 
Previous Iraqi actions had left the coalition with the sense that only its 
observable actions had any value. This meant that a premium was placed on 
the availability and accuracy of intelligence upon which to base any assessment 
of the situation. With the demarche, SAMs were the chosen targets as their 
movements were measurable 29 However, there were some practical 
difficulties posed by the inclement weather over southern Iraq that month, as 
the measurement was contingent upon the coalition's ability to detect the 
missiles. 30 In short, neither the tactical reconnaissance aircraft nor the 
satellites were able to provide the required information, thus imposing a 
limitation on the attempt at coercion. The deadline came and went without 
action. Two days later however, the American government was able to verify 
the Iraqi claim and noted that the missiles were moving out of the SNFZ. 31 
However, as Iraqi activities decreased in the SNFZ, they increased in the 
NNFZ. Thus activity in the two no-fly zones had to be considered in 
conjunction with one another. This synoptic view became the determinant of 
the coalition's actions during the crisis. 
Means and Target Sets 
With the assets already in theatre, the coalition could employ air power 
(from its bases in Saudi Arabia or from the deck of the USS Kitty Hawk) 
and/or unmanned assets. The latter meant that the use of T-LAMs, but the 
option of using air assets from `over-the-horizon' to deliver air-launched 
cruise missiles still existed. There was, however, a problem with the use of 
unmanned power. The US military initially rejected the option of an 
unmanned strike. Unmanned strikes were seen as inflexible because the range 
of target options was limited due to the time it would require to program the 
29 D. Fairhall, `Character of raid dictated by politics', x, 14 January 1993. 
30 DoS DPB, 8 January 1993, p. 3. 
31 In `White I louse Statement on Iraq, 9 January 1993', in Welcr, Ed., p. 736. 
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missile guidance computers, and their use excluded the other members of the 
coalition. 32 This was a powerful incentive to opt for a manned strike. 
Table 7: Assets in Theatre 
Location US; UK France 
Incirlik AB 38 x F-15E, F-16, F- 6x Jaguar 8x Mirage F-1 
4G 
Riyadh 2x E-3 
12 x KC-135, KC-10 
Mushayt 20 x F-117 
Taif 1 or 2x U-2 
2x JSTARS 
Dhahran 20 x F-15E, C 6x Tornado GR-1 10 x Mirage F-1 
20 x F-16 2x Victor Ix KC-135 
20 x A-10 
20 x F-4G 
6x EF-111 
Persian Gulf USS Kitty Hawk HAIS London 
(includes 70 x F/A- HMS Nottingham 









So what target sets could be used to coerce Iraq? Given the political 
limitations, the coalition was left with four basic options. It could strike Iraqi 
airfields to impede the IQAF from flying but the majority of the active IQAF 
airfields were north of the 32nd parallel. The coalition could also attack Iraqi 
army assets in southern Iraq, but the mandate for such action was 
questionable given that the raid on Umm Qasr was conducted by a `mob' as 
32 CIS S201-9, p. 66. The flexibility issue raises the question of whether or not the T-LAhis were not 
used initially in order to maintain a tool of escalation in case that air strikes failed. 
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opposed to an identifiable military organisation. This option was also closed. 
Similarly, the coalition could strike at a WMD facility, but this did not address 
the coalition's problem with the SNFZ. Attacking air defences, on the other 
hand, would demonstrate resolve and take greater steps toward force 
protection for the JTF-SWA. 
The coalition could also deploy forces to the region. In this case, the 
deployment would reinforce the Kuwaiti armed forces as well as to implicitly 
threaten the use of ground forces in support of UNIKOM. The crisis created 
a political and military opportunity for the US government. Not only would it 
show the Gulf States that the US would bring ground forces to the region 
quickly in times of crisis, but the US military could practice doing so. To that 
end, a battalion-sized task force from the U. S. Army's 1st Cavalry Division 
started to deploy on 13 January 1993.33 
Analysis 
The air strikes on 13 January 1993 were launched against four SAM 
batteries, two of which were near Basra and two were near Nasariyah, as well 
as four fixed C31 and radar sites at An Najaf, Samawah, Tallil and Al- 
Amarah. 34 The strike aircraft were supported by a massive array of aircraft 
and were flying at around 9,000 feet due to the Iraqi SAMs 35 The strikes 
were launched at night to minimise the risk of casualties. The JCS stated to 
the Senate Armed Services Committee that: 
"'Allied Warplanes Iiit Iraqi Missile Sites', jß, 14 January 1993. 
34 White, p. 23. 
35 CIS S201-9, pp. 67-68. 
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... we conducted air strikes to neutralise the air 
defence sector 
which was controlled from An Najat down to Samawah, at 
Tallil and back to Al Amarah, basically the air defence and 
control network has to run his air defence system in the 
southern no-fly zone, as well as go after these SA-3 missiles 
that were still operationally deployed .. 
3G 
The intent was to render the southern air defence sector inoperable. The 
strikes were supposed to occur on 12 January, but weather delayed it a day. 37 
Iraq's actions in the DMZ were the catalyst for action. The strikes were 
intended to be a message to the Iraqi government and a means of force 
protection. The CINC stated that: `There were two purposes to the strikes. 
One, to end the provocations by significantly reducing their capability ... 
and two, to indicate to them that we were prepared to strike them 
militarily. '38 However, the choice of the target sets suggested that force 
protection was more important than Iraqi compliance. This came with the 
unintended consequence of reducing the credibility of future threats. 
The results of the strike were not as devastating as desired. The initial 
BDA revealed the existence of a number of problems and errors linked to 
weather and technical problems 39 Of the SAM batteries, only one was 
destroyed, and the other two were ordered to disperse. 40 The results of the 
fixed targets were not much better. At Al Amarah, some radar and buildings 
were damaged, and Samawah experienced some damage to its radar, while at 
Tallil, there was some moderate damage to some buildings, and the 
36 CIS S201-9, pp. 49. For a list of participating aircraft, sec: P. Almond, 'Weather caused targeting 
problems', jam, 15 January 1993, J. Boatman and P. Beaver, 'Coalition draws new line in the sand', 
JIM, 23 January 1993, D. Fulghum, 'Allies Strike Iraq For Defying U. N. ', Aviation Weekly Science & 
Techn 1zy (henceforth /S , 18 
January 1993, G. Joffe, The Allied Attacks', MU1,2 February 
1993. 
37 Hoar, cited in Fulghum, `Allies'. 
38 1 soar Interview, p. 3. 
39 P. Almond, `Weather caused targeting problems', Imo, 15 January 1993, and D. Fulghum, `Pentagon 
Criticizes Air Strike on Iraq', AV(ST/, 25 January 1993. 
40 Boatman and Beaver. 
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communications and radar systems there were destroyed. 41 The damage was 
not seen to be sufficient, and proved to be somewhat controversial. Brent 
Scowcroft, President Bush's National Security Advisor, acknowledged that the 
strike was not as effective as was anticipated, but this was irrelevant because 
the intent of the strike was to send a message to Baghdad. 42 This message 
indicated that Iraq had a choice; it could either accept the SNFZ existed and 
coalition aircraft would be present, or it could fight a defensive counter-air 
campaign with little prospect of victory. The Iraqi government chose to 
transfer the problem elsewhere. One of the American Joint Staff noted that, 
after the 13 January strike, there was: `... a significant increase of events to the 
north. We had British, French and U. S. aircraft, and all received instances of 
AAA fire. Fortunately, none of the aircraft were hit. We also saw Saddam 
begin to deploy his aircraft and violate in a rather routine way the 36 no-fly 
zone with aircraft ... '43 Within days, the Iraqi government began to offer 
limited concessions by allowing UNSCOM to fly into Iraqi airspace if there 
were no coalition aircraft in Iraqi airspace at the same time. The UN's 
historical account stated that: 
On 16 January, Iraq offered to ensure the safety of UNSCOM 
flights, but only if they entered Iraqi airspace from Jordanian 
airspace. UNSCOM responded that it did not have the 
operational capability to re-route its flights through Jordanian 
airspace and reminded Iraq of its obligations to cooperate with 
UNSCOM. While continuing to block all UNSCOM flights, 
Iraq stated on 17 January that UNSCOM aircraft could enter 
Iraqi airspace from Bahrain if UNSCOM ensured that no 
aircraft of the coalition States flew in the no-fly zones over 
Iraq whenever UNSCOM aircraft were in Iraqi airspace. 44 
The Iraqi government was prepared to accede to the demands under SCR 
687, but were not prepared to give up the right to defend their sovereignty 
41 Ibid., Fulghum, 'Allies', and D. Fulghum, `pentagon Criticizes Air Strike on Iraq', A, 25 January 
1993. 
42 Fulghum, `Allies'. 
43 CIS S201.9, p. 49. 
44 ' pp. 86-87. 
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in its entirety. The results obtained were therefore equivocal: the Iraqi 
government offered concessions as if haggling, but these fell short of the 
coalition's expectations and came with unacceptable conditions. 
The results of the strike posed problems within the coalition. Each of 
the national contingents maintained an intelligence assessment capability, 
leading to differences in the perception of the situation. One account noted 
that the French and American assessments of the damage varied by thirty 
percent. The American assessment maintained that approximately 50% of the 
targets had been destroyed, whereas the French assessment maintained that 
80% of the targets had been destroyed. 45 This contributed to the French 
perception of the later strikes being unnecessary or disproportionate. Thus, 
the BDA was important as it determined the coalition's choices of actions 
after 13 January. 
The ambiguous results of the 13 January strike led to escalation. This 
was intended as a `message': if Iraq failed to cooperate with UNSCOM, the 
coalition would disarm Iraq by force. On 17 January 1993, three US warships 
in the Gulf, the USS Cowpens, the USS Hewitt, the USS Stump, and one in 
the Red Sea, USS Caron, launched a series of Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles 
(T-LAMs) at the Zaafaraniyah Advanced Engineering Facility, a nuclear 
factory located in suburban Baghdad. 46 A Department of State spokesman 
stated that: `... it is near Baghdad and makes the point to the people of the 
country as well as to the government that we are willing to enforce the 
resolution ... it also helps in the process of eliminating nuclear weapons in the 
sense of the destructive act itself ... '47 This target symbolised Iraq's lack of 
compliance with SCR 687. Striking such a significant target made clear 
45 M. Evans and J. Dettmcr, 'Allied planes assess damage after hits on half of Iraqi targets', Times" 15 
January 1993. 
46 R. Beeston, and M. Fletcher, 'US fires 40 cruise missiles at Baghdad nuclear weapons site', Times, 18 
January 1993, and D. Usbome and R Fisk, 'US fires missiles at Baghdad factory', j ent, 18 
January 1993. 
47 'US Press Release: Attack Shows U. S. Fully Backs U. N. Iraq Mandate, 17 January 1993', in Weller, Ed., 
p. 747. 
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coalition readiness to escalate its action beyond the no-fly zones and 
underscored its determination to see Iraq comply with the full letter of the 
UN resolutions. 
This was the Iraqi government's second choice. It could be disarmed 
forcibly or peacefully. The former would be somewhat reminiscent of 
DESERT STORM except that the coalition had improved its knowledge and 
understanding of the Iraqi WMD arsenal. Such a penalty, combined with the 
belief that UNSCOM could be deceived into unwittingly allowing a residual 
WMD capability to exist, led the Iraqi government to opt for peaceful and 
possibly limited disarmament. 
The decision to use T-LAMs as a `messenger' was based on two 
factors. One, the target was in Baghdad, an area of Iraq that was well 
defended against air attack. This made surprise important, which meant the 
use of either T-LAMs or F-1 17s. T-LAMs were selected instead of F-117s as 
was explained to the media by an American spokesperson: 'The main reason 
is that we wanted to use the missiles because it did not put U. S. personnel in 
jeopardy. It did not - we did not have to use aircraft. We did not have to 
suffer the risk of having personnel go down. '48 Two, the relative accuracy of 
T-LAMs made them a useful tool to use on facilities in built-up areas, as they 
offered the promise of minimal collateral damage. During this strike, 45 
missiles were fired, and only 37 reached the target. Six of the other missiles 
fell within the target complex, or in a nearby orchard, without hitting their 
aimpoints. Another missile's booster engine failed, and it plunged into the 
sea, and the final missile, which is thought to have been hit by flak, hit the 
Rashid hotel, where it burnt instead of detonating. 49 This was an 
embarrassment for the US, as there were civilian casualties, giving the Iraqi 
48 Ibid., p. 747. T-LAMS used a low altitude approach as opposed to a medium altitude approach used 
by the 13 January strikes. See: C. Bellamy, "`Kamikaze" missiles reduce risks', independent 18 January 
1993. 
49 SCI, S201-9, pp. 67-69. 
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government a means to gain international sympathy. -'O UNSCOM provided 
BDA by inspecting the Zaafaraniyah facility at a later date, they discovered 
that the tools used in the factory for the production of nuclear equipment 
were absolutely destroyed 51 The strike suggested that there was a forceful 
means of removing Iraq's WMDs. 
The coalition sent another package of aircraft on 18 January to finish 
off the targets that had not been destroyed or sufficiently damaged by the first 
strike. 52 This time, the weather was more forgiving, and the strike was 
conducted by daylight to maximise their ability to acquire the targets 53 This 
showed that the air defence threat had been sufficiently reduced so as to 
warrant the risk of a daylight attack. Further damage to the sector was merely 
a means of reinforcing the message. 
The diplomatic reactions to the strikes were mixed. The reactions of 
the regional allies were inherently tied to their own perceptions of the Iraqi 
threat, which explains the unequivocal support from the Turkish and Kuwaiti 
governments, and the less enthusiastic support from the others. The UNSC 
and even the UN Secretariat were consistent in their support for the actions, 
but there was also a growing concern about the possible increase in tension in 
the Middle East as a whole. Within the coalition, there remained lurking the 
potentially serious issue of disagreement about the force of the application of 
the relevant UN resolutions. The French government maintained the view 
that the resolutions did not diminish Iraqi sovereignty beyond the strict terms 
of their application. The American and British government, on the other 
hand, took a much wider view, interpreting the focus of the resolutions to be 
50 R. Beeston, 'Foreigners' hotel damage in raid', Timcs, 18 January 1993, and J. Whittington, 'Conflict 
With Iraq: Damage goes on display in Baghdad', x, 19 January 1993. 
51 'Status on Iraq', CIS 11380-15,22 March 1993, p. 1. 
52 For details, see: R. Beeston, `Daylight raids destroy radar centres', ßs, 19 January 1993j. Boatman 
and P. Beaver, `Coalition draws new line in the sand', ID-W, 23 January 1993, M. Gordon, 'Raids in 2 
Regions', h=, 19 January 1993, and `Statement in the I louse of Commons by the UK Secretary of 
State for Defence, 18 January 1993', in Weller, Ed., p. 748. See above, p. 118. 
53 CIS S201-9_ pp. 69-70. 
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the larger issue of Iraq's position vis-a-vis the Middle East as a whole and 
consequently offered much wider authorities. 
The political reactions of the regional allies were determined by the 
degree to which they perceived a threat emanating from Iraq. Examples of 
this were provided by the Turkish and Kuwaiti governments. The Kuwaiti 
government, as in every other crisis, was co-operative throughout, as anything 
that weakened Iraq was seen as naturally strengthening Kuwait's security. The 
Turkish government did not necessarily share this narrow view of its security 
with regard to Iraq. Given its perception of PROVIDE COMFORT II, 
where the operation was the means of preventing further incursions by 
Kurdish refugees, threats to the existence of the NNFZ guaranteed that the 
Turkish government would support offensive operations against Iraq. 54 The 
Saudi Arabian press supported the idea of striking at Saddam Hussein's 
regime, arguing that UN SCRs had to be respected, whether pertaining to the 
Gulf, Israel or Bosnia 55 This was the only time in the history of 
SOUTHERN WATCH that the Saudi government allowed force to be used 
from their bases 56 
Other states were concerned that further uses of force would bring an 
unwelcome increase in tensions in the Middle East. The Chinese 
government's position was the best example. It stated: We do not wish to see 
further deterioration of situation in the Gulf region. Our consistent position 
is to peacefully settle international disputes. '57 This acted as a powerful 
incentive to ensure that future attempts at coercion would be gradual and 
proportionate. Such strategies seek to use the minimum level of force 
54 See: `Demirel Discusses Iraq, Incirlik', 19 January 1993, FBIS-WEU-93-011, and 'Foreign Ministry 
Issues Statement', 17 January 1993, FBIS-WEU-93-011. 
ss See: `Councils Stresses Respect for All UN Resolutions', 19 January 1993, MIS-NES-93-010, 'Papers 
Call For Overthrow of Iraq's Saddam', 19 January 1993, FBIS-NFS-93-010, and Tapers Support Air 
Strike Against Iraq, 19 January 1993, FBIS-NES-93-010. 
56 White, p. 26. 
57 `Reply by Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman, 18 January 1993', in Weller, Ed., p. 749. 
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possible and escalate only when it is clear that a greater degree of force is 
required. This has the advantage of keeping tensions lower than with other 
strategies of coercion. 
The British and French governments initially criticised the strike on 
Zaafaraniyah. Such statements were intended to distance the two 
governments from the strike and appease the Middle East. Both were quick 
to note that only the US had T-LAMs, the means of striking Zaafaraniyah. 58 
Soon after, the French government implied that it was opposed only to the T- 
LAM strikes because it believed that the strikes lacked UNSC authorisation. 59 
The French reaction to the strikes was irrevocably tied to, the legal 
issues that surrounded both the T-LAM and air strikes of 18 January. In their 
interpretation, SCR 687 defined the existence of a cease-fire, and in the 
absence of a provocation, striking Zaafaraniyah was illegal. The other raids, 
the French government claimed, were justified under the terms of SCR 688 
and the implied right to self-defence of coalition patrols over the SNFZ. 60 
The UN Secretary General, Boaters Boaters-Ghali, and the UNSC 
believed that the 13 January series of strikes fell under the aegis of SCR 687 
because their aim was to modify Iraqi behaviour to obtain compliance with 
the resolution 6' The US government argued that the strikes were justified 
under an even earlier resolution. The State Department claimed that: 
58 Doorstep Interview with the UK Prime Minister, Wednesday, 20 January 1993', in Weller, Ed., p. 751, 
'Point de Rrsse du ministre d1 tat, minu#r des Affair drangens, AL Roland Dumas, d IYssue de son audition de ant 
Teter rt la Commission des Affairrs Etrangena de ! 'AcrrmGlee nationale', La Polltigti tra Prr de la France: 
Documents, January-February 1993, pp. 45-46. 
59 'Official Declaration issued by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of France, 21 January 1993', in Weller, 
Ed., p. 752. 
60 Ibid., p. 752. 
61 CIS I-1380-10, p. 2, 'UN gives official backing after ceasefire violations', Guardian, 15 January 1993, and 
`Written Answers', 15 January 1993,1Iansard, 6th Series, Vol. 216, Columns 855-856 written. 
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The statement [by President Bush] determines the Iraqi 
actions -- that is, on two counts: the incursions and on the 
prohibition of flights by UNSCOM -- constitute material 
breaches of Resolution 687, which established the cease-fire 
and provided the conditions essential for the restoration of 
peace and security in the region, and it warned Iraq of the 
serious consequences that will flow from continued defiance 
of the Council ... The statement 
lays the foundation for 
action by the Council or Member states that co-operated with 
Kuwait in accordance with Resolution 678 to respond to 
violations of the sort addressed by the Council in the 
statement. The possible use of force is not excluded. 62 
Marlin Fitzwater claimed that: `The strike was designed to help ... ensure 
that Iraq never again acquires weapons of mass destruction... ', and he 
claimed that the strike was justified under the terms of SCRs 687,707 and 
715.63 This reflected the greater goal - to obtain complete compliance. 
Both the British and French governments later agreed that the 13 January 
action was justified under the terms of SCRs 678 and 687.64 This 
justification avoided the issue of Iraqi sovereignty by invoking the vaguely 
worded clauses about threats to regional peace and security. If it was the 
case that both NFZs were illegal due to a lack of `positive' authorisation, 
then the provisions for self-defence under Article 51 of the UN would apply 
to Iraq's forces only. 
There were two schools of thought on the legality of the T-LAM 
strike. One position, echoed by the French foreign minister, was based on the 
assumption that while Iraq's actions were undesirable, they did not necessarily 
constitute a breach of SCR 687. The American government, however, 
believed that Iraq's actions were a breach, and remained so until Iraq began to 
comply. The British Foreign Secretary, Malcolm Rifldnd, sustained the 
argument in his statement before the House of Commons on 18 January 1993 
62 DoS DPB, 12 January1993, p. 10. This was due to threats to the forces of the JTT-SWA. 
63 'US Press Release: Attack Shows U. S. Fully Backs U. N. Iraq Mandate, 17 January 1993', in Weller, Ed., 
p. 746. 
64 `Press statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France, 14 January 1993', and 'Statement 
by the UK Secretary of State for Defence, 13 January 1993', in Wcller, Ed., pp. 738 and 744. 
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that the French argument was weak at best, as the American position had 
been validated by warnings given to Iraq by the UNSC. Referring to the use 
of T-LAMs, he stated: 'This action was taken to ensure that Iraq complies 
with its mandatory obligations under UNSCR 687 and related resolutions. 
Iraq has committed a number of material breaches of UNSCR 687 and 
wilfully ignored the warnings given by the Security Council and the US, UK, 
France and Russia on 11 and 14 January respectively. '65 Such warnings were 
intended to notify the Iraqi government that it remained in breach of SCR 687 
until it complied. At the same time, they were also intended to signal the 
coalition's readiness to listen to Iraqi offer of concessions. This weakened the 
French legal argument, and it can be inferred that the subsequent French 
statements were for political purposes. 
What concessions were made by the Iraqi government and why? 
Naturally, it sought to give as little as possible, and its concessions came in a 
series of limited offers. The concessions offered were very specific, and 
reflected a desire not to allow any further deterioration of the Iraqi military 
machine. On 17 January 1993, the Iraqi government announced that the 
police posts in the DMZ would be withdrawn. Within two days, the forts were 
gone 66 The second concession may not necessarily have been prompted by 
the strikes. The Iraqi government declared a unilateral cease-fire on 20 
January in order to allow the incoming Clinton Administration to assess the 
situation and create a `constructive dialogue'. 67 The Iraqi overture was based 
on the widespread perception of the incoming Administration. Tim Trevan 
noted that: 
65 `Statement in the I louse of Commons by the UK Secretary of State for Defence, 18 January 1993', in 
Weller, Ed., p. 748. 
66 `Addendum (S/25085/Add. 1,19 January 1993), jjbj, p. 515, and 'Security Council. resolution 
concerning the work of the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission', S/RCS/773 (1992), 26 
August 1992,1&j,, p. 473. 
67 'Statement issued by the Revolution Command Council of the Republic of Iraq, 19 January 1993', in 
Weller, Ed., pp. 750-751. The incoming Administration rejected it outright. See: DoS DPI;, 21 
January 1993, p. 9. 
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Soon after his election in November 1992 to the US 
Presidency, Bill Clinton was asked what he thought of Saddam 
Hussein ... In particular, Clinton said that, as a southern 
Baptist, he believed in deathbed conversions: he hoped he 
could reason with Saddam Hussein. Those of us with first- 
hand experience of Saddam's regime knew that this would be 
misinterpreted. It would not be taken as the philosophical 
musings of a new President wishing to be loved by everyone, 
but rather as a sign of weakness to be exploited. 68 
President Clinton's initial conciliatory approach offered Iraq at least the 
possibility of complying with UN resolutions with minimal loss of face. 
That they did not seize this opportunity had two effects, both of them 
unfortunate. It cast doubt upon the approach that conciliation was the best 
way forward for the new administration and thus closed it off as a viable 
policy option. Second, the lost opportunity directly paved the way toward 
the `Dual Containment' policy adopted by President Clinton's 
administration later in 1993. 
The NFZs remained tranquil until 22 January, when there was a brief 
series of incidents involving SAMs and illumination, but after that, both 
became dormant 69 The DMZ also became tranquil. 70 With regard to 
UNSCOM, it must be noted that the Iraqi government offered very specific 
concessions. On 19 January, it removed its objections to allowing 
UNSCOM's transit over Iraqi airspace. 7' That was the limit. It failed to 
accept the plans as mandated by SCR 715, and continued to complain about 
the overflights by U-2s in support of UNSCOM. 72 The use of force 
convinced the Iraqi government to comply at least partially to SCR 687 and its 
antecedents and to stop resisting (at least actively) the SNFZ enforcement. 
68 Trevan, Secrets, p. 203. 
69 CIS S201.9, p. 51. 
70 'Report of the Secretary-General on UNIKOM for the period from 1 October 1992 to 31 March 
1993', S/25514,2 April 1993,11hj, p. 529. 
71 UýJ, p. 86. 
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January 1993 represented the first real attempt at the coercion of Iraq. 
The Iraqi government was presented with two choices. It could cooperate 
with UNSCOM (and possibly reduce the damage through deception) or be 
forcibly disarmed as was demonstrated by the 17 January missile strikes. It 
could either tolerate the SNFZ or have to fight for the control of its airspace 
as its air defences and assets were subjected to attrition by the forces of the 
JTF-SWA. None of the choices could be described as particularly attractive 
from the Iraqi point of view, as the choice represented disarmament and a loss 
of sovereignty with or without violence. 
The state of communications between the coalition and Iraq was fair 
at best. It appears that the Iraqi government did not believe the original 
ultimatum was anything either than a bargaining position, and offered limited 
concessions in a form of haggling. The coalition, on the other hand, issued 
definite ultimatums and applied force when compliance was not forthcoming. 
The Iraqi reaction was to make placating statements while shifting the conflict 
to other venues (i. e. to UNIKOM or the NNFZ). It was not until the missile 
strike against the Zaafaraniyah nuclear facility that the Iraqi government 
capitulated and accepted that a provocative approach was not going to bear 
fruit. 
The coalition's actions, particularly the missile strike, somewhat 
increased the coalition's credibility in terms of its threats. While the coalition 
demonstrated that it could and would attack Iraq in order to match threats 
with actions, it demonstrated a definite desire to protect its forces. The use of 
manned air implies the acceptance of risk by the coercer, but that the 
suppression of enemy air defences implies a concern over casualties. This 
suggested that an Iraqi casualty-causing strategy would pay off eventually. 
72 Third report of the Secretary-General on the status of the implementation of the plan for the ongoing 
monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with relevant parts of section C of the Security 
Council resolution 687 (1991)', S/25620,19 April 1993, IM, pp. 531-535. 
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Iraq's willpower was not easily eroded during this operation. The 
timing of the operation (jjust days before the inauguration of President 
Clinton) was one reason, but the dispute between the French and American 
governments presented an image of disunity. This offered the Iraqi 
government some hope. However, this eroded significantly with the prospect 
of forcible disarmament and its isolation. This isolation led to Iraq's speedy 
indication of its willingness to negotiate. The Iraqi government also learned 
that the coalition was capable of striking targets in suburban Baghdad and was 
prepared to fight for control of the SNFZ. The coalition's choice of target 
sets was a reaction to Iraq's provocations, and while the coalition derived 
some benefit from attacking Iraqi air defences, it is possible that the Iraqi 
government was able to justify its actions in terms of an ongoing conflict. 
The nuclear facility was a significant target for two reasons: it was a WMD 
facility in Baghdad. This created a great deal of pain. The loss of the facility 
by force was a far worse option than the presence of inspectors. 
This was a case where threat-based coercion failed and force-based 
coercion eventually succeeded. The original ultimatum did not bring about 
anything but the removal of the SAMs from the SNFZ, but even this was 
limited as additional missiles were moved into the NNFZ. The coalition 
escalated by striking air defence assets in the SNFZ on 13 January, and this 
failed to cause the Iraqi government to offer concessions. The coalition 
escalated by attacking the Zaafaraniyah facility, and this escalated use of force 
led to immediate concessions. The incremental approach eventually led to 
meaningful results. 
Conclusion 
The coalition proceeded on a worst case scenario. Their policy base 
rested on a number of linked pillars held together by the nexus of UNSCRs. 
First, Kuwait had to be secure. Second, Iraq had to comply in full with the 
resolutions. Third, Iraq was not to be subjected to such military depredation 
that the security of the Middle East region was put at untenable risk. This led 
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to an incremental approach to the problem, but given the overarching policy 
umbrella it was an approach in which one step could be followed closely by 
others as the situation demanded. 
The incremental approach was also important for a number of other 
reasons. First, measured rather than all out response was, at least arguably, 
consonant with the wording of the UNSCRs in effect. It followed that 
dissenting views, for example by the French government, but also in more 
veiled terms by the Russian and the Chinese governments, could be dealt with 
within an existing diplomatic framework. Second, an incremental approach 
was consonant with public opinion, particularly within the United States. The 
major phases of the Gulf War had been accomplished without major coalition 
casualties. That set a parameter for other tranches of action. Third, 
incremental action minimised risks associated with imperfect understanding of 
Iraqi action. Fourth, incremental action offered the limitation of action to 
military targets with minimal risk of collateral damage and civilian casualties - 
a consequence that would have been hard for the coalition in public relations 
terms. 
Thus was the scenario set within the coalition for a process of 
escalating action according to result and response. The lessons learned were 
that incremental response is effective, but that a first level response might be 
insufficient. The new Clinton Administration learned that dialogue was 
insufficient when military action has already been advanced by the opposing 
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CHAPTER 9: VIGILANT WARRIOR 
The Iraqi government deployed elements of the RGFC in southern 
Iraq in October 1994. It is not completely clear what the Iraqi government 
was trying to do, but the deployment coincided with a sudden burst of hostile 
rhetoric demanding a lifting of sanctions. The coalition believed that Iraq 
sought to invade Kuwait again, and responded by sending additional ground 
and air forces to the Persian Gulf in Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR in 
order to demonstrate its resolve. There were additional political 
complications, such as the dispute that developed between Clinton 
Administration and key figures in the French government, and the , 
Russian 
government's attempt to influence the eventual outcome of the crisis. By 
November 1994, this led to the Iraqi government's recognition of Kuwait. 
VIGILANT WARRIOR was a strategic success despite the fact that it may 
not be possible to deem it a successful attempt at deterrence. 
Chronology 
5 October 1994 JTF-SWA aircraft detected the 
deployment of elements of the RGFC to 
southern Iraq. 
8 October 1994 The President authorised the 
deployment of forces to the Persian 
Gulf region. 
9 October 1994 Iraqi forces north of the DMZ 
established logistical bases. 
10 October 1994 The Iraqi government ordered its forces 
to withdraw from southern Iraq. 
12 October 1994 Talks between the Russian and Iraqi 
governments began. The Iraqi 
government announced it had 
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completed the withdrawal from 
southern Iraq. The `Ground Exclusion 
Zone' plan was suggested by the US 
Secretary of Defense, William Perry. 
15 October 1994 The UNSC passed SCR 949, demanding 
that Iraq not deploy any further forces 
to southern Iraq. 
7 November 1994 The coalition began to withdraw its 
reinforcements from the region. 
10 November 1994 The Iraqi government announced that it 
would recognise Kuwait. 
Catalyst/Cause for Coercion 
The crisis was caused by the Iraqi government's adoption of 
aggressive tactics in October 1994. During 1993 and 1994, the Iraqi 
government had been more co-operative with the UN and UNSCOM, but in 
the autumn of 1994, its behaviour changed significantly. The American 
government saw this as the prelude to another invasion of Kuwait. 
From February 1993 through to September 1994, the Iraqi 
government had been somewhat co-operative and the UN became optimistic 
about the situation. The Secretary-General reported in early October 1994 
that significant progress had been made over the summer, and that there was 
reason to be optimistic about the future. 1 The situation was sufficiently stable 
that the Clinton Administration, with some prompting from the Saudi 
government, sought to reduce the size of its commitment to the JTF-SWA. 2 
Such optimism was misplaced, as the Iraqi economy was in awful shape 
because the annual inflation rate was 1000%, the Iraqi dinar was nearly 
I See: 'Sixth report of the Secretary-General on the status of the implementation of the plan for the 
ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with relevant parts of section C of Security 
Council resolution 687 (1991)', S/1994/1138 (7 October 1994), IN, pp. 665-684. 
2 Platte interview, pp. 1 and 3. 
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valueless and rations had been cut by at least one third .3 
The Iraqi 
government stated only days later that it would not cooperate or even deal 
with the UN unless economic sanctions were lifted. 4 The Iraqi government 
apparently believed that if it brought pressure to bear, the UN would give in. 
There were precedents supporting this belief, such as the UN's inaction in 
Rwanda, as well as affairs in Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In early 
October, the tone of Iraqi radio broadcasts changed. In a letter to the UNSC, 
the Kuwaiti government complained that an Iraqi News Agency radio 
broadcast issued veiled threats towards Kuwait, where it was stated that: 
... the leadership in Iraq, in accordance with its constitutional 
and moral responsibilities, has no option but to prepare a new 
position that will - straighten out matters and free the Iraqi 
people of the ordeal that has been imposed on them ... we 
will wait until 10 October 1994, and then everyone will bear 
responsibility for their own position ... 
Elements of the RGFC moved into southern Iraq soon after. To the 
coalition, this appeared to be eerily similar to Iraq's behaviour in late July of 
1990. 
While the coalition could draw analogies to the prelude to the August 
1990 invasion of Iraq, its members were better prepared. First, the JTF- 
SWA's reconnaissance flights in the SNFZ revealed that some of the 
Republican Guard units deployed north of Baghdad were moving south. The 
presence of the JTF-SWA enabled the detection of major Iraqi military 
deployments. There were elements of the `Hammurab? and the `Al Nidd 
RGFC divisions deployed in or moving to southern Iraq. Another division, 
3 White, p. 30. 
4 See: B. Crossette, 'Iragi Denounces Sanctions', N, 8 October 1994, and `Iraq says no, guardian, 5 
October 1994. 
s `Leadership Sets 10 Oct Deadline on Sanctions', 113IS-NES 94-194,6 October 1994, p. 12, and 'Letter 
dated 6 October 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Kuwait to the UN addressed to the 
President of the Security Council', S/1994/1137 (6 October 1994), pp. 1 and 3. 
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the `Adnan', appeared to be deploying in depth 6 On 5 October, RAF GR-1 
Tornados reported trains off-loading the equipment of the three RGFC 
divisions at a railyard only a few kilometres west of Basra.? This was sufficient 
to have the DoD direct more intelligence resources and assets in order to 
develop a better picture of the situation on 6 October 1994.8 This led 
eventually to the fastest deployment of land forces over the greatest distance 
in military history. 
Constraints 
The implied aggression inherent in Iraq's actions guaranteed a 
substantial degree of support for the coalition to use force. The coalition's 
members all agreed that action was necessary, and so did the GCC states. 
However, given the forces in theatre and the perceived nature of the threat, it 
was impossible to act without reinforcements. Previously optimistic about 
Iraq's progress, the UN recoiled with horror at the Iraqi provocations. 
The American government quickly drew a link between the Iraqi 
statements and troop movement, and condemned both. For example, the 
White House Spokesman, Mike McCurry, commented that: 
Iraq's threats to cease co-operation with the U. N. Special 
Commission (UNSCOM), and hints of use of force in the 
event sanctions against Iraq are not promptly lifted, 
underscore the importance of the Security Councils being 
assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions before considering to lift 
the sanctions regime. To achieve the lifting of sanctions, Iraq 
must comply fully with all U. N. Security Council resolutions. 
Confrontational tactics will prove no more successful now 
than in the past .9 
6 M. Gordon, `Pentagon Moving A Force of 4,000 to Guard Kuwait', NJ, 9 October 1994, and M. 
Gordon, 'U. S. Sends Force As Iraqi Soldiers Threaten Kuwait', NY L8 October 1994. 
7 D. Fulghum, 'Iragi Invasion Threat Reassessed By Military', AM, 14 November 1994. 
s DoD Backrund Briefing, 20 October 1994, p. 1. 
9 M. McCurry, `U. S. Warns Iraq About Troop Movements', White I louse Press Statement, 7 October 
1994, p. 1. 
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President Clinton reiterated that: `If Iraq really is trying to say in some 
insistent way that what they want is relief from the U. N. sanctions, there 
is a 
clear way for them to achieve that relief -- simply comply with the United 
Nations resolutions. '1° It was unthinkable that Iraq could be allowed to 
behave with impunity in such a belligerent manner. 
The British government shared the aforementioned view of the 
situation. In London, the Secretary of State for Defence, Malcolm Rifkind, 
and the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Douglas 
Hurd, held a press conference in which they stated: We view with concern the 
troop movements in southern Iraq and the recent hostile statements by Iraq. 
If Iraq believes that its threatening behaviour will achieve anything, then it is 
making a serious error of judgement. '11 To reinforce the implied threat, the 
British government began to deploy additional forces to the Persian Gulf. As 
an initial step, they sent 45 Commando, Royal Marines, and six additional 
Tornado' aircraft to Kuwait. 12 
The French government reacted more strongly than usual. It 
expressed its concern and deployed Georges Leygues to the Gulf. 13 French 
forces in the region at the time amounted to six Mirage 2000C on Operation 
SOUTHERN WATCH, five jaguars on Operation PROVIDE COMFORT 
II and two ships in Oman. The only French ground forces in the region were 
4,000 troops in Djibouti. 14 While not necessarily a great addition to the array 
of US forces in the region, it was an important gesture that reflected a useful 
degree of coalition solidarity in the face of a potential threat. 
10 `Press Conference by the President', Wl IPIL 7 Oktober 1994, p. 5. 
» Statement cited in M. Nicholson and G. Graham, 'Clinton sends in warships to warn Iraq off Kuwait', 
IM 8 October 1994. 
*2 'Statement on Iraq', Foreign and Commonwealth Arms Control and Disarmament Quarterly Review, 
No. 35 (October 1994), p. 23. 
13 'Irak-Kowert-Commaniqui du minion der Affaina itrangeres 8 Odober 1994, p. 196, and IrakKoweit- 
Commnniqui da minrün des Affairs itrangerr1,9 October 1994, p. 201, La Po/iligue Etraagerr de L E=, 
September-October 1994. 
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Table 8: Forces in Theatre 5 October 1994 
Air Forces 




29 Support Aircraft 
United 
gYingdom 
6 GR-1 Tornados 
1 Tanker 
France 
6 Mirage 2000, F-1 
Land Forces 15th Marine NIL NIL 
Expeditionary Unit 
Task Force 4th 
Battalion, 7th Air 
Defense Artillery 
(TF 4-7 ADA) 
Naval Forces USS Leyte Gulf Armilla Patrol: NIL 
(includes marines at USS Hewitt HILLS Cornwall 
sea) USS Rodney M HMS Cardiff 
Davis AUX Brambleleaf 
USS Reid 








USS Fort McHenry 
USS Rushmore 
The UNSC became concerned about the RGFC's presence in 
southern Iraq. It condemned the deployment and asked the Secretary-General 
to ensure that: `... the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission 
(UNIKOM) redoubles its vigilance and reports immediately any violation of 
the demilitarised zone .. '15 At the time, this was the extent of 
its possible 
14 D. Buchan, `France offers gulf forces, but without enthusiasm', IM 12 October 1994, and J. ]snarl, 
` 4gme de fare en Irak', A lo 12 October 1994. 
ýS 'Statement by the President of the Security Council concerning cooperation by Iraq with UNSCOM 
and reports of movements by Iraqi troops', S/PRST/1994/58 (8 October 1994), I. ., p. 
685. 
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actions. Without actual fighting, the UNSC could do little but observe and 
issue statements. 
There was little support for Iraq's stances as the deployment was seen 
as a threat to regional stability. Despite the fact that deployment of Iraqi 
forces north of the DMZ was not a breach of SCR 687,. the UNSC was 
unusually supportive of the coalition. The Russian and French governments 
quickly abandoned their calls for a lifting of sanctions. 16 Such leniency 
seemed futile with the RGFC seemingly prepared to invade. 
On 8 October, the American government was quite concerned about 
what it considered Iraqi preparations for the invasion of Kuwait. The real 
object of concern was the addition of over 10,000 RGFC troops from three 
divisions to the 50,000 troops that garrisoned southern Iraq. '? General John 
Shalikashvili, then the Chairman of the JCS, described his perception of the 
situation: `Our task was to deter him from moving into Kuwait or beyond, 
and if he did, to slow him down, stop him, and then push him back. That's 
the task that I saw at hand, and what you saw was the beginning of the force 
necessary to do that. '18 CINC CENTCOM, then Lieutenant-General J. H. 
Binford Peay III, U. S. Army, identified what he thought was necessary to 
achieve this goal. The list of additional force requirements included a USMC 
Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), a MEF, more aircraft, and an Army 
Corps. 19 The RGFC contained the best-trained and best-equipped formations 
in the Iraqi armed forces. CENTCOM's planners assumed that they would 
have to contend with a sizeable mechanised forced equipped with relatively 
modem tanks and artillery. 
16 See: M. Nicholson, 'Security Council takes harder line', 1,11 October 1994. 
'7 Lieutenant General J. Sheehan and Major General P. I Iughes in DoD News Briefing, 8 October 1994, 
p. 3, M. Gordon, Tentagon Moving A Force of 4,000 to Guard Kuwait', N, 9 October 1994, and 
M. Gordon, `U. S. Sends Force As Iraqi Soldiers Threaten Kuwait', ,8 
October 1994. 
Is DoD News Briefen 
_ 11 
October 1994, p. 3. 
19 DoD Back=und Briefing. 20 October 1994, p. 2. 
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Means and Target Sets 
The detection of the RGFC's deployment gave the coalition warning 
that action was potentially imminent. The coalition therefore had a choice; it 
could deal with the threat with its assets in theatre or it could reinforce them 
in order to possibly deter the Iraqi government from acting and prepare for 
the defence of Kuwait should deterrence fail. Failure to reinforce the JTF- 
SWA would have suggested that the coalition was not sufficiently interested to 
take action. 
There was a paradox at work during the crisis. An offensive air 
campaign was out of the question unless Iraqi force actually entered Kuwait, 
which meant no action could be taken until it was possibly too late. The only 
viable target set was Iraq's fielded forces, but even attacks against them were 
unjustifiable unless Iraq attacked. Political constraints reduced the coalition's 
ability to retain the initiative. 
The deployment of ground forces offered . the certainty of 
communicating coalition resolve. US Army or USMC forces brought from 
CONUS would certainly demonstrate that the coalition was willing to fight for 
Kuwait. Such a move also offered the promise of being better able to cut any 
flow of Iraqi units into Kuwait than an air campaign that reinforced Kuwaiti 
ground forces. However, this option relied on speed. CONUS-based units 
would have to board aircraft, fly to Kuwait, disembark, and move to their 
assembly areas to link up with the prepositioned equipment. If the Iraqis 
invaded prior to the deployment of land forces to tactical positions, then they 
would be able to inflict serious casualties on the coalition or prevent the 
deployment in defence of Kuwait altogether. The combination of in-theatre 
assets and deployment of forces from CONUS allowed the coalition to 
provide a clear measure of defence for Kuwait and signal the intent to fight. 
This held the possibility of deterring the Iraqi government while preparing for 
the defence of Kuwait. 
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Analysis 
On 8 October 1994, the American government took further steps to 
dissuade the Iraqis from carrying out what appeared to be an invasion of 
Kuwait by launching Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR. President Clinton 
later reported to Congress that: 
Accordingly, on October 8,1994, I ordered the immediate 
deployment of additional U. S. military forces to the Persian 
Gulf. These deployments included the USS George 
Washington Carrier Battle Group and its accompanying cruise 
missile ships, a U. S. Army Mechanised Task Force, and 
personnel to operate two additional Patriot missile batteries. 
On October 10, I further ordered the deployment of over 500 
U. S. Air Force and Marine Corps combat and supporting 
aircraft to the region 2° 
The USS George Washington carrier battle group left the Adriatic Sea and 
steamed south towards the Suez Canal. Two American warships, the USS 
Hewitt and the USS Leyte Gulf, were already there21 Within 48 hours of 
the order, the USS George Washington and its battle group sailed into the 
Red Sea from the Suez Canal. This added another 75 combat aircraft to the 
67 that flew as part of SOUTHERN WATCH? Z The Army Mechanised 
Task Force to be brought into the theatre was a brigade of the 24th 
Mechanised Division stationed at Fort Stewart, Georgia. Yet President 
Clinton's description of the initial deployment to Congress omitted some of 
the units that deployed initially, such as the 15th MEU. 
The omissions are important to note for different reasons. The ARG 
was already in theatre conducting an exercise with the forces'of the UAE. On 
207ext Of A Letter From The President To The Speaker Of The I louse Of Representatives And The 
President Pro Tempore Of The Senate', WI IPR_ 27 October 1994, p. 2. 
21 Sheehan and Hughes, p. 1, and `Forward Navy and Marine Units Respond to Gulf Threat', Nux 
News Service, 12 October 1994, p. 1. 
22 DoD Background Briefing, 20 October 1994, p. 3, M. Gordon, Pentagon Moving A Force of 4,000 to 
Guard Kuwait'; N, 9 October 1994, and Sheehan &I lughes, p. 1. 
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8 October, it promptly sailed north to the coast of Kuwait. 23 The other was 
the deployment of the 23rd Composite Air Wing of the USAF. At the time, 
this unit was on a `Red Flag' exercise at Nellis AFB, Nevada. It was 
withdrawn from the exercise and moved immediately to the theatre via its 
home base at Pope AFB, North Carolina. 24 This addition gave the CINC 
extra aircraft. The remainder of the 24th Mechanised division was also placed 
on alert along with another composite air wing and I MEF. 25 The British also 
increased their contribution to the region. HMS Cornwall was off the coast of 
Kuwait City by 9 October. 26 
Table 9: Forces in Theatre 8 October 1994 
United States United France 
Kingdom 
Air Forces 9 F-15 6 GR-1 Tornados 6 Mirage 2000, F-1 
24 F-16 1 Tanker 
29 Support Aircraft 
Land Forces NIL NIL NIL 
Naval Forces USS Leyte Gulf and Armilla Patrol Georges Leygues 
Escorts 
ARG 
1 5th T1EU 
This was only the beginning. However, the announcement of the 
initial deployments did not appear to affect the Iraqi deployment of forces in 
southern Iraq. On 8 October, Major General Pat Hughes, the Director of 
Intelligence for the Joint Staff, and Lieutenant General John Sheehan, the 
Director of Operations, claimed that: `... over the last 48 hours elements of 
two of the Republican Guard divisions have moved from positions north of 
the Baghdad area in the central part of the country down to within 20 
23 `Forward Navy and Marine Units Respond to Gulf Threat', Nay News Service. 12 October 1994, p. 
1, and Sheehan &I Jughes, p. 1. 
24 DoD Back=und Briefing, 12 October 1994, p. 4, and DoD Background Briefing, 20 October 1994, 
p. 4. 
25 Sheehan &I lughes, pp. 2-3. 
26 M. Nicholson and IL Allen, 'US warns Saddam of "horrendous" price for war', x, 10 October 1994. 
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kilometres of the Iraqi border ..: 27 The situation appeared to 
be worse on 9 
October, when the Iraqi forces began to establish logistical bases in southern 
Iraq and the number of Iraqi forces continued to limb 28 
Table 10: Forces Deploying 8 October 1994 
United States United France 
IGngdom 
Air Forces 23rd Composite Air NIL NIL 
Wing- 





Land Forces I" Brigade, 24t NIL NIL 
Mechanised 
Division 
TF 4-7 ADA 
Naval Forces USS NIL NIL 
George Washington 
USS San Jacinto 
USS Barry 
Carrier Air Wing 7 
(-75 Aircraft) 
The preparation and deployment of American forces continued on 9 
and 10 October. The Mechanised Task Force began to arrive, albeit in two 
tranches: 'The initial elements of the 1st Brigade minus that was sent to fall in 
on the equipment that was pre-positioned in Kuwait, was over there in 48 
hours after told to deploy [on 10 October 1994]. And the brigade minus had 
fallen in on its equipment and was ready for combat four days after it was told 
to deploy [on 12 October 1994]. '29 Two Patriot batteries deployed under 
similar conditions 30 In the meantime, the JTF-SWA increased the number of 
27 Sheehan &f iughes, pp. 1 and 3. 
28 Text Of A Letter From The President', p. ]. 
29 DoD Background Briefing. 20 October 1994, p. 3. 
30 Sheehan & Hughes, pp. 1-2. 
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flights over southern Iraq. Brigadier General William Guth, the commander 
of the 4404th Composite Air Wing, USAF, noted in an interview with the 
press that: `... in an effort to show presence [the coalition air forces] about 
doubled the operational tempo ... 
31 Two days later, the President ordered a 
greater force package to the Middle East. The deployment seemed to dissuade 
the Iraqis from invading Kuwait This, of course, assumes that it was their 
intent to actually invade. 
Table 11: Forces on Alert 8 October 1994 
United States United France 
Kingdom 
Air Forces 1 Composite Air NIL NIL 
Wing 
Land Forces 24th Mechanised NIL NIL 
Division 
I IMF 
Naval Forces Maritime NIL NIL 
Prepositioning 
Ships 
On 10 October 1994, the Iraqi government finally blinked. It sought 
to assure the UNSC that the RGFC would withdraw from southern Iraq. 32 
President Clinton remarked in reaction that: `Iraq announced today that it will 
pull back its troops from the Kuwait border. But we're interested in facts, not 
promises; in deeds, not words, and we have not yet seen evidence that Iraq's 
troops are, in fact, pulling back. We'll be watching very closely to see that they 
do so. '33 There was no immediate evidence of any changes in the Iraqi force 
posture. As a result of this lack of change, the President announced the 
following day that the deployment of forces would continue to ensure that the 
31 Brigadier General William Guth, cited in D. Fulghum, `Iraqi Invasion Threat Reassessed by Military', 
AM, 14 November 1994. 
32 'Letter dated 10 October 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq addressed to the President 
of the Security Council', S/1994/1149 (10 October 1994), p. 2. 
33 `U. S. Actions To Preserve Stability in the Persian Gulf (10 October 1994), U. S. Department of State 
Disratch, Vol. 5, No. 42 (17 October 1994), p. 689. 
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Iraqis would not invade and would withdraw their forces to central Iraq. 34 A 
day later, evidence appeared that Iraqi forces had started withdrawing to the 
north. This did not mean that the coalition, and the US in particular, felt that 
the crisis had abated. Dee Dee Myers noted that: 
... we have seen some evidence that troops are withdrawing 
from the southern area, from the Bosra [sic] region of Iraq. 
There have been some indications that that is broad-based; 
there have been some movements such as tanks being loaded 
up on trains and other things that indicate that they are, in 
fact, pulling out. However, some units do appear to be in 
place, so we're continuing to monitor it closely .. 
35 
Table 12: Forces Deploying 10 October 1994 
United States United France 
Vingdorn 





Land Forces 24 Mech Div (-) 45 Commando, NIL 
Forward Elements I Royal Marines 
MEF 1 Battery, 290, Field 
Regiment, 
Royal Artillery 




The American government recognised that it would take some time for the 
Iraqi forces to withdraw. The same day, the forward elements of I MEF 
began to deploy from Camp Pendleton, California to the Middle East. This 
3+ DoD News Briefing, 11 October 1994, p. 1, `Remarks By The President Upon Departure For Detroit, 
Michigan', WI IPR, 11 October 1994, p. 1, and DoS DPB, 12 October 1994, p. 1. 
35 DoD Background Briefing, 12 October 1994, p. 1, and 'Press Briefing By Dee Dee Myers', Thitc 
I louse Press Arifin 
, (henceforth jPB), 12 October 1994, p. 1. 
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would add roughly 18,000 more troops. 36 The movement of a large 
mechanised force is not simple or easy to conduct at short notice. It was 
imprudent to rescind forward movement orders and to start redeploying 
these forces back `over-the-horizon' when the Iraqi forces had not 
completely withdrawn. On 15 October 1994, two RGFC brigades remained 
camped near Nasiriyah, some 180 kilometres west-north-west of Basra. 37 
Table 13: Forces in Theater 10 October 1994 
United States United France 
Vingdorn 
Air Forces 24 A-10 6 GR-1 Tornados 6 Mirage 2000, F-1 
18 F-15 1 Support Aircraft 
32 F-16 
51 Support Aircraft 
Land Forces TF 4-7 ADA 45 Commando, NIL 
1', Bde, 24 Mech Royal Marines 
Div 







36 DoD Background Briefing, 12 October 1994, p. 2. 
37 G. Graham and M. Littlejohns, `US warns Iraq on new build-ups', J, 17 October 1994. 
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The two Iraqi brigades around Nasiriyah attracted American attention. 
While not a large force, it was still seen as a threat by the American 
government. In a radio address, President Clinton noted that: 
Much of the force that Iraq sent to the border has retreated. 
But significant elements still remain within striking distance of 
Kuwait. We're watching this situation very carefully and 
continuing with the deployment of our own forces. They will 
remain in the area and on alert until we are absolutely satisfied 
that Iraq no longer poses threats to Kuwait. 38 
By late October, the size and saliency of the threat diminished. The 
Americans began to downgrade their force posture, and stop some of their 
deployments. I MEF stopped deploying, but the 24th Mechanised Division 
continued deploying although under the guise of an in-theatre exercise. The 
prepositioning ships also began to treat the deployment as an exercise 39 
The British government decided to keep 45 Commando in theatre. 0 
Exercising may have also been an aid to the American attempts to base 
equipment in theatre. Previously, only one brigade's worth of equipment 
was held there, and political concerns had obviated the prepositioning of 
additional equipment. In addition to this, American force levels in the 
region were increased. 24 A-10 ground-attack aircraft were deployed to Al 
Jaber airbase in Kuwait on a permanent basis 41 In early November 1994, 
the virtual absence of threat prompted the US to withdraw some of its 
forces. The DoD spokesman announced that: `The threat to the security 
and stability of the region remains, however, U. S. forces must therefore 
remain in the region to help enforce U. N. Security Council Resolutions. '42 
The 24th Mechanised Division would return to Fort Stewart, GA, the 
38 'Radio Address By The President To The Nation', WI IPiZ 15 October 1994, p. 2. See also: DIM 
Background Brif ng, 20 October 1994, p. 1. 
39 DoD Background Briefing, 20 October 1994, pp. 2 and 3-5. See also: DoD News Briefing. 20 
October 1994, pp. 1-2, and DoD News Briefinn, 25 October 1994, pp. 1-2. 
40 P. Almond, British And US forces to stay on in Kuwait', M 26 October 1994. 
41 M. Gordon, 'U. S. Will Station Warplanes in Kuwait', 1111,28 October 1994. 
42 Troop Withdrawal Plans Set', News Release (Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public 
Affairs)), pp. 1-2. 
261 
Chapter Nine - VIGILANT WARRIOR 
number of aircraft in JTF-SWA would remain augmented, and the US naval 
presence would return to its pre-crisis level. 43 This marked the end of the 
actual crisis, but a diplomatic aftershock was still to come. 
Was VIGILANT WARRIOR a success? It is not possible to answer 
that question without first examining some of the diplomacy that surrounded 
the crisis as the diplomatic wrangling affected Iraqi behaviour. The Russian 
government intervened in order to obtain its preferred outcome. In addition 
to this, divisions within the French government over whether or not Iraq 
intended to invade became public. This division within the coalition was, to 
say the best of it, unhelpful. However, VIGILANT WARRIOR was a 
powerful demonstration of American resolve and capability. While the crisis 
stopped short of actual hostilities, it served both to cement the bond between 
the coalition and its Arab allies and to affirm that the coalition truly was 
serious about its responsibilities pertaining to further threats against Kuwait. 
The Franco-American dispute began as a result of differing 
interpretations of certain resolutions and the degree of the threat posed to 
Kuwait by Iraq. The French government was also opposed to the creation of 
a `Ground Exclusion Zone' (GEZ), the Clinton Administration's solution for 
preventing future attempts at invasion,. During the crisis, William Perry, the 
US Secretary of Defense, came up with this idea of excluding the RGFC from 
southern Iraq while allowing existing garrisons to remain 44 The French 
government, fearing that a GEZ might be potentially destabilising, was 
opposed to the idea, as it provided the Iraqis with a very simple means of 
testing allied will. 45 Based on a historical precedent, this was not incorrect, but 
both NFZs fulfilled the same criterion as was demonstrated in Chapter Eight. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Tress Briefing by Dee Dee Myers', jß, 12 October 1994, pp. 6-7 and 9. 
nie. 45 Entretien du A1inistn d7 tat, Alinistre De La Defense a `France 2", 12 October 1994, PPi pos Sur !a D4 
No. 46 (October 1994), p. 146, `Irak-Reßonse du mini litre desAffains itrangina, 111. Alain Juppe ä une question 
orale au Senat, La Politigue 8tranöere de la Frana, September-October 1994, p. 217, `Press Briefing by Dec 
Dee Myers', WIIPB, 12 October 1994, p. 2, E. Sciolino, 'U. S. Offers Plan To Avoid Threat From Iraq 
Again', M, 13 October 1994. 
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The French defence minister, Francois Leotard, claimed that the crisis had 
been exaggerated, and had more to do with American domestic politics than 
with an Iraqi threat. Furthermore, he, like many in the French cabinet, did not 
believe that Iraq had done anything illegal in deploying its troops in southern 
Iraq. 46 The deployment of Iraqi forces to southern Iraq was not illegal but 
merely threatening. The intent behind a GEZ was to ensure that there would 
be no ambiguity about the illegal nature of such deployments. This would 
provide the coalition with another means of containing Iraq and further 
warning in case of future deployments. The French position sacrificed any 
chance for surprise in order to achieve the status of legality', whereas the 
American government sought to maintain the freedom of action associated 
with not having to expend additional diplomatic effort. The American 
Permanent Representative to the UN noted that this hindered British and 
American efforts to maintain consensus with their Arab allies 47 Minister 
Leotard implied that VIGILANT WARRIOR, like most cases, was an 
American overreaction. This was reminiscent of earlier arguments about the 
appropriateness of means for dealing with Iraq. Within a week, Alain Juppe, 
the French Foreign Minister, publicly stated that more peaceful means were 
required for dealing with Iraq 48 The necessity for action had been questioned 
and concomitant with this came a loss of credibility. Whether the Iraqi threat 
had been exaggerated or not, the coalition's credibility had been weakened by 
the dispute. Even with a significant threat, the coalition could become 
divided, thus demonstrating to the Iraqi government that the coalition's 
threats could be countered. 
46 'Point de Prue du 11 Odobro Declarations du Porte Pam/l, 11 October 1994, French FMPR, and Tress 
Briefing by Dee Dee Myers', x, 12 October 1994, pp. 4-5, and DoS DPB, 13 October 1994, pp. 
9-10. 
47 G. Graham, S. Dalby, and M. Nicholson, 'US and France clash over exclusion zone in southern Iraq', 
Q, 14 October 1994. 
48 M. Naim, 'Selon Alain J, Ope, i1 faut "nnnir ks a ndrtions de lapaix et non preparrr nne noavelleguemr ", 1l1¢ödt, 18 
October 1994. 
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The Clinton Administration continued to work towards the creation 
of a GEZ in southern Iraq. On 14 October, Christine Shelly, the Department 
of State press briefer, stated that: 
... our primary objective 
has been to end the threat to 
Kuwait, which was posed by the movement of Iraqi troops to 
the southern area and then to ensure that such a situation does 
not recur. 
We're presently consulting with Security Council members 
on a resolution that is designed to accomplish both of those 
objectives. I'm told there were some informal P-5 type 
exchanges this morning. 49 
While the Franco-American argument festered, the program was still being 
pursued at the Security Council. The US government sought to obtain a 
resolution that would order the withdrawal of the Iraqi forces from the 
Kuwaiti border. 50 On 15 October, the UNSC passed SCR 949 as a Chapter 
VII resolution. This eliminated the French government's concern about 
positive authorisation, but their point about a means of testing allied will 
remained valid. The resolution stated that the UNSC: 
1. Condemns recent military deployments by Iraq in the 
direction of the border with Kuwait; 
2. Demands that Iraq immediately complete the withdrawal 
of all military units recently deployed to southern Iraq to their 
positions; 
3. Demands that Iraq not again utilise its military or any other 
forces in a hostile or provocative manner to threaten either its 
neighbours or United Nations operations in Iraq; 
4. Demands therefore that Iraq not redeploy to the south the 
units referred to paragraph 2 above or take any other action to 
enhance its military capacity in southern Iraq. 51 
49 DoS DPB, 14 October 1994, p. 12. 
50 B. Crossette, `U. S. Is Demanding A Quick U. N. Vote On Iraqi Pullback', x, 15 October 1994. 
51 'Security Council resolution concerning military deployments by Iraq in the direction of the border 
with Kuwait', S/RES/949 (1994) (15 October 1994),. UN, p. 694. 
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This gave the coalition a licence to use force if the Iraqis repeated their 
southward movement. It left the Iraqi garrisons in southern Iraq alone. 
Without this, it was believed Iran could exert influence more easily in 
southern Iraq. 
The Russian government intervened as VIGILANT WARRIOR drew 
to a close in order to obtain a particular outcome. The reintegration of Iraq 
into the international community held out potential economic benefits for 
Russia. Igor Ivanov, the Russian 1st Deputy Foreign Minister, and Viktor 
Posuvalyuk, the head of the Middle Eastern department of the Russian 
ministry of Foreign Affairs, travelled to Iraq in order to bring about what was, 
from the Russian government's point of view, the preferable outcome to the 
crisis 52 Iraq would have to demonstrate good faith to the international 
community that Iraq merited its trust; this was the exact opposite of the effect 
of Iraq's recent actions. A joint Iraqi-Russian communique to the Security 
Council stated that: 
Iraq announced officially that at 2100 hours on 12 October it 
had completed the withdrawal of its troops to rearguard 
positions. The Russian Federation expressed its warm 
appreciation of this step on the part of Iraq. 
Iraq affirmed its readiness to resolve in a positive manner the 
issue of recognising Kuwait and borders, ' as laid down in 
Security Council resolution 833 (1993). 53 
The price for the recognition of Kuwait was the lifting of sanctions. 54 
Neither the American nor the British governments believed this expression 
of willingness for the recognition of Kuwait would be sufficient to justify 
the end of sanctions. The coalition decided to keep additional forces in 
52 M. Nicholson, 'Russian envoys start Baghdad talks', Q, 13 October 1994. 
53 `Letter from the Representatives of Iraq and the Russian Federation transmitting the text of a joint 
communique containing Iraq's announcement that it had withdrawn its troops to rearguard positions 
on 12 October 1994', S/1994/1173 (15 October 1994), 11N, p. 695. 
54 B. Crossette, `Russia and Iraq Work Out Plan to Ease Gulf Tension', x, 14 October 1994, and A. 
La Guardia, 'Iraq tries to strike bargain on Kuwait', DI, 14 October 1994. 
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theatre until they were satisfied that the RGFC units had withdrawn 55 Both 
the American and British governments supported the idea of a timetable 
and probationary period for the lifting of sanctions in principle, but given 
Iraq's recent belligerence, were unwilling to allow such a scheme to begin at 
the time. 56 The sanctions remained in place, and a timetable for their lifting 
remained a mere possibility. 
The Russian government sought to convince Washington that the 
Iraqi government needed to be rewarded. The Russians realised that any of 
their `solutions' to the crisis would require American concurrence to prevent 
the use of the American veto within the UNSC. The Russian Foreign 
Minister, Andrei Kozyrev, reported that the Iraqis said they were willing to 
recognise Kuwait 57 Andrei Kozyrev met with Warren Christopher in New 
York to discuss the situation on 17 October. 58 Their meeting resulted in a 
series of joint declarations about what the two had pledged to do. This 
amounted to vague statements about the necessity of co-operation and the 
lack of reward for the withdrawal of threats 59 Reports circulated that the 
Iraqi People's Assembly was going to meet to approve the recognition of 
Kuwait 660 The Assembly, instead of doing as was predicted, issued a 
statement of support for Saddam Hussein. 61 The key to the problem was the 
potential lifting of sanctions. The reward for Russian intervention, in Iraqi 
eyes, was a schedule for the lifting of the sanctions and this was the intended 
ss G. Graham, M. Nicholson and S. Dalby, 'US rebuffs Russian mediation on Kuwait', 1, l5 October 
1994. 
56 Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs Robert Pcllctreau testified before the House of 
Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs that it was US policy to ensure that there was an 
unidentified test period of UNSCOM's monitoring system, in Developments in the Middle East', 4 
October 1994, CIS Document 11381-13, pp. 37-38. 
57'Russian Says Iraqis Yield On Sovereignty of Kuwait', x, 15-16 October 1994. 
58 DoS DPB, 17 October 1994, p. 10. 
59 Ibid., p. 8. 
60 M. Nicholson, `Iraq to approve border', IS, 18 October 1994. 
61 M. Nicholson and M. Littlejohns, No formal Kuwait recognition', Et, 18 October 1994. 
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reward for Iraq if they chose to recognise Kuwait. 62 The American and 
British governments remained unwilling to allow the sanctions to be lifted and 
refused even to discuss a timetable G3 
The Russian intervention eventually made progress. Two days after 
the US troop withdrawal was announced on 7 November 1994, the Russian 
government announced that the Iraqi government promised that it would 
recognise Kuwaiti sovereignty. 64 This measure did not lead to an immediate 
change of heart in the American government. The State Department issued a 
backhanded warning about the Iraqi promise: `If today's announcements are 
followed by the necessary implementing measures, it will mark an important 
achievement for the United Nations Security Council which has steadfastly 
insisted that Iraq must comply - and comply fully with all its requirements. 
" 
The Russian gambit failed to bring about a timetable, let alone a lifting of 
sanctions. Both the American and British governments were adamant that the 
Iraqi statement had to be ratified and proven to be true 66 
The American and British governments left themselves open to 
accusations of threat inflation or having `moved the goalposts' to prevent the 
lifting of sanctions. The Iraqi government then complied with their wishes by 
submitting all the documentation to the Security Council as proof of their 
recognition 67 In exchange for its actions, the Iraqi government was praised 
62'As you were', Economist, 22 October 1994. 
63 M. Walker and M. Tran, `US fears Russian sanctions plan will let Saddam off the hook', Guardian 18 
October 1994, and C. Laurence, `Iraq oil sanctions will not be lifted', DI, 18 October 1994. 
64 IL Matthews, `Baghdad recognises Kuwaiti sovereignty', LZ, 11 November 1994, and 'Moscow wins 
Iraqi pledge over Kuwaiti sovereignty', LX, 9 November 1994. 
65 DoS ICI B, 11 November 1994, p. 2. 
66 See: M. Evans, 'Sanctions must stay, Foreign Office says', Thacs, 11 November 1994, G. Jansen, 
'Saddam sees the light?, j, 18 November 1994, J. Kampfner and G. Butt, 'Iraqi recognition of 
Kuwait will not end embargo', j21,11 November 1994, and `U. S. Insists Iraq Must Do More Than 
Recognize Kuwait', in 9 November 1994. 
67 `Letter dated 13 November 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq transmitting the 
declaration of the National Assembly (10 November 1994) and decree of the Revolutionary 
Command Council No. 200 (10 November 1994) affirming Iraq's recognition of the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and political independence of Kuwait and of its international boundaries as 
endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 833 (1993)', 11, pp. 696-698, and 'Statement by the 
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by Madeleine Albright, the President of the Security Council at the time, who 
noted that: 'The Security Council considers this decision by Iraq to be a 
significant step in the direction towards implementation of the relevant 
Security Council resolutions. '68 Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR had been 
more of a success than expected. 
VIGILANT WARRIOR was an attempt at coercion through power 
projection, which relied on threats rather than the use of force. Air power was 
used to monitor the situation and to bring forces in from `over-the-horizon'. 
The Iraqi choice was simple: it could have either done nothing and possibly 
withdrawn the three RGFC divisions from southern Iraq or it could have 
crossed the DMZ and entered Kuwait in some form of feint, raid or invasion. 
It chose the former. The coalition's deployment was intended to cause the 
Iraqi government to do nothing (inaction being the coalition's desired 
concession). This was an attempt to deter Iraq, and the attempt at threat- 
based coercion was sufficient for success. 
The Iraqi government's motives remain unknown. One can only 
construct theories of why it ordered the RGFC to southern Iraq and whether 
an invasion would have occurred in the absence of VIGILANT WARRIOR. 
In November of 1994, reports surfaced that even in the USAF, there were 
doubts that the movements were a prelude to an invasion, as the only forces 
that moved were ground forces 69 Iraq's actions were either a case where 
Iraq's economy dictated that the government try to reduce pressure by seeking 
a provocation with the coalition and/or that the Iraqi government saw an 
opportunity for action. If it was the former was true, then an invasion of 
Kuwait was not necessary to address the problem. A renewed threat from the 
coalition would suffice to reduce pressure. Byman and Waxman offered the 
President of the Security Council concerning Iraq's recognition of the sovereignty, territorial integrity 
and political independence of Kuwait and. of its international boundaries as endorsed by the Security 
Council in its resolution 833 (1993)', in S/PRST/1994/68 (16 November 1994), 11S, pp. 698-699. 
68 S/PRST/1994/68, UN, pp. 698-699. See also: DoS D1,1;. 14 November 1994, p. 11. 
69 Fulghum, `Iraqi Invasion Threat'. 
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only, although unverifiable, evidence supporting the other explanation: a 
`high-level Iraqi defector' stated that Saddam Hussein would have attacked 
had there been no response. 70 A possible invasion of Kuwait could be used as 
a bargaining tool for the lifting of sanctions? ' The deployment could have 
had any number of purposes. If the Iraqi movement into southern Iraq had 
i 
been a feint for diplomatic reasons, or even as a preliminary military exercise 
to test American and coalition readiness to fight and in what manner, then it 
would be semantically wrong to claim an Iraqi backdown. This all suggests 
that Iraqi forces would have attacked had no reaction occurred, but 
VIGILANT WARRIOR cannot be described as a case of successful 
deterrence. The operation represented the application of a strategy of 
deterrence, but not a deterrence situation. 
VIGILANT WARRIOR represented the application of a combined 
approach to deterrence using both land forces and air power. The JTF-SWA 
offered a command and support infrastructure for `Over-The-Horizon' forces 
as an enabler. In addition, it offered significant reconnaissance and 
intelligence capability that translated into strong situational awareness. The 
reinforcement of JTF-SWA with ground forces served as a means of reducing 
the probability of Iraq attaining any benefits from offensive operations against 
Kuwait. The JTF-SWA detected the movement, but did not necessarily deter 
it. Had it been a successful deterrent, no such movement would have taken 
place as a prelude to invasion. The CINC's list of requirements would have 
been more than sufficient to defend Kuwait against an invasion. It would 
have also been sufficient to mount offensive operations on land against Iraqi 
forces in Iraq should they have not complied with SCRs 687 and 949. 
The danger with VIGILANT WARRIOR was that it was possible to 
draw the wrong lesson. An example of this occurred before the operation 
ended: 
70 Byman and Waxman, Confronting Iraq, p. 56. 
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The end result of this force build-up, which was, I hasten to 
add, accompanied by actions on our part to deter the Iraqis 
and to be ready to act against them if that was required, also 
took place during that time. So the fact of the Iraqi build-up 
was certainly being paralleled, if you will, by our activities 
during this period. 
The bottom line for the Iraqis was two Republican Guard 
armoured divisions and some other combat support elements, 
notably air defences, some additional artillery, and some 
support equipment capability, came into the south and arrayed 
themselves in a threatening manner against Kuwait, near the 
Kuwait border. 72 
These statements imply that the Iraqis were actually going to invade. Short 
of proving that it was Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi government's intent to 
invade Kuwait a second time, it is not possible to say that deterrence actually 
occurred. However, this may have been more indicative of a degree of 
success with SOUTHERN WATCH in that the Iraqi government knew that 
its forces would take high casualties in they conducted aerial operations 
across the SNFZ. The operation certainly showed American and allied 
resolve. After the troops began to arrive in theatre, Iraqi forces were 
withdrawn. It demonstrated the coalition's ability to bring in forces from 
`over-the-horizon', and in a fashion, reinforced the belief that the coalition 
members were going to assist the friendly Gulf States. 
The crisis prompted greater co-operation from the GCC states 
regardless of the popular perception of the situation. The GCC foreign 
ministers met in Kuwait on 11-12 October 1994, and the American Secretary 
of State, Warren Christopher, and the British Foreign Secretary, Douglas 
Hurd, attended. The Department of State spokesperson later commented 
that: 
711 Zerr, pp. 5-15. 
72 DoD Backpioun j Briefing, 20 October 1994, p. 1. 
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... the Gulf Co-operation 
Council said that it would not let 
Saddam Hussein intimidate the international community again 
in this way. The countries participating in the meeting granted 
overflight clearances and bed-down for a coalition aircraft; 
that the GCC also agree urgently to review the burden-sharing 
questions to make sure that there would be an equitable 
sharing of the costs and other support associated with the U. S. 
presence there and other presence .. 
73 
The threat had thus created the diplomatic position that the coalition was 
united against a potential invasion of Kuwait. This, of course, meant that 
the normally more reluctant host nations were more willing to allow 
coalition military forces into their territories. Their governments were more 
accepting than ever of the JTF-SWA. 74 The threat posed by the Iraqi 
deployment of forces near the DMZ provided an opportunity for the US 
armed forces to test their capability for rapid deployment in a cost-justifiable 
manner. This heightened sense of threat reinforced the JTF-SWA's ability 
to enable future operations. 
VIGILANT WARRIOR demonstrated that victory went to the swift 
(or defeat went to the hesitant). It demonstrated to the Gulf Allies that the 
coalition's efforts were not solely about the containment (or punishment) of 
Iraq, they were also devoted to their defence. After VIGILANT WARRIOR, 
both the governments of Kuwait and Qatar allowed the US military to store a 
brigade's worth of equipment within their territories. This increased the 
American military's ability to fight a contingency in the Gulf region. 
The nature of the communication' between the coalition and Iraq 
further complicated the issue. Most of the communication was conducted 
indirectly, either by decree or through a third party (the Russian government) 
or through actions (i. e. the deployment of forces). This last form of 
communication relied on the Iraqi government's ability to perceive the 
increase in coalition forces over time, which is difficult to prove yet easy to 
73 DoS DPB, 12 October 1994, p. S. 
74 Platte interview, p. 3. 
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assume. The speed of the coalition's deployment demonstrated its capability 
to project power into the theatre, and this made its threats more credible. 
The erosion of Iraqi willpower is hard to judge, as the penalty was the 
maintenance of the status quo. Given that the state of the Iraqi economy may 
have provided the impetus for some form of action, Saddam Hussein may 
have attempted a feint to provide the Iraqi people with a threat against which 
they could rally and forget their economic woes. If this is the case, then 
Saddam Hussein had achieved his aim. However, the Iraqi government made 
its strategic situation worse than it had been, as its actions in October 1994 
contributed to its isolation, despite the Russian government's offers of 
mitigation. Key military personnel in the JTF-SWA believed that had the Iraqi 
government not acted until 90 days later, the outcome would have been 
significantly different. 75 The coalition demonstrated its capability to act 
quickly, and it is likely that Saddam Hussein was sufficiently deterred from 
undertaking offensive operations until Iraq had a signif cant arsenal of WMDs 
to support such operations, thus increasing the significance of WMDs. 
Conclusion 
Nevertheless, whatever the true reason behind Iraqi troop 
movements, VIGILANT WARRIOR brought about real gains for the 
coalition side, and this was a `strategic' victory in that Iraqi actions renewed 
the justification for Iraq's containment while allowing for progress. Most 
notably that was Iraqi recognition of Kuwait, but it was equally significant that 
the UN under SCR 949 gave licence for force in the absence of movement 
beyond territorial boundaries and on the basis of threat. The removal of the 
perceived military threat by Iraq was a fact, as opposed to a chimera. The 
SNFZ became a SEZ, and this allowed them to base 24 ground-attack aircraft 
in Kuwait on a permanent basis 76 The coalition therefore became truly 
75 Platte interview, pp. 1 and 3. 
76 Dunn, p. 60, and S. Watkins, `No End in Sight', A, 19 December 1994. 
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capable of taking direct action in southern Iraq against Iraqi forces in the air 
or on the ground. This was the political and military high water mark of the 
coalition. 
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Figure 21: RGFC Movements August 1996 
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Figure 22: Entry and Egress Routes 
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Figure 23: Targets 3 August 1996 
Courtesy of Perry-Castaneda Map Library, University of Texas at Austin 
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Figure 24: SNFZ Extension 
Courtesy of Perry-Castaneda Map Library, University of Texas at Austin 
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CHAPTER 10: DESERT STRIKE 
In late August 1996, the KDP invited the Iraqi government to 
intervene in the KDP's war with the PUK. The coalition reacted by 
conducting Operation DESERT STRIKE in early September 1996 to increase 
the pressure on Iraq. This had some unintended consequences. 
Operation DESERT STRIKE was a series of missile strikes in order 
to extend the SNFZ to the 33rd parallel This meant that the coalition 
controlled Iraqi airspace as far north as Baghdad's suburbs. Correctly noting 
the implied threat to Baghdad, Iraqi forces challenged the SNFZ extension. 
This led the coalition to attempt to remove the air defence threat by threat and 
force of arms. 
The Kurdish `civil war' and DESERT STRIKE set in motion a chain 
of events that led to evacuation of a number of Kurds associated with NGOs 
operating in Iraqi `Kurdistan'. These evacuations caused humanitarian 
operations in northern Iraq to end, which in turn caused the French 
government to withdraw from PROVIDE COMFORT II. DESERT 
STRIKE's long-term costs were considerable for the coalition both in 
diplomatic and political terms. Indeed it marked the beginof 
fragmentation of the coalition that had stood in place since DESERT 
STORM. 
Chronology 
17 August 1996 The PUK allowed Iranian forces to 
pursue elements of the KDP-I in PUK- 
territory in exchange for arms. 
22 August 1996 The KDP requested military assistance 
from the Iraqi government. 
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31 August 1996 RGFC elements captured the city of 
Irbil in northern Iraq. 
3 September 1996 American forces struck a series of air 
defence assets in southern Iraq using air- 
and sea-launched cruise missiles. 
4 September 1996 The SNFZ was extended to the 33rd 
parallel. 
10 September 1996 The Iraqi government was warned not 
to rebuild its air defences in southern 
Iraq. 
17-18 September 1996 
22 October 1996 
23 October 1996 
25 November 1996 
4 December 1996 
9 December 1996 
QUICK TRANSIT I, the first of three 
evacuations of Kurdish refugees to 
Guam, was conducted. 
QUICK TRANSIT II occurred. 
The KDP and PUK agreed to a cease- 
fire. 
The `Oil-for-Food' deal was revived. 
QUICK TRANSIT III occurred. 
SCR 986 came into effect. 
27 December 1996 Displeased with the removal of the 
humanitarian element of PROVIDE 
COMFORT II, the French government 
withdrew its forces. 
1 January 1997 PROVIDE COMFORT II became 
Operation NORTHERN WATCH. 
Catalyst/Cause for Coercion 
The crisis developed as a result of the KDP-PUK conflict. After the 
formation of a national assembly in the spring of 1992, the two factions (both 
based on regional constituencies) shared power in a coalition government. 
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The KDP controlled the western portion of Iraqi `Kurdistan' bordering on 
Turkey. Trade in this area was greater than in the eastern, largely PUK- 
controlled portion of `Kurdistan' bordering on Iran. The conflict started in 
1994 over customs revenues, and: `... an important factor in the KDP-PUK 
battle for territory was to gain more opportunities for taxation and to bring 
more organisations under their control. Furthermore, the more people each 
side controlled, the greater their share of food and humanitarian supplies to be 
distributed in the region under the UN's plan ... 'i Despite numerous cease- 
fire attempts, the conflict continued. On 17 August 1996, the Iranian 
government offered the PUK arms in exchange for the ability to cross PUK- 
held territory in pursuit of guerrillas from the KDP-I. The PUK immediately 
used their newly gained weapons in a series of attacks. 2 The KDP's leader, 
Massoud Barzani, sought outside assistance by inviting the Iraqi military to 
intervene. 3 Several RGFC divisions would help the KDP recapture the city of 
Irbil. 
Asterisions mounted in northern Iraq in late August 1996, Boa 
Poo Boaters4 Ghali suspended the `oil-for-food' deal, concerned that the safety of none 
employed to monitor the oil sales or distribute aid to the Kurds was in 
danger. Irbil was the intended hub of the aid distribution network under the 
'deal'. 4 The `deal' provided a humanitarian underpinning for actions that were 
less palatable to broader public opinion. Losing or diminishing the `oil for 
food' deal risked a significant public relations set-back. 
The coalition aim shifted throughout the crisis. At first, it sought to 
end to the KDP-PUK conflict through mediation, as this was a source of 
' J. Barham, 'I iunger for war booty is driving fight between Kurds', IM 10 September 1996. 
2E Mortimer, 'Saddam exploits Kurds' division', IT, 2 September 1996, and S. Myers, T. Weiner, J. 
Miller and E. Sciolino, `A Failed Race Against Time: U. S. Tried to Ilead Off Iraqis', IQ, 5 
September 1996. 
3 S. Myers, T. Weiner, J. Miller and E. Sciolino, `A Failed Race Against Time: U. S. Tried to I lead Off 
Iraqis', N, 5 September 1996. 
4 S. Myers, 'U. N. I Jalta Deal for Iraq As U. S. Pledges Action on Attack', ,2 September 
1996,12Q 
120- 11 September 1996, p. 17, and x, 16 September 1996, p. 14. 
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major embarrassment. The logic behind American policy toward the Kurds 
and Iraq was that although Saddam Hussein was undesirable, he should be 
overthrown from within Iraq. If the Kurds were engaged in internecine 
conflict, then they were not contributing to the future overthrow of Saddam 
Hussein. The Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Robert 
Pelletreau, was sent to try to bring about a cease-fire. After speaking to both 
Jalal Talabani, the PUK leader, and Massoud Barzani, Robert Pelletreau was 
able to convince both factions to meet in London. 5 The talks began on 23 
August 1996, and the US State Department spokesman reported that the two 
parties agreed to a cease-fire and to return their forces to their previous 
positions .6 Both the KDP and PUK broke the cease-fire shortly thereafter. 
The US intelligence community became aware that the Iraqi 
government was moving forces northwards in response to Massoud Barzani's 
request, and suspected that this was not just an exercise. On 28 August 1996, 
the US government believed that 30,000 and 40,000 Iraqi troops were about 
to enter Kurdish territory.? The NSC presented a series of options which: `. . 
. developed the argument for our general strategic approach that we're using 
here, rather than responding tactically to a move by Saddam in the north to 
pick the time and place of our own choice for an adequate and measured 
response ... '8 All American forces in the Gulf region went on alert. 
9 The 
Clinton Administration was afraid of the indirect consequences of the Iraqi 
seizure of Irbil, as recalled by William Perry: 
5 Press Briefing by Mike McCurry and Mark Parris, Senior Director for Near Bast and South Asian 
Affairs', WI ZPR, 3 September 1996, p. 2. 
6 Davies, 23 August 1996, p. 1, and S. Myers, T. Weiner, J. Miller and B. Sciolino, 'A railed Race Against 
Time: U. S. Tried to I lead Off Iraqis', ,5 September 
1996. 
7 `Press Briefing by Mike McCurry and Mark Parris', pp. 1-3, and The United States responded with a 
hard line and dozens of cruise missiles to let him know, once again, he miscalculated the situation', 
Defense Issues, Vol. 11, No. 79, p. 2. 
8 `Background Briefing by Senior Administration Official', WI IPI, 31 August 1996, and McCurry and 
Parris, pp. 5-6. 
9J. Adams, `US jets poised for Iraq strike', T1t11ý I September 1996. 
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The Iraqis, emboldened by their success against the relatively 
weak PUK forces, might - if they saw no reaction from the 
international community - move to suppress both the PUK 
and KDP; or they might move against their neighbours to the 
south - as they did in August of 1990 and again in October of 
1994. Without a military response, Saddam Hussein's position 
in the country and the region would be strengthened and vital 
interests to the United States could be threatened. '° 
As the conflict threatened the `oil-for-food' deal and encouraged the Iraqi 
government to engage in military adventures, it posed a threat to stability. It 
was not possible for the American government to stand by and let a 
position develop in which Saddam Hussein was able to entrench greater 
control over the Iraqi people and greater control over the political and 
physical geography of Iraq. The American positions was, of course, 
tendentious. On the one hand, they wanted to weaken Saddam Hussein's 
hold on his country. On the other, they were naturally anxious about being 
seen to meddle too overtly in the internal politics of Iraq. Such could be 
called into question as ultra vices the content of the relevant UN resolutions 
and thereby could unglue the coalition and also ran counter to general Arab 
feelings about the sovereignty of Iraq. t1 
On 30 August 1996, the Clinton Administration issued its first 
warning to Iraq. It warned that: `. .. there would 
be serious, grave 
consequences for launching any type of offensive manoeuvre against Irbil .. 
: 12 It was a habit of the Iraqi government to refuse acceptance of messages 
from the United States, and this made communication difficult. Yet there 
could be no misconstruing of American action. As well as the alert of 
I0 DoD News Brifing, 3 September 1996, p. 2. 
>> The danger was that unity and control were being confused. It is possible to argue that if Iraq's armed 
forces were kept busy exercising control over Iraq, then they would be less able to project power into 
Iraq's neighbours. 
12 McCurry and Parris, p. 3. 
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coalition military forces, aircraft sorties increased under both SOUTHERN 
WATCH and PROVIDE COMFORT 11.13 
Iraqi forces overran Irbil early on the morning of 31 August They 
bombarded the city before dawn, and immediately after the barrage, Iraqi 
forces, spearheaded by a column of 60 tanks, seized control of the city. '4 
Saddam Hussein ordered the Republican Guard to withdraw from Irbil on 1 
September. 's The Turkish government reported that the withdrawal was 
actually occurring, but the PUK and other resistance organisations claimed 
that Iraqi forces and the KDP were rounding up and massacring members of 
the Iraqi opposition. '6 This evidence increased the Pentagon's suspicion that 
the Iraqi government was leaving a residual security and intelligence 
presence. 17 
Constraints 
The 1996 Presidential election had a definite influence on the Clinton 
Administration's decision-making. First, President Clinton was sensitive to 
the effects of the crisis on polls and the opportunities it would create for his 
political opponents. President Clinton's Republican opponent, Senator Bob 
Dole, was very critical of the 'President's approach to Iraq during the 
campaign, and advocated a strong response to Iraq's action. Second, the 
Democratic Party National Convention forced President Clinton to delegate a 
number of tasks to members of his administration. "g President Clinton 
13 McCurry and Parris, p. 4. 
14 `Press Briefing by Senior Administration Official', WI IPB. 31 August 1996, p. 2. 
15 S. Myers, `U. N. I Ialts Deal for Iraq As U. S. Pledges Action on Attack', N. YL 2 September 1996. 
16 S. Kinzer, 'Iragi Troops Said to Round Up Kurd Leaders', rjYr, 3 September 1996. 
17 E Sciolino, 'racing Saddam, Again', ,4 September 1996, and T. Weiner, 'Iraq Pulling 
Out, But 
Leaving Spies Behind, U. S. Says', =6 September 1996. 
18 M. Iletcher, 'flow Saddam's desert marauders ambushed Clinton campaign caravan', TImes> 5 
September 1996, McCurry and Parris, pp. 4-5, S. Myers, 'U. S. Calls Alert As Iraqis Strike A Kurd 
Enclave', M, 1 September 1996 and `Pentagon Says Command Site Was Struck', N, 3 
September 1996. 
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discussed the options with Vice-President Al Gore, and on the evening of 2 
September 1996, opted to use force. 19 At the same time, he: `... reaffirmed 
that vital national security interests of the United States in containing Iraq, and 
a key to that containment is the U. S. military presence in the region. In 
particular, the linchpin of that is what we call Operation SOUTHERN 
WATCH... '20 The President defined the main American interests as the 
military containment of Iraq as opposed to the stability of northern Iraq. 
This statement represented a major change in the American public 
posture. Initially, it had clothed its actions as saving the `oil for food' 
programme. It had then moved its position to repelling the RGFC incursion 
into northern Iraq. The latter severely strained the ambit of the appropriate 
UN resolutions. The new position marked a move to an overt attempt to 
deny Saddam Hussein the control of Iraq he seemed to be wresting back. The 
`containment' of Iraq required that Iraqi military aspirations in the north and 
the south had to be denied. This was, of course, a policy with considerable 
risk in terms of public relations and perceptions. It ran the risk of being 
attacked as a cynical abrogation of the initiatives for humanitarian relief and 
replacing them with objectives that lay squarely and almost exclusively with 
American interests. 
Neither the British nor the French government wanted to intervene 
any further in the internal politics of Iraq, and nor did either want to engage in 
massive retaliation. Both governments tried to impress upon the US that the 
furthest they should go was an airstrike 2' Iraqi forces, after all, had not acted 
outside Iraq's borders, were invited by a Kurdish faction, and the incursion 
did not threaten, at least initially, regional stability. The French government 
publicly stated that the Iraqi incursion did not violate any of the UNSC 
19 McCurry and Parris, p. 6. 
20 Perry, in DoD News Briefin 
_ 17 
September 1996, p. 1. 
21 J. Fitchett, 'Keep Retaliation Limited, Allies Urge Clinton', JUL 3 September 1996. 
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resolutions. 22 The Secretary-General recalled that `While Iraq's military move 
into the north was deplorable, it was, after all, an Iraqi government operation 
within the sovereign territory of Iraq. '23 After all, even SCR 688 paid lip 
service to Iraq's sovereignty. 24 The French government was not the only one 
concerned about the situation. The Russian government agreed that action 
was required, but did not feel drastic measures were necessary. 25 The question 
was difficult and remains unanswered: does the mistreatment of one's 
population negate the legitimacy of the state's ability to maintain a monopoly 
of violence? 
The Arab allies believed that action was necessary, but wanted to 
avoid exacerbating the crisis. In response to a question about the support of 
the regional allies, the Department of State spokesperson stated that: 
... what I can tell you is that I don't believe you've seen any 
active opposition to the military move of the United States by 
those countries. We did have a variety of conversations with 
them preceding the attack. We let them know what, in a 
preliminary basis, some of our options were as we looked at 
the situation .. 26 
The Saudi government forbade offensive operations being conducted from 
their soil, and the Turkish government feared that operations against Iraq 
would lead to another refugee crisis 27 This severely limited the coalition's 
military operations. 
There were two implicit aims to the strikes, which were to the support 
the military containment of Iraq through the SNFZ, and to rescue of the 'oil- 
for-food deal' by reversing Iraq's incursion in northern Iraq. There was 
u DoSDPB, 3 September 1996, p. 4. 
23 Boutros-Ghali, p. 297. 
24 SCC p. 161 above. 
25 DoS DPB, 3 September 1996, p. 6. 
26 DoS DPB, 3 September 1996, p. 8. 
27 S. Myers, `Pentagon Says Command Site Was Struck', It, 2 September 1996, r-. Sciolino, `racing 
Saddam, Again', NIE, 4 September 1996, and White, p. 40. 
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another, yet less obvious, aim of minimising the risk of casualties, be they 
American, coalition or Iraqi. This made target selection very difficult. If Iraqi 
casualties were a concern, strikes against Baghdad, the capital of Iraq and the 
heart of its government, would be unacceptable. 28 The President had already 
had a foretaste of the effect of American casualties on public perceptions. 
Earlier that year, Khobar Towers, an apartment building employed as an 
American military barracks near Riyadh, was bombed. 29 In one White House 
press briefing, it was noted that the President, during his meeting with Tony 
Lake and the JCS Director of Operations, Lieutenant General Peter Pace, 
USMC, wanted to minimise the amount of collateral damage and civilian 
casualties . 
30 A choice of target that led to large numbers of Iraqi casualties 
would have been unacceptable to the Arab allies, and certainly odious to the 
remainder of the Islamic world as well as unpopular in Europe. 
Means and Target Sets 
Political factors significantly constrained the coalition's actions. It 
could not employ air assets from within the theatre of operations. It could 
therefore only use air assets from `over the horizon', carrier-based air assets or 
unmanned power. The use of carrier-based aviation required the striking 
aircraft to conduct airborne refuelling over Iraq, which would have been easy 
prey for the LADS and IQAF. 31 Air assets were also restricted to a rather 
narrow lane of entry and egress, which would make them easier targets for 
Iraqi air defences and increase the probability of coalition casualties. This did 
not meet President Clinton's guidance to the JCS Director of Operations, and 
this left only one means: unmanned power. 
The further targeting strayed from installations clearly within the 
relevant UN resolutions, the more difficult the targeting became to support 
28 Homer, `What We Should I lave Learned', p. 55. 
29 See p. 82 above. 
30 McCurry and Parris, p. 7. 
311 lomer, 'What We Should', p. 4 and Hyman and Waxman, p. 63. 
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diplomatically and politically. The US certainly wished to diminish 
perceptions of itself as an aggressive bully. Yet equally it was sure that the 
situation warranted intervention on a larger scale than hitherto. In the light of 
the `oil-for-food' proposal, it would have been counter-productive to attack 
any economic target (i. e. telecommunications, oil, economic infrastructure, 
and even industry). WMDs were not the focus of the crisis, and their value as 
a target set was reduced. The RGFC units in northern Iraq were not a feasible 
target given their mobility and the requirement to program missile guidance 
systems. This left the coalition with two choices for target sets: the Iraqi 
intelligence and security apparatus and air defence assets. Most of the 
intelligence and security apparatus can be found in Baghdad, and the 
implication of the President's guidance was that targets in that city were off- 
limits 32 This left air defences as the only viable target set, and the coalition 
chose to send a combination of air- and sea-launched cruise missiles through 
the narrow gap to widen the approaches to Baghdad and implicitly threaten it. 
Analysis 
The coalition reacted a day after the RGFC withdrew from Irbil. The 
President, after consulting with his advisors and allies, authorised the use of 
force while a pair of B-52 bombers from Guam flew towards the Persian 
Gulf. 33 As the bombers entered the airspace over the Gulf, they were joined 
by their escort, a number of F-14D aircraft from the aircraft carrier the USS 
Carl Vinson. 34 31 T-LAMs were fired by the Carl Vinson's carrier group, and 
the B-52's had launched 13 Conventional Air-Launched Cruise Missiles 
(CALCM) at the targets: `... which included command and control nodes, 
missile launch sites and radar facilities key to the integrated air defence 
capability at Al Kut, Al Iskandariyah, An Nasiriyah and Tallil ..: 
35 The 
32 Ilomer, 'What We Should', p. 4. 
33 I. Brodie, M. Theodoulou and J. Sherman, 'Order to attack Saddam is signed', Times, 3 September 
1996. 
34 http: //www. cvn70. navy. ma/facts/cvn7O. htm. 
35 B. Starr, 'Clinton's line in the sand puts pressure on DoD', J, 1 , 
11 September 1996. 
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targets were hit at approximately 9: 25 AM Baghdad time. 36 A second strike 
was ordered as there were four sites where the effect of the first series of 
strike had been questionable due to cloud cover over the target. 37 The USS 
Russell fired eight more Tomahawks, the USS Hewitt fired two others, five by 
the USS Laboon and the USS Jefferson City'contributed two more missiles to 
the second strike. 38 
The American government deliberately chose to not focus on the 
problem in northern Iraq. - William Perry and Vice-Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph Ralston, USAF, claimed in a3 September 
briefing that `. .. our response protects the United 
States interests by 
strengthening our ability to contain future Iraqi attacks. We have chosen the 
time, the place and the modality of our response to suit our strategic interests 
and our comparative advantage, not his ... '39 General 
Shalikashvili explained 
that: 
... there had been a decision made that if the Iraqis ever tried 
something that would require the use of force, that the 
response should not be made to match the Iraqi actions. For 
example, if they attacked the Shi'a, we could respond 
anywhere we saw fit ... We reserved the right to hit where 
it 
made sense to us, and that meant high-value targets ... 
The strikes enabled the transformation of the SNFZ into a coercive 
instrument by expanding it to the 33rd parallel. 
The President drew a distinction, however cosmetic, between the 
action to extend the SNFZ and the military strikes to make it effective, by 
stating that: 
36 'Pentagon Says Command Site Was Struck', jam, 3 September 1996. 
37 Tress Briefing by Mike McCurry', maß, 3 September 1996. 
38 'Statement by the Press Secretary', ,3 September 1996. 
39 William Perry, in 'The United States responded. . ', p. 2. 
40 Shalikashvili interview, p. 4. 
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Our objectives are limited, but clear: to make Saddam pay a 
price for the latest act of brutality, reducing his ability to 
threaten his neighbours and America's interests. First we are 
extending the no-fly zone in southern Iraq. This will deny 
Saddam control of Iraqi airspace from the Kuwaiti border to 
the southern suburbs of Baghdad, and significantly restrict 
Iraq's ability to conduct offensive operations in the region. 
Second, to protect the safety of our aircraft enforcing the no- 
fly zone, our Cruise missiles struck Saddam's air defence 
capabilities in southern Iraq. 4' 
Logically, of course, if not in terms of political presentation, one is the 
concomitant of the other given the prevailing situation. Ironically, what 
appeared to be a coercive act (the missile strikes) was really an act intended 
to enable an increase in the coercive value of the SNFZ. General Ralston 
stated: `The message that we are sending to Saddam Hussein ... That 
is, if 
he violates the norms that are expected, that he will suffer a penalty. In this 
particular case, he is suffering a penalty in loss of sovereignty over his 
airspace. '42 A Department of State spokesman claimed that: 
... we have attacked Saddam Hussein's centre, 
his strategic 
centre, the assets that are most precious to him -- command 
and control assets, anti-aircraft assets. We chose to react to 
the events of recent days by choosing targets that were in our 
interests to destroy. Those are the targets we destroyed. They 
weaken Saddam Hussein. They weaken him militarily, and, in 
a general sense, they reduce his ability to pose a threat to the 
region .. 
43 
The expansion of the SNFZ was a means of applying further pressure and 
the incursion provided an opportunity for the coalition to exploit. It also 
obviated the uncomfortable and undesirable position of having to pick a 
side in the Kurdish conflict. 
It would be unwise, given the logistical requirements for the 
maintenance of the SNFZ, to enlarge the zone without guaranteeing the safety 
41 `Statement by the President', W} IPR 3 September 1996, p. 1. 
42I? oI) News Briefnn_ 4 September 1996, p. 6. 
43 DOS DPA, 4 September 1996, p. 9. 
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of the enforcing aircraft. General Ralston revealed how the operation affected 
the situation and the American reasoning behind their action: 
... the rationale for this is the fact that our strategic interests 
of the United States [sic] are certainly to the south, and we 
want to make it as difficult as possible for Saddam in some 
unpredictable way to threaten his neighbours, certainly, to the 
south. By increasing the size of the no-fly zone that gives us 
additional warning; but more importantly, it significantly 
impacts his training of his armed forces and reduces their 
readiness. 
In order to facilitate our pilots enforcing that no-fly zone, we 
wanted to do everything possible to reduce the risk to our 
aircrews. So our strikes yesterday were designed to reduce the 
threats to our airplanes and our pilots enforcing the no-fly 
zone. We had targeted surface-to-air missile sites as well as his 
integrated air defence network .. 44 
There were some concerns associated with the strike and the extension. 
The 32nd parallel was originally chosen in order to ensure that the tanker 
orbits took place within the safety of Saudi airspace. 45 With the extension of 
the SNFZ and in particular because of the removal of hostile air defence 
assets, the coalition could risk putting tanker aircraft onto station within the 
zone, thus allowing for greater NFZ loiter times. 
How effective were the strikes? The first strike was conducted using 
unmanned means, such as CALCMs and T-LAMs. Of the 13 CALCMs, eight 
of the 10 targets were struck, and three of the missiles failed their pre-launch 
inspections 46 However, it was noted that: `Part of the problem with the 
CALCMs were [sic] that they were fired at targets they were not intended to 
destroy, a product of hasty planning ... The planning error occurred 
because 
no air component commander, with specialised knowledge of the effects of 
aerial weapons, was assigned by Central Command to help plan the mission. '47 
44 Ralston, in DoD News Brkfin 
_4 
September 1996, p. 1. 
45 See p. 214 above. 
46 `Pentagon bolsters force in Gulf as Iraq ignores warnings', jf, 18 September 1996. 
47 D. Fulbhum, `I lard Lessons in Iraq Lead to New Attack Plan', Aß, 16 September 1996. 
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This was a hastily planned strike forced by the coalition's strategy of 
asymmetrical response to Iraqi actions. Nine to 12 of the 14 T-LAMs hit their 
target on the first strike, and 12 to 15 of the second wave of 17 T-LAMs hit 
the target. 48 The hastiness of the operation meant that the T-LAMs were 
reliant on global positioning systems (GPS) as opposed to the digital terrain 
mapping normally used by the missile. This translated into a relative lack of 
accuracy. 49 Secretary Perry noted that these systems had a Circular Error 
Probable (CEP) of between 10 and 15 meters, and given that the warheads 
weighed 2,000 pounds in one case, and 1,000 in the other, they will have an 
effect on the target 50 Given the popular perception of the T-LAM, it was 
necessary for the DoD to explain why it had not met all expectations. The 
executive officer of the US Navy's cruise missile office was quoted in the New 
York Times explaining some of the theory behind the employment of the 
missile, where it was necessary to fire: `... multiple missiles on some aim 
points. And in the case of complex targets, they have chosen to go back and 
restrike ... '51 With complex targets, more would be required, and 
in the case 
of doubt, it would make sense to fire another salvo 52 
Did the strikes improve the military situation? As already noted, the 
effectiveness of coalition aircraft in terms of the time to be spent in the SNFZ 
and their distance of penetration was increased. General Shalikashvili stated: 
`Coupled with the extension of the southern no-fly zone up to the southern 
suburbs of Baghdad, this provided us with a better view of what was going on 
in Iraq. Combined with the no-drive zone, from a military point-of-view, it 
was a much better situation ... Our ability to defend Kuwait 
had been 
increased. '53 The extra space allowed the coalition to detect and react to 
threats to Kuwait with greater speed. Due to the extended range, aircraft 
18 `Pentagon bolsters force'. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Perry & Portillo, p. 4. 
51 J. Cushman, Tentagon Defends Missile's Accuracy, Nn 5 September 1996. 
S2 Ralston, in DoD News Briefinn, 4 September 1996, p. 4. 
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enforcing the SNFZ could now easily strike at most of Iraq's air defence 
network. 54 With the southeastern air defence network out of operation, the 
allies would have a path, clear of opposition and even the means to detect 
incursions, to launch strikes at Baghdad. 55 
Viewed in the light of the SNFZ extension and its role in the 
American' policy toward Iraq, one can discern that containment was the 
American objective. In his later statement to the House of Representatives 
International Relations Committee, Robert Pelletreau stated that: 
Our policy is to contain Iraq, employing political, economic 
and military measures. This policy has enjoyed bipartisan 
support through two administrations ... The 
key elements of 
containment are: 
-- inspections and monitoring by UNSCOM to prevent Iraq's 
pursuit of weapons of mass destruction; 
-- a strong UN sanctions regime; 
-- no-fly zones below the 33rd parallel and above the 36th 
parallel to prevent Iraq's use of airpower; and 
-- a no-drive zone pursuant to UNSCR 949, whereby Saddam 
is prohibited from reinforcing his ground forces in the 
south. 56 
The SNFZ extension was another means of placing pressure on Iraq to 
comply with SCR 687 and its antecedents. William Perry reiterated this by 
stating that: `Our objective remains the same as it has been from the 
beginning, to deter Saddam Hussein from taking actions which commit 
atrocities to his own people, which attack his neighbours, and which upset 
S3 Shalikashvili interview, pp. 4-5. 
54 B. Starr, `Clinton's line in the sand puts pressure on DoD', 112W, 11 September 1996. 
55 E. 'Air Zone Enforced', N)a, 5 September 1996. 
56 http: //www. state. gov/www/regions/nea/960925. htm1, p. S. 
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the security and stability of the region. '57 A White House press spokesman, 
Mike McCurry, went further than William Perry, by claiming that: 
One of our goals here was to not be fixated on responding to 
his tactical moves, nor towards the Kurds. There are a lot of 
practical and geopolitical reasons for that, but our interests 
were, first and foremost, to restrict his ability to pose further 
threat [sic] to international peace and security, consistent with 
U. N. Security Council resolutions, and also pose a threat to 
long-time allies of the United States in the region. 58 
If Iraqi compliance with UN resolutions could not be obtained, Iraq would 
still have to be contained. 
The SNFZ extension provided evidence to support suspicions within 
the international community that the containment of Iraq was the only goal 
for the US-led coalition. This goal bore little relation to the humanitarian 
situation despite the public statements to the contrary. Marc Weller argued 
that: `In consequence, the humanitarian veneer which had covered the aerial 
exclusion zones was peeled off. It appeared that the worst fears of the 
opponents of a right of humanitarian "intervention" in international law were 
being fulfilled: the doctrine appeared to be abused by powerful states as a 
cover for power politics. '59 This was a significant blow to the coalition's 
public image, and another soon followed. 
The allies were not exactly enthusiastic about the strikes and SNFZ 
extension. Despite its provision of logistical support of the first strike, namely 
the use of the airfield at Diego Garcia for refuelling aircraft for the B-52s, the 
British government was unimpressed with the NFZ extension. Initially, 
British forces were ordered not to enforce the extension, but this was 
rescinded shortly after. 6° The French government was unequivocal about its 
position, as `... ra participation s e' fectuera au sud du 32e parallele ... '61 The 
British 
57 Perry, in `Perry and Portillo', DoD News Briefing, 4 September 1996, p. 4. 
Ss McCurry, in McCurry and Parris, p. 8. 
59 Weller, 'The US, Iraq and the Use of Force', p. 95. 
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government then tried to table a resolution at the Security Council that directly 
addressed the situation in northern Iraq. 
The strikes and extension of the SNFZ proved to be rather unpopular 
with certain members of the UNSC. The Russian government was extremely 
upset by the strikes and called them `disproportionate'. 62 It also made it 
known that it believed that any further actions should be authorised 
specifically by the UNSC. 63 The Chinese government had troubles of its own 
in Tibet and opposed the extension due to the potential precedent, and the 
Arab world recoiled from it, fearing it would fuel a fundamentalist backlash 64 
The British delegation to the UN continued to campaign for a draft 
resolution, but became caught up in a wrangle over the tone and language of 
its contents. The French, Chinese and Russian delegations to the UN wanted 
to weaken the condemnation of the Iraqi government and include a 
condemnation of the American strike and SNFZ extension to be included. 65 
By 6 September, the British government gave up, and it seemed that any 
vestige of international recognition of the legality of the strikes was lost 66 
The unusual legal justification for DESERT STRIKE led to a lack of 
consensus within the UNSC. The Clinton Administration maintained that the 
60 C. Whitney, 'Washington Is on Its Own: Allies Express Support But Shun Involvement', ], (i, 4 
September 1996. The British political and military support for the strikes can be found in: I. Black, 
'US presses for support on Iraq', Guardian. 17 September 1996, M. Binyon, `Rifkind backs blow 
against man who "cannot be trusted"', Via 4 September 1996, '11awk Major stands alone', 
Guardian, 4 September 1996, and Perry and Portillo, p. 4. 
61 French Foreign Minister I Ierve Charette, in 'Francs-Etats-Unis-1raq- ommunigal do ministirr des Affairs 
Etrangen?, 5 September 1996), French FMPR. The translation: '... its participation will occur to the 
south of the 32nd Parallel... ' 
62 Lavrov cited in A. Mitchell, `U. S. Continuing Bid to Smash Air Defense', NU 4 September 1996. 
63 Boutros-Ghali, p. 297. 
64 I. Black and M. Tran, 'Allies pin down Saddam's forces: Russia leads protests', srcUn, 6 September 
1996, J. Bone, 'Allies out of step on text on UN resolution', Times, 5 September 1996, and 
`Saddamned'. Economist, 7 September 1996. 
65 B. Crossette, 'U. N. Council Members Negotiate, Fruitlessly', N, 6 September 1996. 
66 J. Bone and T. Rhodes, `Britain gives up bid for UN unity against Saddam', Tjmc 7 September 1996, 
and 'Move to Censure Iraq Fails', jam, 7 September 1996. 
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incursion by Iraqi forces violated SCRs 688 and 678.67 Herve Charette, the 
French Foreign Minister, claimed on a number of occasions that Americans 
actions were neither justified nor authorised by the Security Council. 68 The 
jurisprudential basis of American action was, to say the least, shaky. It is a 
general principle of law that the legality of actions can only be determined by 
reference to governing law, or in this case to the legality and scope of the 
governing UN resolutions. The latter point has to be emphasised. UN 
resolutions are not of themselves necessarily legal. They can be subject to 
judicial test. Second, even if the resolutions are themselves legal, it is also a 
matter for judicial review whether particular actions fall properly within their 
ambit. It is clearly insufficient for legality that those taking action persuade 
themselves that the action is legal. It is also clearly insufficient to meet the test 
of legality that there be support by more than one party to the action, as this is 
collusion as opposed to legality. Thus the US found itself facing problems as 
a result of its action. The US defence was that the scope of UN resolutions 
gave empowerment for the action it undertook. Yet in significant measure, its 
adducement of legality apparently flowed from the fact that the majority of the 
coalition partners agreed that the action should be taken. This is a doubtful 
premise and, moving from the strictly legal argument, the premise became 
even weaker when members of the coalition themselves questioned the 
legality of action and took the stance that the UN resolutions provided 
insufficient legal cover for the actions actually taken. 
The Turkish government was concerned about the situation in 
northern Iraq. Fears of terrorism prompted it to launch airstrikes against the 
PKK bases in northern Iraq. 69 In late September, the Turkish government 
67 DoS DPB, 3 September 1996, pp. 10 and 16, DoS DPB, 4 September 1996, p. 2, and McCurry and 
Parris, pp. 10-11. 
68 'Entntien do mimst, des Affth s ftranghrs, Al, Henri de Charrtte, aver 'Europe 1" (8 September 1996), La 
Politigne 
. tra hr de la Frana (September-October 1996), p. 21, and '511 Assemblie grnfrale des Nations 
unier-Entirtien du ministre des Aff s ftrangens, At Hervä de Charette, avec la presse francdsl (24 September 
1996), La Politigue 
. tra ere de la Franas (September-October 1996), pp. 92-93. 
69 S. Kinzer, Turks, Opposing U. S., Urge Iraq To Take Control of Kurdish Area', , 
21 September 
1996, Turkey to Keep Iraq Security Zone', 25 September 1996, and Dom 5 September 1996. 
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informed its American counterpart of its intention to establish a 10-kilometer 
wide buffer zone along their border. The buffer zone was established within 
days70 Ankara was also concerned about the state of disorder, and sought to 
pre-empt a refugee crisis similar to that of March-April 1991. 
The strikes were unpopular with the Gulf States, but the extension of 
the SNFZ itself met with approval and support. Both Kuwait and Bahrain 
agreed to greater numbers of American forces on their soils. Additional 
aircraft were based at Al Jaber Air Base in Kuwait, and Sheikh Isa Air Base in 
Bahrain. 71 The Saudi government supported the extension of the SNFZ and 
its relation to the policy of the containment of Iraq. 72 However, there were a 
number of reports that the strikes were not well-received in the Arab world. 73 
While the popular reaction focussed on American imperialism or arrogance, 
the governmental reactions were less emotional. Most governments feared 
that the strikes would contribute to the growth of fundamentalism and the 
further erosion of Iraqi sovereignty. 74 
The strikes and extension failed to address the KDP-PUK conflict. 
Fighting continued in Sulaimaniyah on 6 September 199675 The renewed 
fighting in northern Iraq led to another refugee crisis. On 9 September, the 
KDP captured Sulaimaniyah and the Lake Dokan dam. 76 A large number of 
refugees fled towards the Iranian border. The UN estimated that there were 
between 70,000 and 75,000, while the Iranian government thought there was 
70 `U. S. Backs Turkish Troop Move', NU 8 September 1996, 
71 DoD News Briefirr 
, 
17 September 1996, pp. 2-3. 
72 Ibid., p. 3. 
73 N. MacFarquhar, Toes Say Saddam's Gamble Paid Off, ]jam, 7 September 1996, `Mixed reaction in 
Arab capitals', IT, 4 September 1996, and C. Walker, 'Outrage in Arab world puts peace process at 
risk', Times" 4 September 1996. 
74 B. Crossette, 'Clinton Finds Little Support At the U. N. for Iraqi Strikes', N, 5 September 1996. 
75 11. Pope, `Policing Saddam', Independent 7 September 1996. 
76J. Barham, B. Mortimer and P. Waldmeir, `Saddam's Kurdish allies take key town', ] t, 10 September 
1996, D. Jehl, `Faction of Kurds Supported by Iraq Takes Rival's City', )x, 10 September 1996, and 
C. Nuttall, `Iraq's Kurdish allies take key towns', Guardian, 9 September 1996. 
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as many as 200,00077 The UNHCR dispatched some personnel to assist the 
Iranian government with its new problem. 78 The refugee crisis highlighted the 
problems associated with the `Kurdish Civil War' by reinforcing the point that 
fighting hindered aid distribution. ' The PUK and KDP resumed fighting on 
10 October. 79 Within four days, the PUK recaptured Sulaimaniyah 80 
The American government tried frantically to obtain another cease- 
fire. The KDP-PUK conflict made it difficult for the American government 
to argue that the Iraqi government should not control the aid distribution in 
northern Iraq. The purpose of the cease-fire talks was to allow the `oil-for- 
food' deal to go forward. Robert Pelletreau was able to get both parties to 
agree to talks on 16 October 1996.81 The State Department stated that the 
talks were an attempt to bring about peace and secure guarantees from both 
parties that they would not seek Iraqi or Iranian intervention. 82 It did not 
appear hopeful. The fighting continued as the talks started, and on 18 
October 1996, Koi Sanjaq fell yet again to the KDP. 83 Progress began to be 
made on the peace talks. By 23 October 1996, these talks led to a cease-fire 
and an agreement to continue with some reconciliation talks at a later date 84 
The cease-fire solidified when the parties agreed to the creation of a buffer 
zone and its monitoring. 85 This cease-fire removed the remaining obstacle for 
the `oil-for-food' deal. A few weeks later, the deal was revived and agreed 
n D. Jehl, 'Fearful Kurds I cuddle at Iran's Closed Door', x, 11 September 1996, and M. Theodoulou, 
Tehran begs for help as Kurds flood to border', Z=-;, 11 September 1996. 
781)05 DPB, 12 September 1996, pp. 4-5. 
79 DoS DPA, 9 October 1996, p. 18, DoS DPB, 10 October 1996, p. 10. 
80 D. If irrt, `Saddam's Kurdish foes retake city, Guardian, 14 October 1996, `Kurdish Faction Recaptures 
Stronghold of Iraq-Aided Rivals', N. Yl, 14 October 1996, and M. Theodoulou, 'Vital Kurdish city is 
recaptured by anti-Saddam group', Times" 14 October 1996. 
81 DoS DPB, 16 October 1996, p. 9. 
s2 `Rival Kurds Open Peace Talks', 1111,31 October 1996. 
83 DoS DPB, 18 October 1996, p. 3. 
84 S. Myers, `Kurd Rivals in North Iraq Said to Agree to NY1,24 October 1996. 
85 S. Erlanger, `Kurdish Factions Extend Cease-Fire in Iraq: U. S. Still Cautious', NYL 1 November 1996. 
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upon by both the UN and Iraq. 86 On 10 December 1996, oil was flowing 
through the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline, as Iraqis rejoiced-87 This would 
reduce the human cost of sanctions, and prevent a further decline in the 
American image on the international scene. 
Did the SNFZ extension have an effect on Iraq's actions? The new 
zone came into effect at noon (GMT) on 4 September 1996. Prior to this, 
between 20 and 25 Iraqi fighters were moved to airfields in central Iraq-88 The 
Iraqi government seemed prepared to deny battle and accept the new scope of 
the SNFZ. The JTF-SWA ordered that coalition aircraft not fly below 20,000 
feet in order to avoid AAA and Roland fire 89 At the end of the first mission 
to fly north of the 32nd parallel, two MiG-29s challenged the extension by 
flying south of the 33rd parallel, and then fled before any allied aircraft could 
attack them. 90 On 11 September, two SA-6s fired at a pair of F-16s over the 
NNFZ. Two F-15Es were dispatched to destroy the launchers, but they failed 
to find the target 91 A day later, the Iraqis fired three missiles in the SEZ, but 
there were no allied aircraft in the vicinity. 92 The aforementioned incidents 
were tests of coalition will and capability to enforce the existence of the 
NFZs. At the same time, the Iraqi government tried to repair their damaged 
air defence network. On 10 September, General Shalikashvili stated that: We 
have warned Saddam that any attempt to repair those sites or to reinforce 
them will be taken very seriously, and he must understand the 
86 B. Crossette, 'Iraq and U. N. Make Deal on Oil Sales for Aid', hlfl., 26 November 1996. 
87 J. Bone, 'UN authorises "oil for food" deal', M=,;, 10 December 1996. 
88 E. Schmitt, 'Air Zone Enforced', jyjM 5 September 1996, and Ralston, in DoD News Briefing. 4 
September 1996. 
89 White, p. 41. 
90 Perry and Portillo, p. 1, Schmitt, 'Air Zone', and White, p. 42. 
91 P. Shenon, 'U. S. Is Preparing Bigger Air Strikes On Targets In Iraq', NI, 12 September 1996. 
92 P. Shenon, 'U. S. Sends Another Carrier To Bolster Mideast Forces', x, 13 September 1996. 
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consequences. '93 The immediate consequence was that the might engage in 
another series of strikes. 
The American government began to deploy some of its forces after 
the second warning. Four B-52s were moved to Diego Garcia, and the USS 
Enterprise and its battle group, which was augmented with several warships. 
The third brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division began to fly over to Kuwait 
several days later, as well as a Patriot battery. 94 Saddam Hussein ordered a halt 
to the attacks on 13 September. 95 This was Iraq's concession to the pressure 
of the combination of the strikes, the expansion of the SNFZ, and the 
deployment of an American armoured brigade. The deployments continued 
because they believed that Iraq was continuing to threaten the aircraft 
enforcing the NFZs. There were two reasons for this belief. First, the 
Kuwaiti government became concerned after the Iraqi Prime Minister Tariq 
Aziz had made some threatening public statements 96 Second, the US, having 
wrecked the fixed air defence missile launchers, wanted the Iraqis to reveal 
their mobile launchers 97 This would obviate any chance of allied aircraft 
being unpleasantly surprised. Given the Iraqi track record on compliance, this 
was futile. It was only in mid-September that Saddam Hussein ordered a halt 
to resistance to the enforcement of the NFZs. It is not entirely clear why the 
decision was made, but the timing of the decision is consistent with the 
announcements of deployments of American forces to the Gulf. It is likely 
93 Shalikashvili cited in M. Fletcher, and M. Theodoulou, `Clinton is ready to make Saddam pay "hell of a 
Mau-, & 10 September 1996. See also: DoS DPI;, 10 September 1996, p. 3, and DoS D1, B_ 11 
September 1996. 
94 Major General L Laporte, U. S. Army, and Major M. Cummings, U. S. Army, `Prompt Detcrrencc: The 
Army in Kuwait', M$, Vol. LXXVII, No. 6 (November-December 1997), p. 39, N. MacFarquhar, 
'U. S. Warning Iraq That New Attacks Are Still Possible', x, 16 September 1996, 'Pentagon bolsters 
force in Gulf as Iraq ignores warnings', j= 18 September 1996, P. Shenon, `U. S. Sends Another 
Carrier To Bolster Mideast Forces', I, 13 September 1996, and M. Walker and I. Black, 'US ups 
stakes against Iraq', Guardian, 13 September 1996. 
95 P. Shenon, 'Iraq Orders I lalt To Missile Strikes on American Jets', N1'r, 14 September 1996, and M. 
Theodoulou and M. Evans, `Baghdad halts attacks on coalition air patrols', = 14 September 1996. 
96 DoD News Bd fing, 17 September 1996, pp. 5-6. 
97 P. Shenon, `Iraq Has Not Fully Met Demands, U. S. Says', x, 16 September 1996. 
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that the Iraqi government was sensitive to large deployments, and perceived 
them as a prelude to the renewal of hostilities. 
Another second-order effect of this crisis was the American decision 
to end its participation in the relief operations associated with PROVIDE 
COMFORT ahead of schedule. Since the RGFC's incursion into Iraqi 
`Kurdistan', any American presence in northern Iraq, whether for aid or not, 
was unwelcome. The Clinton Administration stated that its direct support 
would end, but its support for the relief organisations would continue 98 
Worse yet, those Kurds that had worked closely with American organisations 
were probable targets for retribution by the Iraqi government. A day later, the 
Clinton Administration announced that it would evacuate approximately 2,000 
of their Kurdish employees and INC members 99 The' first evacuation, 
labelled Operation QUICK TRANSIT, began on 16 September 1996.10° This 
evacuation was completed by the end of the month. 
The American government began to consider the merits of a second 
evacuation. This meant that NGOs associated with the American 
government would leave northern Iraq. 10' QUICK TRANSIT II began on 19 
October, and this time, it consisted of 600 people associated with the INC. 102 
The American government sought to prevent the collapse of the Iraqi 
opposition. The evacuations had a deleterious effect. The French 
government stated that if PROVIDE COMFORT II lost its humanitarian 
aspect, it would withdraw its forces from that operation. 103 Without this 
98 S. Myers, `U. S. Seeks To End Direct Aid For Kurds, r1I 12 September 1996. 
99 DoS DPB, 11 September 1996, pp. 14-15. 
100 DoS DPI1.16 September 1996, pp. 5-6. 
101 DoS DPB, 20 September 1996, p. 8, and DoS DPB_ 25 September 1996, p. 8. 
102 DoS DPK- 21 October 1996, p. 7. 
103 'Entry ien acrnrdie par le ministre diligai aux Af aires er vpienes, M Michel Barmer, as quodilien `Turkish Daily 
News", La Poäd= Etrano? re De La France: Textes et Doa menu (September-October 1996), (Paris: French 
Foreign Ministry, 1996), p. 218. See also: 'K. un1istan iraquien-Commnnigai du minirten ds Aprrs itrangeni, 
2 November 1996), French FMPR. The loss of infrastructure was noted in C. Nuttall, Relief from 
Iraqi oil sales "at risk"', Guardian, 6 December 1996. 
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`legitimising' part of the operation, consensus soon evaporated. The Clinton 
Administration announced in late November that it was going to conduct a 
third evacuation. This time, 5,000 people who worked for the NGOs during 
PROVIDE COMFORT II would be evacuated in QUICK TRANSIT 111.104 
This began in 4 December 1996. The Acting Department of State 
Spokesman, John Dinger, announced on Christmas Day that: Because of 
changes to the mission as a result of the closing last fall of the Military 
Command Centre in Zakho, and the end of humanitarian assistance in the 
north under UNSCR 986 to international organisations, the title "Provide 
Comfort" will no longer be used. '105 This signified the end of the 
humanitarian relief operations mandated by PROVIDE COMFORT II. 
The French government withdrew from PROVIDE COMFORT II 
due to the cessation of relief operations in northern Iraq. It announced that 
on 1 January 1997, French aircraft would no longer enforce the NNFZ. 106 
Without the humanitarian element, the French government would not 
participate any longer. PROVIDE COMFORT II became Operation 
NORTHERN WATCH. 
Conclusion 
DESERT STRIKE was intended to provide a coalition response to 
Iraq's intervention in the KDP-PUK conflict. Iraq's choice was limited by its 
withdrawal from Irbil before the attack. The SNFZ extension was more-or- 
less a reprisal as opposed to an act of coercion. The extension completed the 
transformation of the SNFZ into a coercive instrument, but the coalition 
appeared to be ill prepared for actions in northern Iraq, thus weakening the 
104 DoS DPB. 26 November 1996, p. 19. See also. http: //www. incirlik. afnA/history/Crr-_. pc. htm for 
statistics on all three airlifts, 'US completes Kurdish airlift', Guardian, 17 December 1996, and 'US to 
evacuate aid workers from Iraq', Guardian, 27 November 1996. 
105 'Extension of Coalition Air Operation Over Northern Iraq', U. S. rartment of State Press 
Statement. 25 December 1996. 
106 `Participation franmise aux di positifs Troaide Comfort" et "Southern Watch" - Corm unique du mrnistine des 
Affaires prang ref (27 December 1996), La Po trgnr 1ý=g&e Dr La Francr Textes r1 Document: 
(November-December 1996), (Paris: French Foreign Ministry, 1996), p. 309. 
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credibility of its threats. The SNFZ extension seemed to imply the coalition's 
preparedness to attack Baghdad, and the Iraqi government seemed to act on 
this threat, and sought to escalate, thus requiring another threat by end- 
September. The second and third order effects of the crisis offered some 
hope to the Iraqi government. These effects included the French 
government's refusal to enforce the extension, the American QUICK 
TRANSIT series of operations and the French concern about the 
abandonment of humanitarian efforts in northern Iraq. Despite claims to the 
contrary, the coalition's overall capability was constrained politically. Such 
constraints meant that it was unable to strike the RGFC in northern Iraq. The 
coalition chose to attack air defence assets, a target set of limited significance, 
in a scheme of incremental escalation. This satisfied Clinton Administration 
criteria but failed as a coercive operation. 
It is a matter of fact that the SNFZ was extended and coalition aircraft 
were enabled to operate within its confines with relative impunity. It is also a 
fact that this was achieved at a cost. The NNFZ was almost ignored by the 
United States and the result of that in combination with the action in the 
South was to alienate France, and in the end, to cause their virtual withdrawal 
from the coalition. The creation of Operation NORTHERN WATCH was a 
direct result of the Iraqi intervention and not the coalition's actions on 3 
September. While the increase in Iraq's containment was achieved, it was at 
the expense of the weakening of the coalition. Saddam Hussein's capacity to 
harass Kuwait was reduced by the extension of the SNFZ and to that extent 
that strand of the strategy was also successful. 
With respect to the inhibition of action by the Iraqi government, the 
situation is much more confused. The strikes seem to have failed to alter Iraqi 
actions as they were a retaliatory act. The RGFC was ordered to withdraw 
before the strikes. There were north and eastwards movements of Iraqi forces 
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along the roads from Kirkuk towards Chamchamal and Sulaimaniyah. 107 Its 
presence still lingered there and at least a battalion of troops camped near 
Qosh Tepe, 15 miles southeast of Irbil, for a week after the strike. 108 These 
forces later withdrew to the south. DESERT STRIKE meant that Iraq would 
incur a high cost if, in the future, it tried to move back into the SNFZ. This 
was true as regards incursion by aircraft, but even more true if the Iraqis tried 
to rebuild air defence capability. However, in terms of cost to the Iraqi 
military machine, the costs apart from the loss of assets, was minimal. The 
extension of the no-fly zone did not impose any direct and unavoidable cost 
on Iraq, provided that it was content that the enlarged SNFZ should exist. 
While it was another `turn of the screw' on Iraq, it was still insufficient 
pressure to cause the Iraqi government to comply with the UN resolutions. 
107 'Press Briefing by Mike McCurry', WI II'R- 3 September 1996, p. 2, and M. Theodoulou, 'Saddam's 
tanks push on despite pullout claim', Vic 2 September 1996. 
108 D. Jehl, `Some Iraqis Are Still Dug In Inside the Kurdish Region', N, 8 September 1996, and P. 
Shenon, Pentagon Sees Slim Chance of U. S. War Role in Northern Iraq', ,9 September 
1996. 
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CHAPTER 11: DESERT FOX 
Throughout 1997 and 1998, Iraq exploited every opportunity to 
hinder UNSCOM's inspections and end the regime of sanctions. The 
coalition reacted by planning operations against Iraq, but inevitably, these 
were cancelled due to international opposition. By late 1998, the international 
community was frustrated enough to have UNSCOM conduct a test of Iraq's 
compliance with a view to ending sanctions. Iraq failed to comply, and this 
led to the coalition's conduct of Operation DESERT FOX, a four-day-long 
bombing campaign in December 1998. Not focusing solely on air defence 
assets, DESERT FOX was intended to be more prolonged and devastating. 
The coalition was determined to remind Iraq that its disarmament would 
occur, either peacefully or by force. DESERT FOX was hailed as a victory by 
the American and British governments, but it failed to achieve its aim of 
obtaining Iraqi compliance 'with UN resolutions. Iraqi resistance, both 
political and military, increased as a result. 
Chronology 
June 1997 A series of incidents occurred where 
UNSCOM inspection teams were 
hindered or denied access to inspection 
sites. 
September 1997 On three separate occasions, the Iraqi 
government denied UNSCOM access to 
inspection sites because they were 
considered `Presidential Sites'. 
23 October 1997 The UNSC stated that it would impose a 
travel ban on all Iraqi government or 
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military officials until 11 April 1998 
unless Iraq co-operated. 
30 October 1997 The Iraqi government demanded that 
American members of UNSCOM leave 
Iraq within seven days. It also barred 
two American arms inspectors from re- 
entering Iraq after a vacation. 
12 November 1997 The UNSC imposed a travel ban on 
Iraqi officials. 
23 November 1997 The Iraqi government announced that 
any palaces and presidential sites would 
remain off-limits to UNSCOM 
inspection teams. 
December 1997 Despite delays and interference, several 
`off-limits' sites were inspected despite 
the Iraqi pronouncement of 23 
November, and UNSCOM reported 
that there was evidence that material had 
been removed. 
12 January 1998 The Iraqi government announced that it 
would bar UNSCOM's inspection team 
led by Scott Ritter, an American, as it 
contained too many American and 
British citizens and was therefore biased 
or spying. 
14 January 1998 Following an Iraqi government protest 
about the inspection team having too 
many Americans, the American 
government stated that it was prepared 
to allow changes to the team. 
The Russian Foreign Minister contacted 
the American Secretary of State to 
register his government's opposition to 
the use of force. 
15 January 1998 Both the French and Russian 
governments offered to replace the 
American and British members of the 
Ritter team with their own nationals. 
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16 January 1998 In order to break the deadlock, the UN 
offered to accelerate UNSCOM's 
activities and allow Iraqi participation. 
19-21 January 1998 The UNSCOM Executive Chairman, 
Richard Butler, held two days of talks 
with the Iraqi government. He was 
unable to obtain Iraqi permission for 
access to `presidential' sites, but did 
obtain an agreement on the use of 
technical experts for third-party 
assessments. 
22 January 1998 The Russian and Chinese government 
urged the UNSC to certify that Iraq had 
halted its nuclear programs despite 
UNSCOM's claims to the contrary. 
23 January 1998 Richard Butler briefed the UNSC on the 
19-21 January talks, and claimed that 
with Iraq's activities, UNSCOM was 
unable to fulfil its mandate. 
26 January 1998 The Russian government sent its 
Deputy Foreign Minister, Viktor 
Posuvalyuk to Iraq to find a diplomatic 
solution to the crisis. 
29-31 January 1998 Madeleine Albright, the American 
Secretary of State, travelled to Europe to 
meet with the British, French, Russian, 
and other European governments in 
order to obtain support for contingency 
operations against Iraq. 
1 February 1998 Both the Egyptian and Saudi 
governments called for a diplomatic 
solution to the crisis. The latter refused 
to allow any strikes to be conducted 
from its territory due to political 
sensitivities. 
3 February 1998 The British government announced it 
would also participate in military 
operations against Iraq if required. 
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The Chinese government announced its 
opposition to the use of force. 
4 February 1998 The Iraqi government offered to open 
eight `presidential' sites for one month, 
and the American government rejected 
the offer. 
5 February 1998 The French government refused to 
participate in any military action against 
Iraq. 
11 February 1998 The Iraqi government expanded its 
earlier offer to 60 days. 
12 February 1998 William Cohen, the American Secretary 
of Defense, visited Russia, and was told 
that if offensive operations were 
conducted against Iraq, it would damage 
Russo-American relations. 
20 February 1998 Kofi Annan visited Baghdad to meet 
with the Iraqi government to reach a 
diplomatic solution and discuss the 'oil- 
for-food' deal. 
22 February 1998 After a meeting with Saddam Hussein, 
Kofi Annan announced that he had 
reached a deal with the Iraqi 
government that resolved the crisis. 
30 March 1998 Richard Butler reported to the UNSC 
that Iraq still needed to provide more 
details with regard to its FFCDs on its 
chemical projects, especially its projects 
on VX, a deadly nerve gas. 
9 April 1998 UNSCOM reported that it suspected 
that Iraq was concealing its biological 
warfare programs. Technical 
evaluations proved the Iraqi declarations 
to be in error or false. 
13 April 1998 The IAEA announced that Iraq had 
complied with all requirements 
pertaining to its former nuclear weapons 
program. 
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2 June 1998 UNSCOM announced its concern about 
Iraq's accounting of missile warheads. 
5 July 1998 Talks between UNSCOM and the Iraqi 
government on the remaining 
requirements for a lifting of sanctions 
ended abruptly with the Iraqi rejection 
of all of Richard Butler's proposals for 
UNSCOM's activities. 
29 July 1998 The Russian government, with the 
support of its French and Chinese 
counterparts, proposed a SCR stating 
that Iraq had complied with its 
obligations under SCR 687 for the 
destruction of its nuclear arsenal. 
5 August 1998 The Iraqi government announced that it 
would cease to cooperate with 
UNSCON1. It would, however, allow 
monitoring by cameras to continue. 
9 September 1998 The UNSC adopted SCR 1194 that 
condemned Iraq's lack of co-operation 
and suspended all sanctions review until 
Iraq co-operated. 
5 October 1998 Following a visit by Tariq Aziz, the Iraqi 
Deputy Prime Minister, Kofi Annan 
outlined to the UNSC a `comprehensive 
review' of Iraqi compliance with SCR 
687 if Iraq co-operated with UNSCOAI. 
The review would see Iraq providing an 
accurate count of its arsenal, which 
UNSCOM would reconcile with its 
accounts on a deadline. 
6 October 1998 Richard Butler stated in his October 
review of UNSCOM's progress that 
Iraq was close to fulfilling its 
requirements for ballistic missiles and 
chemical weapons, but discrepancies 
remained in the area of biological 
weapons. 
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30 October 1998 The UNSC completed the proposal of 
the `comprehensive review'. Iraq 
announced that it would no longer 
cooperate with UNSCOM unless Butler 
was fired and sanctions were lifted. 
Early November 1998 
15 November 1998 
17 November 1998 
The US reinforced the JTF-SWA with 
the USS Enterprise carrier battle group 
and 129 extra aircraft. 
President Clinton called off a series of 
air strikes at the last minute after being 
notified that the Iraqi government 
agreed to cooperate with UNSCOM. 
UNSCOM began a series of inspections 
designed to test Iraq's claims. 
25 November 1998 Citing national security concerns, the 
Iraqi government refused to hand over a 
series of documents to UNSCOM. 
9 December 1998 An UNSCOM inspection team was 
denied access to a Ba'ath party office. 
The Iraqi government later declared all 
party offices to be off-limits to 
UNSCOM. 
11 December 1998 An UNSCOM team was denied access 
to an inspection site due to the Islamic 
sabbath. 
15 December 1998 Richard Butler submitted his findings to 
the UNSC. 
16 December 1998 As the UNSC debated Butler's findings, 
the coalition members launched 
DESERT FOX. The operation lasted 
until the night of 19 December 1998 
(Baghdad time). 
23 December 1998 Iraqi resistance continued over both 
NFZs, where aircraft and AAA were 
employed against the coalition. 
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Catalyst/Cause for Coercion 
From late 1996, many saw the coalition's activities as a merciless 
system of containment. The international community no longer believed that 
the coalition's humanitarian justifications were genuine. The coalition's 
support of UNSCOM consisted mainly of the threats about the use of force. 
However, threats relied on the coalition's credibility. This relied upon 
international support, which had declined since DESERT STRIKE. ' This 
was due to a genuine scepticism about the coalition's claims of a humanitarian 
basis for their actions, the bluntness of sanctions, and the popular sympathy 
within the Arab world for the plight of the Iraqi people. 
One of UNSCOM's major concerns in 1997 and 1998 was that the 
Iraqi government was concealing its WMD programmes in order to maintain, 
at least in some form, its arsenal. Scott Ritter noted that: 
From the outset he [Saddam Hussein] decided to outwit the 
disarmament provisions of the Security Council Resolution. 
Immediately after the adoption of 687, an emergency 
committee, chaired by Tariq Aziz and loosely-based on the 
SSO [Special. Security Organisation] Committee, met in 
Baghdad to craft Iraq's response ... The committee had clear instructions from Saddam Hussein: save as much of the Iraqi 
weapons of mass destruction capability as possible? 
In 1997, UNSCOM strongly suspected that a conspiracy existed to conceal 
Iraqi WMDs, and imagery taken during inspections in 1991,1996 and 1997 
provided further evidence. 3 Iraqi behaviour during the summer of 1997 led 
to greater suspicion. UNSCOM reported that: `In June 1997, the 
Cockburn and Cockburn, p. 264. 
2 Ritter, p. 105. The SSO (`Awn Al Khasi) is an Iraqi security organisation that deals with 'presidential' 
affairs, such as the quest for WNMDs and the protection of the leadership of Iraq. 
3 S/1999/94, p. 175. The imagery from 1991 was taken prior to, during and after the incidents at Abu 
Gharaib (23 June 1991) and Al Fallujah (28 June 1991). See: AO 1991, pp. 453.13.116.2 to 
453.13.116.5. 
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Commission experienced delays and obstructions throughout the 
inspections including the removal of material from sites ... given the 
information about concealment practices and the absence of evidence about 
their termination, the Commission believed it had no choice but to 
continue. '4 Inspections during August and September 1997 confirmed the 
existence of a conspiracy. This led to the decision to remove Iraq's curtain 
of deception. 5 
As a result of the decision to change approaches, UNSCOM became 
more intrusive, and the patience of the international community with Iraq 
grew thin. The coalition (now consisting primarily of the US and UK'') 
remained hesitant to use force due to concerns about French, Chinese and 
Russian opposition. 6 While these governments did not support Iraq's 
obstructive tactics, they were equally, if not more, opposed to the use of force 
against Iraq. Other means were therefore required. The first censure was 
SCR 1134 (23 October 1997) which threatened a travel ban, and this ban was 
imposed in SCR 1137 (12 November 1997)? Richard Butler, Rolf Ekeus' 
successor as Executive Chairman of UNSCONI, noted that: `... this action 
sent the clearest possible signal to Iraq -- namely that the Security Council was 
wavering in its resolve to enforce its own law ... 's The Iraqi government's 
response to SCR 1137 was to order the ejection of any American citizens 
employed by UNSCOM from Iraq. Richard Butler, fearing for UNSCOM's 
unity should only the Americans be ejected, ordered a complete withdrawal to 
Bahrain. The French, Russian, and Chinese governments heavily criticised the 
move .9 The coalition seriously considered force, but this was averted by 
4 S/ 1999/94, p. 176. 
5S/1999/94, P. 177. 
6 The French government continued to participate in Operation SOUTHERN WATCII after 
withdrawing from Operation PROVIDE COMFORT II. 
7 Security Council Resolution 1134, S/IES/1134 (1997), 23 October 1997, and Security Council 
Resolution 1137, S/RCS/1137 (1997), 12 November 1997. 
8 Butler, p. 91. 
9 Butler, pp. 102-104. 
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Russian intervention. 10 Iraq avoided another series of strikes while weakening 
the political status of the coalition, thus gaining a political victory. 
The Iraqi government quickly returned to its old ways. The Iraqis 
denied access to some `presidential sites', and this led to the American 
reconsideration of the use of force. "t In late November 1997, support for the 
coalition using force against Iraq was non-existent. A number of Gulf State 
governments made it known that the use of force was unacceptable, fearing 
that an attack on Iraq would derail the Middle East Peace Process. 12 The 
French and Russian governments made it clear that they would veto any 
UNSC authorisation of force. 13 
The US, UK, and a number of their allies prepared for the use of 
force against Iraq in an operation dubbed DESERT THUNDER in early 
1998. Yet it was evident that many states, including the other P-5 members, 
were opposed to the use of force due to the effects of sanctions. 
In addition to the significant opposition to a military operation against 
Iraq, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, offered to 
mediate between Iraq and the coalition. The Secretary-General and his staff 
wanted to resolve the crisis peacefully. Richard Butler claimed this desire was 
so compelling that they: `... detached the goal of conflict resolution ... 
from 
the fundamental requirement of disarming Iraq ... 
'14 This naturally impacted 
negatively on the political support offered to UNSCOhi. 
By mid-February 1998, even President Clinton favoured a diplomatic 
solution due to the lack of international support for the use of force. Scott 
Ritter noted acerbically that: `In allowing Madeleine Albright to encourage the 
10 S. Erlanger, 'Use of Force Avoided', JUL 24 November 1997. 
11 'Saddam's "Brinkmanship" Draws New U. S. Warning', 1LJ, 17 December 1997. 
12 D. Jehl, 'Arabs Concerned Clinton Could Lose I lis Focus on Peace in the Mideast', IM, 28 January 
1998. 
3 Cockburn and Cockburn, p. 272 and 275. 
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mission of Kofi Annan to Baghdad in February 1998, the Clinton 
Administration set the stage for the full endorsement of the Memorandum of 
Understanding, with its self-defeating secret protocol. '15 This `secret protocol' 
allowed the inspections of presidential sites to occur once only, and the 
Secretary-General would work towards a lift of the sanctions on Iraq. '6 Kofi 
Annan's MoU saw the Iraqi government reconfirm its acceptance of SCRs 
687 and 715, and grant access to the `presidential sites' in exchange for the 
inspection of said sites by a `Special Group' consisting of a number of 
diplomats and technical experts. '? The results of Kofi Annan's visit were 
popular both within the UNSC and the international community. 18 On 2 
March 1998, the UNSC endorsed the Secretary-General's deal, therefore, 
authorising the plan contained within it, `secret protocol' and all. 19 
This came at a very difficult time. While the deal appeared to lead to 
some form of Iraqi co-operation, there remained some concerns. For 
example, the Technical Expert Mission for BW noted that previous FFCD 
were, incomplete and inaccurate in many areas, including the history of the 
programme, its organisation and acquisition procedures 20 UNSCOM's 
consolidated report of April 1998 noted that it would be unable to fulfil its 
mandate for the destruction of ballistic missiles as well as chemical and 
biological weapons. 21 The IAEA reported that there were no problems with 
I4 Butler, p. 129. 
15 Ritter, p. 190. 
16 Ritter, p. 182. 
» `Letter Dated 25 February 1998 From the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security 
Council', S/1998/166 (27 February 1998). 
18 C. Wren, 'Security Council Supports Iraq Accord', 
, 25 
February 1998. 
19 Security Council Resolution 1154, S/RES/1154 (2 March 1998). 
20 `Letter dated 8 April 1998 from the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission Established by the 
Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) Addressed 
to the President of the Security Council', 8 Apri) 1998, pp. 3-10. 
21 Note by the Secretary-General', S/1998/332 (16 April 1998), pp. 7-14. 
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access or evidence of concealment of nuclear activities22 This complicated 
the issue, as it was not completely clear what Iraq still possessed. 
UNSCOM tried to obtain Iraqi co-operation throughout the spring 
and summer of 1998 in the formulation and implementation of a schedule for 
UNSCOM's inspection and final activities. This effort ended by August 1998 
due to Iraqi demand for a lifting of sanctions unless UNSCOM proved an 
Iraqi arsenal still existed. 23 The coalition suspected that, by speaking out 
without being able to use force, it risked a further loss of credibility. It was 
therefore necessary to set the stage for future uses of force. The first step was 
SCR 1194 (9 September 1998), which suspended any review of sanctions until 
the Iraqi government decided to cooperate with UNSCOM 24 This was a step 
towards a peaceful solution in order to avoid violence. 
By autumn 1998, the key issues were the states of the Iraqi chemical 
and biological arsenals. Richard Butler held the opinion that: 
... the disarmament phase of the Security Council's 
requirements is possibly near its end in the missile and 
chemical weapons areas but not in the biological weapons 
area; Iraq is permitting the monitoring work of the 
Commission to be exercised only at a less than satisfactory 
level, yet its development is vital to the future; and full 
disclosure by Iraq of all necessary materials and information 
remains the crucial ingredient for both an end to the 
disarmament process and future monitoring .. 
25 
A Technical Expert Mission (TEM) had been undertaken earlier that year to 
evaluate Iraqi claims that VX had never been weaponised. By late October, 
this TEM found evidence of degraded V1 in warheads and therefore 
concluded that the Iraqi claim was false. 26 President Clinton, in a3 March 
22 `Letter Dated 9 April 1998 From the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security 
Council', S/1998/312 (9 April' 1998), pp. 3-4. 
23 S/1999/94, p. 6. 
24 'Note by the Secretary-General', S/1998/920 (6 October 1998), p. S. 
25 S/1998/920, p. 18 
26 Butler, p. 9 and `Report of the VX Expert Fleeting', 23 October 1998, p. 3, and S/1999/94, p. 7. 
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1999 letter to Congress, remarked on the events of the summer and autumn 
of 1998: 
The build-up to the current crisis began on August 5 when the 
Iraqi government suspended co-operation with UNSCOM 
and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), except 
on a limited-range of monitoring activities. On October 31, 
Iraq announced that it was ceasing all co-operation with 
UNSCOM. 27 
The Iraqi government's behaviour created for international political support 
Clinton Administration. The UNSC passed SCR 1205 on 5 November 
1998, stating that it: `... Reaffirms its intention to act in accordance with the 
relevant provisions of resolution 687 (1991) on the duration of the 
prohibitions referred to in that resolution, and notes that by its failure so far 
to comply with its relevant obligations Iraq has delayed the moment when 
the Council can do so ... '28 The UNSC then threatened that sanctions 
would not be reviewed until Iraq co-operated. This rebuke was a 
manifestation of the residual opposition within the Council to the use of 
force. The coalition was going to attack in mid-November, but it was called 
off the attack at the last minute. Having seen Iraqi casualty estimates, 
President Clinton became concerned and delayed the attack to wait for the 
Iraqi government to pledge co-operation, which it did late on 15 November 
1998.29 
The Iraqi pledge of co-operation hardly seemed credible, and it was 
necessary to verify this pledge. Sandy Berger, the American National Security 
Advisor, recalled that: `On the 17th of November, UNSCOM began to test 
Iraq's co-operation. The timetable for that effort was established by 
27 `Iraq's Compliance With the UN Security Council', U. S. I Louse of Rcpres ntatives Document 106-34, 
3 March 1999, p. 2. 
28 Security Council Resolution 1025 (1998), S/RTS/1205 (1998), 5 November 1998, p. 2. Underlines 
occur in the original. 
29 B. Graham, `Clinton Overruled Most Advice on Raids', IJfl , 
17 November 1998. 
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UNSCOM's Chairman, Richard Butler. '30 The tests were: `... focussed on 
four main areas, pursuant to the Commission's mandate: requests for 
information through access to documents and interviews of Iraqi personnel; 
monitoring inspections; inspections of capable sites; and, disarmament 
inspections relating to proscribed weapons and activities ..: 
31 This was the 
first step towards coercion. The declaration of the test period came with the 
implicit threat of punishment for Iraq if it failed to cooperate with UNSCOM. 
Dr. Edgar Buckley, Assistant Under Secretary (Home and Overseas), of the 
British Ministry of Defence (MoD) explained that: 
When the requirement came to prepare a specific possible 
attack on Iraq in response to Saddam Hussein's withdrawal of 
co-operation with UNSCOM in October, a plan was drawn 
up to include a specific selection of these targets designed to 
achieve the desired military effect. This plan was on the point 
of being put into operation on 14 November when Saddam 
Hussein capitulated and promised unconditional full co- 
operation with UNSCOM in future ... Following that crisis a 
new plan was drawn up, codenamed Operation DESERT 
FOX, against the possibility that, as in the past, Saddam's 
word would prove worthless. 32 
If Iraq failed to sufficiently comply with the coalition's and the UN's 
demands, force would surely follow. 
Richard Butler submitted his report to the UN Secretariat on 15 
December. Since the results of this report determined Iraq's fate it was very 
controversial. The Director-General of the IAEA, Mohamed El Baradei, 
claimed that: `The Iraqi counterpart has provided the necessary level of co- 
operation to enable the above-enumerated activities to be completed 
°'Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Sandy Berger', WI TIM, 16 December 1998, p. 2. 
31 `Letter dated 15 December 1998 from the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established 
by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) 
addressed to the Secretary-General', Annex Ito 7stter dated 15 December 1998 From the Secretary- 
General Addressed to the President of the Security Council', S/1998/1172 (15 December 1998), p. 4. 
32 Buckley cited in Cordesman, The Role of British Forces in DESERT FOX, (Washington, DC: CSIS, 
1999), p. 2. 
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efficiently and effectively. "33 For the most part, monitoring met with Iraqi co- 
operation. However, in one incident, the Iraqis would not allow photographs 
to be taken due to 'national security concerns'. On 11 December 1998, 
another monitoring team was forbidden to conduct an inspection due to the 
fact that it was the Islamic sabbath. 34 Later that month, UNSCOM was denied 
access to: '. .. a facility occupied by the People's Mojahedin Organisation of 
Iran (PMOD. The site of t1ds facility was declared as being not under the 
authority of Iraq ... A dialogue has begun on this matter and the PMOI has 
accepted, in principle, that its sites are subject to access by the Commission .. 
. 135 In six other inspections, the Iraqi government declared the sites 'sensitive', 
and therefore, UNSCOM had to adhere to the procedures for such sites. The 
report contained the observation that: 'In light of the clear evidence that Iraq 
had taken advance actions at certain of the locations planned for inspection in 
order to defeat the purposes of inspection, the Executive Chairman decided 
not to conduct the full range of inspections the team had planned. No 
inspections of presidential sites took place. 36 Richard Butler concluded the 
report by stating: 
... in the light of this experience, that is, the absence of full 
co-operation by Iraq, it must regrettably be recorded against 
Iraq that the commission is not able to conduct the 
substantive disarmament work mandated to it by the Security 
Council and, thus, to give the Council the assurances it 
requires with respect to Iraq's prohibited weapons 
programmes .. 
37 
The coalition now had a clear justification for the use of force against Iraq. " 
33 `Letter dated 14 December 1998 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency addressed to the Secretary-Gencral', Annex Ito S/1998/1172, p. 2. 
34 'Letter dated 15 December 1998', Annex Ito S/1998/1172, p. 6. 
35 `Letter dated 15 December 1998', Annex I to S/1998/1172, p. 7. The PAMOI is an Iraqi-backed 
Iranian resistance movement also known as the Al jahedin e-Kha/q. 
36 'Lcttcr dated 15 December 1998', Annex Ito S/1998/1172, p. 8. 
37 'Letter dated 15 December 1998', Annex Ito S/1998/1172, p. 8. 
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What was the Iraqi government trying to achieve by resisting 
UNSCOM? William Cohen believed that Saddam Hussein sought to get rid 
of UNSCOM and therefore lift the sanctions on Iraq. 38 Iraq's complaints had 
met with a more sympathetic reaction from the international community in 
1997-1998, and it would seem logical to the Iraqi government that passively 
resisting UNSCOM was a fruitful course of action. The Iraqi government was 
pursuing a strategy of provocation designed to make the coalition appear 
aggressive. To cause the coalition to take action or threaten action would 
likely cause the international community to seek another compromise or, 
worse yet, generate further sympathy for Iraq's plight. 
The Clinton Administration and the British government found the 
situation unacceptable. Joe Lockhart, the White House Spokesman, noted 
that: `... the report from Chairman Butler and UNSCOM raises a serious 
concern about Iraq's willingness and ability to comply with the commitments 
they made in mid-November ... '39 The American government claimed that 
Iraq's lack of co-operation with UNSCOM was a breach of SCR 687, and 
SCR 678 authorised force for actions subsequent to the Gulf War. 4° The 
vague wording of the latter created a legal `loophole' that had never been 
countered 41 This perceived breach provided the catalyst for the subsequent 
use of force. 
The coalition, on the other hand, sought to obtain Iraqi compliance 
with all UNSC resolutions, especially those pertaining to UNSCOM. In mid- 
December 1998, as it appeared that Iraq was not co-operating with 
UNSCOM, the coalition began to prepare for the use of force. For example, 
as a warning for Iraq, the US deployed seven B-52 bombers to Diego Garcia 
38`Operation DESERT FOX', Dol) News Briefirr 
, 
17 December 1998, pp. 4-5. 
39 `Press Briefing by Joe Lockhart', \K/1 IPB 16 December 1998. 
40 DoS DPL, 16 December 1998, p. 4. 
4 See p. 136 above. 
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on 11 December. 42 UNSCOM needed the coalition's support to fulfil its 
mandate, yet it could not act without the UNSC's backing. The coalition's aim 
of supporting the disarmament of Iraq became distasteful to a number of 
governments because that aim was perceived as a means of unnecessarily 
prolonging the sanctions on Iraq and the suffering of the Iraqi people. 
Constraints 
Coercion was more important than outright physical destruction due 
to the need to improve the coalition's political image. This was weakened by 
the shifts in the American policy of containment, the scandal over the 
President's alleged perjury about an extra-marital affair, the UNSC's hesitance 
to allow the use of force, and the proximity to Ramadan and Christmas. 
There were serious problems with the Clinton Administration's policy 
on Iraq. In late 1998, it remained a policy of containment based on four 
elements: 
" The maintenance of sanctions; 
" UNSCOM; 
" The credible threat of force; and 
" Support from allies. 43 
However, the Administration was coming under increasing pressure from 
Congress to do more about the Iraq problem in 1998. The Iraq Liberation 
Act (ILA) was one means. This committed the Clinton Administration to 
support attempts to oust Saddam Hussein. Martin Indyk remarked that: 
`The policy, as expressed by the President and the Secretary of State and 
others, is containment and, over time, an effort to produce -- to help the 
42 M. Evans, B-52s send warning to Iraq', ßg, 11 December 1998. 
43 'Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Sandy Berger', p. 3. 
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Iraqi people produce a government that is more representative of their 
aspirations and more willing to meet Iraq's obligations to the international 
community. '44 Naturally, the Administration was hesitant to implement the 
ILA. A number of important Senators, such as the Majority Leader, Trent 
Lott, the Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms, and the 
Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Richard Shelby, wrote the 
President, urging him to implement the ILA more vigoroUSI Y. 45 The 
implementation of the ILA was accelerated in response to Congressional 
pressure. 46 
ne President had an affair with a Wifte House intern named Monica 
Lewinsky in 1996, and when questioned about it, Bed. In n-ýid-December, the 
scandal over the affair and President Clinton's testimony led to a debate in 
Congress over impeachment. On 16 December 1998, the House of 
Representatives was considering impeachment while the coalition launched 
DESERT FOX. 47 This was a rare event, as it is traditional for Congress to 
separate domestic political concerns and the execution of foreign policy- in 
times of emergency, but the threat of impeachment strained the relationship 
between the President and the largely Republican Congress. 48 
At the UNSC, Richard Butler's report met with a number of different 
reactions. The Secretary-General advocated a more diplomatic approach, 
recommending three other options: 1) further review of the trial period; 2) 
further time for Iraq to cooperate; and 3) review of Iraqi co-operation since 
44 Transcript Indyk December 18 Teleconference on US policy on Iraq', USIA Wgshinom-E& 21 
December 1998, p. 6. 
41 Letter from Senators Lott, I lelms, Shelby, Kyl, Lugar and Brownback to President Clinton, 16 
December 1998, pp. 1-2. 
46 'Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Sandy Berger', p. 7. 
47 P. Wolfion, 'Congress-Iraq', Voice of America, 16 December 1998. 
48 P. Wolfqon, 'Congress/Imp(. -achmene, Voice of America, 16 December 1998. 
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199149 Many of the other members, feeling that Butler's report was 
inaccurate or misleading, agreed with Kofi Annan's recommendations. 
The French government, for example, sought to develop a new 
system of arms control for Iraq. The French government believed that the 
American government sought to maintain the sanctions in order to remove 
Saddam Hussein as opposed to the disarmament of Iraq. 50 This belief, along 
with economic self-interest, contributed heavily to the French opposition to 
the use of force. It offered a compromise in a less intrusive version of 
UNSCOM as a result. 
Being the likely targets of Iraqi WMDs, the Gulf States were more 
supportive of the coalition position in November 1998. At that time, the 
GCC states were prepared to allow the coalition to conduct offensive 
operations from their territories. 51 In early December, the GCC issued a 
statement placing responsibility for any consequence that would follow 
UNSCOM's tests on Saddam Hussein. 52 By mid-December, however, only 
Kuwait and Oman were prepared to host forces conducting offensive 
operations against Iraq. 53 Drawing from the DESERT STRIKE experience, 
the Clinton Administration reduced its force presence in Saudi Arabia as it 
could substitute unmanned power without political complications if force was 
to be employed. 54 
The Arab hesitancy to allow operations to be staged from their 
territories was tied to the fact that Ramadan, an Islamic festival, was to start 
with the coming of the new crescent moon on 18 December 1998. This 
49 S/1998/1172, p. 1. Butler noted that these recommendations were similar to proposals made by the 
Russian government earlier that year in pp. 176-177. 
50 Butler, pp. 200-201. 
51 S. Nlyers, Arab Show Little Support For Strikes Against Iraq, HM 7 November 1998. 
52 Tress Briefing by National Security Advisor Sandy Bcrgee, p. 6. 
53 D. jehl, Saudis Limit U. S. Aircraft I Iitting Iraq', RU, 19 December 1998. 
54 Wite, p. 54. 
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presented the coalition leadership with a dilemma. To attack during Ramadan 
would be an insult to the Islamic world and would have potentially alienated 
the very states that hosted coalition forces. On the other hand, delaying any 
operation until after the festival could have led to a situation where other 
interested states, such as the PRC or Russia, could have generated enough 
opposition to prevent the conduct of any operation. 55 
The Clinton Administration believed that speed was of the essence. 
Sandy Berger recalled that: Ve've learned from previous episodes that the 
longer the time between CNN reporting that we're thinking about acting and 
actually acting, the more time Saddarn Hussein has to disperse his forces, the 
more time he has to move things that we would like not to be moved. 156 
Given that the Iraqi government could move WNID-related materiel from site 
to site and that some material, such as precursor chemicals and dual-use 
materiel, were difficult to track, it was imperative to act quickly before the 
situation changed. 57 The Chairman of the joint Cl-ýiefs of Staff, General 
Henry Shelton, U. S. Army, stated that: '. .. one of the reasons that we revised 
our plan back on 15 November so that we could strike within 24 hours was to 
try to hold down on the amount of movement time allowed, so that in those 
suspected areas, we could achieve maximum effectiveness ... '58 Surprise was 
therefore vital. This, however, did not come without costs. The timing of 
Butler's report obviated any degree of surprise. lberc had been no real 
political preparation for the use of force, as this report was considered 
sufficient evidence of the breach. As a result of the requirement for surprise, 
there were no serious efforts to win over the international media or 
communýity. 19 Surprise was necessary to ensure that casualties were kept to a 
minimum. President Clinton recalled that: 'Secretary Cohen and General 
55 Cordesman, Lessons p. 14. 
56 `press Briefing by National Security Advisor Sandy Berger', p. S. 
57 'Broad Range of Targets May Be Only Option', ABC News, 17 December 1998. 
s"`Operation DESERT FOX', DoD News Briefing, 18 December 1998, p. 7. 
59 Cordesman, Lessons, p. 14. 
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Shelton strongly urged that we act at the point where we could have 
maximum impact with minimum risk to our own people because of the 
surprise factor. '60 The President was also concerned about the possibility of 
Iraqi casualties, and ordered that efforts be taken to minimise the possibilities 
of Iraqi casualties and collateral damage 61 
Means and Target Sets 
The coalition's options were somewhat constrained because only 
Kuwait and Oman were willing to allow offensive operations to be staged 
from their soil. Of course, `over-the-horizon' and carrier-based power were 
also available, but this excluded all JTF-SWA assets based in Saudi Arabia. In 
addition to this, the coalition was restricted to its narrow route of entry and 
egress into Iraqi airspace. 
The fact that the crisis was based on Iraqi behaviour with regard to 
UNSCOM meant that more significant target sets became suitable. Both 
WMD assets and the intelligence and security apparatus that aided in their 
concealment were obvious choices. Given that the entry/egress route was 
narrow, Iraq's air defences that protected the approaches to Baghdad needed 
to be suppressed. This would lead to a situation where unmanned power 
would be used to suppress Iraqi air defences so that coalition aircraft could 
attack WMD targets in the Baghdad area. 
60 `Remarks by the President in Photo Opportunity with Foreign Policy Team', Wf [PR, 17 December 
1998, p. 2. 
61 Transcript: Albright Interview on Larry King Live December 16', USIA WpshinTton File, 16 
December 1998, p. 2. 
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Table 15: Forces in Theatre as of 15 December 199862 
USAFJ ý ý USNXSMC : ill 1: 4 / 







2 U-2 (UN flagged) 
6 UH-60 
UAE 12 KC-10 
Warships USS Enterprise MIS Boxer 










USS Belleau Wood 
USS Dubuque 
USS Gennantown 
Forces on ship USS Enterprise: 
14 F-14B 












62 Data from `http: //www. fas. org/man/dod-101 /ops/desert_fox orbat 981223. htm'. 
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V USAF::; USN/USMC RAF/RN - Diego Garcia 15 B-52 







Oman 10 KC-10 
Bahrain 6 B-1 2 VC-10 
Analysis 
Operation DESERT FOX was launched on the night of 16 
December (Baghdad time). Joe Lockhart announced that: 
At the direction of the President, United States military forces 
have launched a substantial military strike against Iraq. The 
President decided to take this action this morning, after 
reviewing the conclusions of the report to the United Nations 
Secretary-General and Security Council yesterday by 
UNSCOM Chairman Richard Butler, and discussing the 
situation with his foreign policy team here at the VVhite 
House. 63 
The objectives and conduct of the operation demonstrated that Iraqi co- 
operation with UNSCOM was both the American and the coalition goal. 
The first night of DESERT FOX, December 1998, saw the coalition 
concentrate its efforts first against the Iraqi IADS. The British Cl-ýief of the 
Defence Staff (CDS), General Sir Charles Guthrie, British Army, remarked in 
a 17 December 1998 press conference that: erhe decision to use sea-launched 
systems at the outset of the campaign was made both to maximise tactical 
surprise and operational security. The United States did not use land-based 
63'Statement by Press Secretary Joe Lockhart', WI! VB, 16 December 1998. 
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aircraft either. 164 It was impossible to obtain strategic or even operational 
surprise, as the Iraqi government was well aware that Butler's report would 
lead to the use of force by the coalition. In preparation for the imminent loss 
of control, Saddam Hussein assigned responsibility for each of four sectors of 
Iraq to four trusted aides. 65 General Shelton remarked in a press conference 
the following day that: 'Last night's actions principally involved our naval 
forces in the Gulf with more than 70 Navy and Marine Corps strike support 
aircraft from the USS ENTERPRISE; and well over 200 Tomahawk cruise 
missiles launched from Navy ShipS. 166 The attacks against air defences were 
intended: '. .. to create access for the aircraft flying north, and in fact to create 
access even for the cruise missiles so that we increase the probability of those 
reaching their targets as well ... $67 These targets were also referred to as 
esupporting targets, where they were necessary in order to enable fin-ther 
strikeS. 68 Over 50 targets were struck that night, and the majority were air 
defence assets. Some WMD, WMD security and WMD production targets 
were also attacked. 119 These targets did not include 'dual-use' facilities due to 
the possibility of collateral damage and political senSidVity. 70 This had the 
effect of leaving some WMD-related industries intact, and reinforced the 
belief that the coalition would be unable to carry out its threat of destroying 
Iraq's chemical and biological weapons. 71 
On the first day, the President also authorised the deployment of the 
`Crisis Response Force' (CRF). The CRF consisted of an second carrier battle 
64 'Edited Transcript of Press Conference Given By the Secretary of State for Defence, George 
Robertson, and the Chief of Defence Staff, General Sir Charles Guthrie, London, Thursday 17 
December 1998', FCO News Release, 17 December 1998, p. Z 
65 Ritter, p. 128, and'Saddarn Consolidates Rule', M, 17 December 1998 
66'Operation DESERT FOX, DoD News Brief= 17 December 1998, p. Z 
67 Rear Admiral Thomas Wilson, USN, Director of Intelligence of the joint Staff, 'Operation DESERT 
FOX', DoD News Brieffia 18 December 1998, p. 8. 
68 Wilson, 'Opcration DE SERT FOX, DoD News Brief= 18 December 1998, p. 14. 
69 'Operation DESERT FOX', 17 December 1998, p. Z 
70 Cordesman, Lessons p. 25. 
71 Ibid., p. 105. 
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group, extra aircraft and an army task force. The Secretary of Defense 
ordered its deployment after President Clinton's 16 December `Address to the 
Nation'. 72 The USS Carl Vinson and its battle group arrived in the Red Sea on 
17 December 1998. The remainder of the CRF arrived on 20-21 December 
1998.73 
The second day of the operation expanded the target list. These 
targets included 'economic' targets, such as the Basra oil refinery, since it was a 
conduit for the illegal shipments of oil. 74 Other targets included certain 
airfields, and 'command and control' targets, like the headquarters of Iraqi 
military intelligence and the RGFC as well as its divisional and corps 
headquarters. 75 With the target Est expansion, the coalition began to use 
manned air -assets from Carrier Air Wing 3 on board the USS Enterprise as 
well as aircraft based in Kuwait and Oman. In terms of air defence on both 
days, coalition spokesmen revealed that the Iraqis had employed only some 
limited AAA. 76 The 16 December missile strikes had been successful in 
enabling the expansion of target sets for the application of manned air power. 
Operations continued on 18 December 1998 due to the fact that the 
coalition had not completed the BDA. CINC CENTCOTNI later commented 
that: 'At the end of the third day and going into the fourth day, I was asked if I 
felt our objectives were achieved or could be achieved. I felt I needed the 
fourth night. Part way through that I was asked again, and informed the 
Chairman that I was satisfied that we had achieved the objectives as I saw 
them-'77 The CINC was referring to the target sets involving the RGFC- At 
72 L Kozaryn, 'Saddam Abused I lis Last Chance, Clinton Says, Armed Forces Information Service, 17 
December 1998. 
73'Operation DESERT FOX', 17 December 1998, p. 3. 
7"Operation DESERT FOX', DoD News Brief= 18 December 1998, p. 3. 
75 'rranscript Cohen/Shclton/Wilson Briefing on Iraq Dec. 19', USIA Washington File, 19 December 
1992, P. Z 
76'Operation DESERT FOX', DoD News Briefing, 18 December 1998, p. 4. 
77 DoD News Briefi= 21 December 1998, p. 1Z 
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the DoD briefing on 19 December 1998, General Shelton remarked that: '. -- 
the majority [of strikes] today were directed against Republican Guard units, 
which were restrikes of the same units, different types of units within the same 
These would be the last strikes of the operation. 
DESERT FOX ended after the strikes on 19 December 1998. The 
President remarked at a press conference that: 'It wiR take some time to make 
a detailed assessment of our operation, but based on the briefing I've just 
received, I am confident we have achieved our mission. 79 His optimistic 
assessment was not necessarily borne out by all of the evidence offered by his 
spokesmen. 
The initial BDA suggested that the operation was successful in terms 
of physical destruction. To be fair, it is difficult to gauge victory or defeat 
from estimates of the destruction of targets or target sets. Early reports 
claimed that the strikes were going well since the targets were being 
significantly damaged. 110 The Pentagon briefers admitted that the BDA 
priority during the first two days was to assess the damage done to the 
IADS. 81 On the second day, they concluded that: '. .. the southern Iraq air 
defence system has been degraded and has largely proven to be ineffective 
against the strikes which have been conducted to date .. . "82 The strikes were, 
at the very least, having an impact on the Iraqi government's security 
apparatus for production of WN1Ds. The focus of effort was against missile 
production facilities as opposed to biological or chemical facilities, as WNID 
delivery systems posed a greater threat than the MIDs themselves. On 19 
December, more details of the coalition's BDA were revealed. 
78 DoD News Briefing, 19 December 1998, p. 5. 
79 Transcript Clinton Remarks on Iraq December 19,1998', USIA Washinaon File, 19 December 1998, 
p. 2. 
80 Senior Master Sergeant J. Katzaman, USAF, 'Initial damage assessments show "good coverage"', Ak 
Force NZy_q, 17 December 1998. See also: Cordcsman, Lessons pp. 46-47. 
81 Wilson, `Operation DESERT FOX', DoD News Bricfine. 18 December 1998, p. 15. 
82 Ibid., p. 8. 
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Table 16: BDA - 18 December 19983 
AIL Lt lllodý::, : Sev 
IADS 8 1 1 2 1 14 Southern 
sector 
'degraded' 
C2 2 0 2 5 5 4 Security HQ 
severely 
damai, ed 0- 
WMD 1 4 9 1 2 2 
Security 
WNID 0 2 1 0 0 8 Missile 










Airfields 0 3 1 10 10 
Economic 10 10 10 10 10 11 
'Lt', Ught: 1-14%; 'Mod'. Moderate, 1545%; 'Sev', Severe, 45-75%; 'Destr', 
Destroyed 76-100%; and'Unk, Unknown. 
There were serious concerns about the BDA after the operation. On 
21 December 1998, it was reported that of 99 targets struck, 28 had been 
destroyed or severely damaged, 46 had light or moderate damage, and 23 were 
still being assessed. 84 At the end of the operation, in response to a question 
about BDA, the CINC replied: 'If I had to put a score sheet up, which I am 
reluctant to do -- but I will because I know in some ways that's the way we get 
focused on BDA - we successfully hit 85 percent of our targets, as we know it 
now. And fully successful in terms that I'm completely satisfied that we had 
the results gained was 74 percent. '85 'Me data, to say the least, was suspect-" 
83 Data from `BDA Assessment Slides', 18 December 1998. 
84 B. Graham, 'I)cntagon Evaluatcs Impact of Bombing lUds', UM 21 December 1998. 
85 DoD News Bdefi= 21 December 1998, p. 3. 
330 
Chapter Eleven - DESERT FOX 
This cast doubts on the American claim of victory. From this 74% 
assessment came the Secretary of Defense's observation that: We estimate 
that Saddam's missile program has been set back by at least a year-'117 By 
January 1999, this estimate was changed to two years. 88 '111e coalition was well 
aware that UNSCOM was effectively finished. If Iraq could not be contained 
with inspections, it would have to have its means of VjMD delivery destroyed 
to retard the development of a VJMD capability in the absence of UNSCOM. 
Containment therefore had an expiry date. 
Table 17: BDA - 19 December 1998: 89 
IIIL Lt lhod-4, i Sev Dest.: ' JInk Aemarks-, 
IADS 0 4 4 5 1 18 Southern 
sector 
'degraded' 




WNID 0 5 6 5 2 0 
Security , 
WNID 0 4 5 1 0 1 
Production 







Airfields 0 1 4 0 0 1 
Economic 0 1 0 0 0 0 
86 Cordcqman, Lessons, p. 90. 
87 Cohen cited in 'Defence Department Report, Saturday, December 19', USIA Wa'. ', hinzon File, 19 
December 1998. 
88 Shelton cited in L Kozaryn, 'Zinni Say-, Saddam's "Shaken, Desperate ... 9 
Armed F-orces Information 
Service, 12january 1999. 
89 Data from 13DA Assessment Slides', 19 December 1998. 
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The coalition members believed prematurely that their aim had been 
achieved after the strikes. President Clinton reported to Congress that: 
Since December 23, following the conclusion of Desert Fox, 
we have seen a significant increase in the frequency, intensity, 
and co-ordination of the Iraqi air defence system to counter 
enforcement of the no-fly zones. Since that date, U. S. and 
coalition aircraft enforcing the no-fly zones have been subject 
to multiple anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) firings, radar 
illuminations, and over 20 surface-to-air missile attacks. 90 
The Iraqi government more or less went to war by increasing resistance 
within the NFZs. Due to the perceived success of DESERT FOX, the CRF 
began to redeploy on 28 December 1998. The USS Enterprise and its battle 
group left for the Mediterranean, and the majority of the B-52s were 
withdrawn in addition to six B-1 bombers, 10 A-10s and 10 KC-10 tanker 
aircraft. Ground force levels also declined. 91 The coalition reversed its 
deployment just as Iraq began to actively resist. 
On the domestic front, the strikes did little to ward off President 
Clinton's opponents. Despite the tradition of forgetting partisan issues in 
times of crisis, Congress continued to ponder what should be done about the 
President's alleged perjury. * Late on 16 December 1998, the House of 
Representatives opted to postpone the vote on impeachment. 92 However, 
this did not last long. On the morning of 17 December, they decided to re- 
open the debate on impeachment. 93 Despite the appearance of protesters in a 
number of American cities, the American public was supportive of President 
Clinton's decision to strike Iraq. Poll data showed that the majority (from 
60% to 80%, depending on the data) supported the actions against IraqP4 
90 1 louse Document 106-34, p. 4. 
91 L Kozaryn, 'Gulf Force Draws Down, Armed Forces Information Service, 28 Deccmber 1998. 
92 D. Swan, 'Congress/Iraq/lmpeachment', Voice of America, 16 December 1998. 
93'Congressional Report, Ilursday, December IT, USIA Washington He 17 December 1998. 
94 M. Leland, Bombing Opposidon', Voice of Amedca, 17 Deccmber 1998. 
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'Me consequences of the strikes did not help the situation. On 15 
December 1998, the American Ambassador to the United Nations, Peter 
Burleigh, warned Richard Butler that strikes on Iraq would be likely in the 
wake of Butler's report. As a result, UNSCOM and IAEA personnel were 
evacuated to Bahrain, and other UN personnel, such as those responsible for 
humanitarian relief began to evacuate on 16 December 1998.95 Ile Executive 
Chairman reported to the UN Secretariat that: '. .. the prime considerations in 
his decision were to ensure the safety and security of the Commission's 
personnel and the need to act immediately ... 196 This was not received well 
by the international community. The coalition's use of force appeared to be 
the cause of, and not the catalyst for, UNSCOM's cessation of operations. 
Ilere were mixed reactions within the Arab world. Most of the 
governments stated that it was Saddam's fault that strikes had occurred . 97 
Pan-Arab sentiment gave rise to a popular expression of sympathy for the 
Iraqi people. 98 Some of the other political bodies, such as the Arab League, 
echoed this sentiment by condemning the operation. 99 Part of the problem 
could be attributed to the nature of briefings where the key audience appeared 
to be the American people, seen-ýing to ignore the Arab world. "" 
Naturally Iraqi spokesmen objected strongly to DESERT FOX 
Nizar Hamdoon complained that the bombing started before the UNSC 
could decide on the matter of Richard Butler's report. He also complained 
95 'Daily Press Briefing of Office of Spokesman For Secretary-Gcncral', 16 December 1998, p. 2. See 
also. 'Sccretary-Gencral's Advisory on United Nations Personnel in Iraq, Press Rc1L-asc SG /SNI/684 
IK/266,16 December 1998, and Temporary Relocation of IAEA Personnel from Iraq to Bahrain', 
Press Release IAF. A 11330 1K /263,16 December 1998. 
96 Note By Ile Secretary-G encral', S/ 1999/401 (9 April 1999), p. 7 
97 'Franscript Secretary of State's Briefing on Iraq Dec. 17', USIA WashinZon File, 17 December 1998, 
p. 3. 
98 For examples, see R. Engel, 'Arabs/Iraq', Voice of America, 18 December 1998, "As-Sharq", cited in 
A. Guthrie, 'A Skeptical World Reacts To U-S Iraq Attack, Voice of America, 17 December 1998, 
'World Opinion Roundup: Air Strikes Against Iraq', USIA WashinZon File, 17 December 1998. 
R. Engel, Arabs/Iraq', Voice of America, 17 December 1998. 
100 Cordesman, LaNons, p. 39. On p. 44, Cordesman noted that the Arab world was fascinated by the 
Lewinsky affair, and that American actions at the time were all seen in that light. 
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about Ambassador Burleigh's warning to UNSCOM about its withdrawal 
from Iraq. 101 In addition to this, Ambassador Hamdoon outlined that it was 
the Iraqi government's belief that the US, by conducting DESERT FOX, 
sought to weaken the regime in order to cause an ouster of Saddam 
Hussein. 102 In one press conference, Madeleine Albright stated there were 
three goals to DESERT FOX. These were: 
" 'Short-Terrn: degradation of Iraq's VIMI)s and C2 infrastructure; 
" Wedium-Term': compliance with all UN SCRs; and 
" 'Longer-Term': a government in Iraq that was more representative of the 
Iraqi peoplc. 103 
The 19 December Presidential radio address reinforced the policy 
statements made by the Secretary of State. President Clinton stated that the 
US would use force to ensure that Saddam Hussein would not pose a threat, 
that the US would seek to maintain sanctions until the Iraqi government 
complied with UN resolutions and that it would: '. .. strengthen our 
engagement with Iraqis who want a new government, one that win respect 
its citizens and Eve in peace with its ncighbours ... 2104 Laws like the 
ILA 
would only serve to confirm this belief in the minds of a number of 
governments, thus helping engender international sympathy for Iraq's cause. 
Key UNSC members criticised the operation. The French 
government, echoing Arab sentiment, stated that it was concerned about the 
fate of the Iraqi people. In addition, it noted that Iraq failed to comply, thus 
101 'Statement by Ambassador Nizar Ilamdoon to members of the Security Council of the United 
Nations during its meeting of December 16,1998, regarding the ongoing aggression of the U. S. and 
U-K against Iraq', pp. 1-2. 
102'Ambassador I lamdoon's appearance on Iarry King Uve on December 17,1998', lJSIA Washin=a 
E& 17 December 1998, pp. 1 and 5 
103 Transcript: Secretary of State's Briefmg on Iraq Dec. 17', pp. 5-6. 
104 76dio Address of the President to the Nation', 19 December 1998 (10: 06 r. Sl), cited in A. 
Cordesman, Desert Fox: Kcy. Official US and British Statements and Press Conferences, (Washington, 
DC: CSIS, 1999), p. 111. 
334 
Chapter Eleven - DESERT FOX 
prompting American action. 105 While this statement hardly appears to be 
critical of DESERT FOX, the French government later made its distaste 
known. On 30 December 1998, it decided to withdraw its forces from 
SO=ERN WATCH. 106 The Russian and Chinese governments were 
outraged by DESERT FOX During the UNSC debate on the Butler report, 
Sergei Lavrov, Russia's Permanent Representative to the UN, questioned the 
right (or lack thereoo of the coalition to use force without prior authorisation 
of the UNSC. 107 The Russian Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov, speaking at a 
conference in Madrid, claimed that Butler was: '. .. "grossly exceedine' 
his 
authority in Iraq ... '108More serious actions were taken. The Duma, Russia's 
parliament, postponed the ratification of the START II treaty. 109 Madeleine 
Albright replied by warning that: '. .. if START II is not ratified, that they [the 
Russians] will have to use scarce defence funds for the problem of 
maintaining missiles that they don't need, rather than on some of their other 
force needs .. . '110 President Yeltsin recalled the Russian Ambassador to the 
United States. 111 The Russian government believed that its concerns were 
being ignored. 112 At the UNSC, the Russian government later sought to 
condemn the coalition for its actions, as well as agitated for the Executive 
Chairman's resignation. 113 The Chinese government was like-minded. 
Chinese government spokesmen claimed that the report was groundless, and 
that the use of force could only worsen the situation. 114 Sun YuxL the 
105 'Am&fion duAfinistm Des Affainslltraqjýtrs,. AL Hmbed Vidiine, Depantla Commiýjion des Afairvsbranghrs 
de lAzemblie National?, French FNIPR 22 December 1998, p. 1, -and J. Nundy, 'France/Iraq', Voice 0 
America, 17 December 1998. 
106 Tatrols Ended, France Confirms', na, 30 December 1998. 
107 Tress Release SC/661 1,16 December 1998, p. 2. 
108 P. I leinlein, Russia/Irag', Voice of America, 16 December 1998. 
109 START 11 is the acronym for the 'Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, an American-Russian forum over 
the reduction of their nuclear arsenals. 
110 7ranscript: Secretary of State's Briefing, 17 December 1998', P. 7. 
111 B. Rodgers, `Russia/U-S-Iraq-Update', Voice of America, 17 December 1998. 
112 M. Gordon, 'Nioscow Orders U. S. Envoy I lome to Protest Air Strikes', MU 18 December 1998. 
113 M. Ruston, U-N/Iraq Fridaf, Voice of America,, 18 Dccember 1998. 
114 Tress Release SC/6611', 16 December 1998, pp. 2 and S. 
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Chinese Foreign Minýistry spokesman, called for a halt to the strikes, as they 
lacked authorisation and were a violation of the UN Charter. 115 
The Iraqi government did not comply with UN resolutions after 
DESERT FOX. There were two reasons for the lack of effect. First, the 
coalition declared victory before the Iraqi government admitted defeat. This 
was either a public relations gambit, or the coalition's purpose was really to 
support containment by eliminating or at least retarding Iraqs missile 
capability, prior to UNSCOM's possible replacement by a weaker inspections 
regime. Second, it appeared that Iraq's defeat became necessary. Iraq began 
to treat the coalition as an enemy and fought back, as if it were at war. 
Ambassador A. Elizabeth Jones, the Principal Assistant Secretary of State for 
Near East Affairs, testified before the Senate Committee for Foreign 
Relations, that: 
Ever since the December air strikes, the government offices in 
Baghdad have been dispersed; the government is unable to 
function with the efficiency that it has in the past. More 
importantly, the Republican Guard has been dispersed and is 
unable to take advantage of the relative comforts of Baghdad - 
.. Saddam. Hussein failed in his primary strategy through the 
fall, which was to get sanctions lifted and to gain control of 
the money from the sale of oil and from the lifting of 
sanctions. 1 16 
Yet Saddam Hussein did not do what the coalition wanted him to do and 
offer to cooperate with UNSCOM. Why was this the case? The CRF was 
withdrawn from the region as Iraqi forces resisted in both the NNFZ and 
the SNFZ, and the ILA provided empirical proof for the Iraqi government 
that the coalition sought its overthrow. Not to resist would have meant that 
the Iraqi government had already surrendered to the coalition's demands. 
lls 'China Condemns U. S. Airstrikes Against Iraq', USIA Washinlaon File 17 December 1998, and S. 
I lo, 'China/Iraq', Voice of America, 17 December 1998. 
116 Ambassador Jones' testimony before the Committee appears in 'United States Policy Toward Iraq', 
Senate I learing 10641 9 March 1999, pp. 5-6. 
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In DESERT FOX, the Iraqi government was presented with the 
choice of co-operating with UNSCOM or being disarmed by force of arms. 
This message was impossible to misinterpret given the lead-up of the crisis. 
The timing of the crisis, where it was overshadowed by an American political 
scandal and Ramadan, offered Iraq a powerful opportunity. If the coalition 
attacked, it was sure to appear to be overly forceful, and this would have 
definite political benefits for the Iraqi government. Similarly, the chance that 
President Clinton might be impeached offered additional benefits and gave 
the impression that this was a retreat from domestic affairs to a war. The Iraqi 
government had ample reason to believe that any coalition action would be 
unpopular with the international community and short. UNSCOM's report 
and the speed at which the coalition acted upon it created significant political 
friction, and this reduced Iraq's political isolation. Ile coalition, however, 
was able to provide Iraq with a clear perception of its capability despite the 
fact it was limited to entering Iraqi airspace via the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border. The 
coalition finally attacked the two most significant target sets. However, tl-ýs 
was still insufficient to coerce Iraq. The Iraqi government was well aware that 
even if DESERT FOX significantly damaged the Iraqi arsenal, this was 
irrelevant as UNSCOM was now gone. It had both offers of mitigation (in 
that whatever replaced UNSCOM would respect Iraqi sovereignty) and hope 
because of the international outcry. The 'pain' became more than bearable. 
Conclusion 
DESERT FOX was a failure. The Iraqi government did not comply 
with the coalition's demands for co-operation with UNSCOM. The coalition 
withdrew before Iraq even offered a hint of concessions. Neither the implied 
threat (a period of testing Iraqi co-operation) nor the use of force convinced 
the Iraqi government that compliance was preferable to resistance. Coalition 
actions seemed to reinforce the value of resistance. The international 
community no longer seemed to be concerned about the enforcement of SCR 
687 and its antecedents. Richard Butler reported in April of 1999 that: 
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Under the Commission's monitoring plan, Iraq is required to 
provide to the Commission semi-annual declarations on 
activities, facilities, materials and other items that might be 
used for prohibited purposes. Iraq has not provided the 
declarations which were due on 15 January 1999. The 
Commission has not received any other notifications required 
from Iraq under the monitoring plan. 1 17 
He also observed that from 6 October 1998 on: '. .. the Commission 
has 
not received, in the period under review [until 11 April 1999], the co- 
operation required of Iraq to enable it to conduct its work as mandated by 
the Security Council .. . "18 What did this mean for the coalition? 
Scott 
Ritter summarised the situation best by stating that: 'Desert Fox ... 
provided the fmal proof that the U. S. was fully committed to an open-ended 
policy of containment and little else. Precision bombardment with cruise 
missiles made many walls crumble. UNSCOM crumbled with those walls in 
Baghdad. Weapons inspections ceased. And a once-mighty coalition of 
allies has disintegrated. '119 The coalition could only extend the most crucial 
element of containment for a short time after UNSCOM ended. The 
American and British governments were forced to gamble and lost. 
1 17 S/ 1999/401, p. 13. 
1 Is Ibid., p. 14. 
1 19 Ritter, p. 29. 
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CHAPTER 12: CONCLUSION 
This thesis postulated a series of criteria to determine success or 
failure in coercion. These criteria were: 
" Choice 
" Communication 
" Credibility of Threats and Actions 
" Erosion of Willpower 
" Isolation 
" Adversary's Perception of Capability 
" Value of Target Sets 
" Sufficient Degree of Tain. 1 
Three main questions were posed when applying these criteria to the cases: 
1. Have air and unmanned power been effective tools for the exercise of 
coercion against Iraq? 
2. Has the coercion of Iraq been successful at fulfilling the coalition's goals? 
3. What academic and policy lessons can be drawn about coercion for the 
future? 
Each question will be answered in sequence. 
1. Air and Unmanned Power: Means and Effectiveness 
This question cannot be answered without first determining which 
cases were coercion, 'enabling' or control and then matching the cases to the 
means employed in each case. 
I See p. 61 above. 
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DESERT STRIKE VIGILANTWARRIOR 
-I -5E-SERT FOX 
The 'enabling' and 'control' cases will not be discussed further. This leaves 
four cases from which to draw conclusions about coercion: January 1993, 
VIGILANT WARRIOR, SOUTHERN WATCH (due to the SNFZ 
cxpansion in DESERT STRIKE), and DESERT FOM 
The coalition tended to use air power in tandem with other means. It was 
on one occasion employed alone as a threat, but in force-based cases, 
unmanned power was also used. 
I 
This question of means and effectiveness really focuses on the last two 
criteria of the thesis, these being Value of Target Sets and Sufficient Degree of 
Tain'. These two criteria beg the questions of whether or not there was a 
suitable match between the chosen means and the choice of target sets, and 
whether or not the means were sufficiently threatening and/or destructive. 
Threat-Based Coercion: 
Were the means used to threaten Iraq appropriate for the threat, that 
is, were they tied to the political justifications (SCRs 678 and 687) as well as 
the particular crisis? Were the target sets threatened valued by the Iraqi 
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government? In the first case, VIGILANT WARRIOR, the coalition 
threatened in order to 'deny' an Iraqi invasion. Coalition activities and force 
levels were increased to signal that its readiness to use force. In the second 
case, SOUTHERN WATCH post-August 1996, the coalition merely 
increased the pressure by increasing the SNFZ to the 33rd Parallel. This 
represented an implied threat that the coalition could attack targets in Baghdad 
without notice. While this might personalise the situation for Saddam 
Hussein, this gambit was not inherently tied to the earlier UN resolutions and 
had little to do with RGFC actions against the Iraqi Kurds. This became 
politically contentious, which weakened the credibility of an implied threat. It 
is not possible to ascertain intended target sets for VIGILANT WARRIOR as 
this represented an attempt at deterrence. 
Were the means employed sufficiently threatening or destructive? 
Tbis really equates into two simpler questions: Could the coalition actually hit 
the targets being threatened? Was there a doctrinal match between the means 
being threatened and the target sets in tenns of the optimisation, of weapons 
effects? In the threat-based cases, the coalition could hit the targets being 
threatened (Iraqi land forces or targets in southern Iraq - their capability to 
locate and destroy targets was proven well in DESERT STORNý. 2 For 
VIGILANT WARRIOR, both questions point towards an assessment of 
whether or not the coalition could effectively 'deny' Iraq had there been an 
invasion. The combination of air assets and ground forces from over the 
horizon would have prevented afait accoi*k, and been capable of repelling or 
reversing an invasion shortly thereafter. In the post-DESERT STRIKE 
iteration of SOUTHERN WATCH, these questions focus on whether or not 
the coalition could strike targets in Baghdad with little to no warning. This, of 
course, was a risky proposition. While this had been done effectively in the 
DESERT STORM air campaign, it was undertaken primarily by T-LANIs, 
2 See pp. 114- 121 above. 
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Stealth aircraft and with a rather focussed SEAD effort. 3 SEAD is vital, but 
to coerce successfully, it may be necessary deliberately to assume risk to 
maintain tactical surprise or to convey the appearance of recklessness to the 
adversary. This meant that this threat's credibility was weakened by the 
perceptions of casualty aversion and a requirement to bring additional assets 
from 'Over the Horizon' unless the coalition was prepared to assume 
additional risk. 11iis suggests that a strategy of gradual escalation is 
inconsistent with a threat based on surprise. 
Force-Based Coercion: 
Was the employment of air and unmanned power appropriate for the 
target sets chosen in the cases of January 1993 and DESERT FOX? In both 
cases, the target sets (air defences, WMD sites and WMD-related sites) were 
tied to the political justifications and the crisis. In both 1993 and 1998, the 
core issue was Iraqs non-compliance with SCR 687's terms of disarmament. 4 
Similarly, both cases focussed on more significant target sets than the threat- 
based cases. In January 1993, the missile strikes were focussed on the 
Zaafaraniyah nuclear plant, which reinforced the coalition's demand for Iraqs 
co-operation with the UN by suggesting that Iraq could be disarmed by force 
instead of peacefully. ne strikes against the southern air defences were an 
attempt to ensure the continued safety of the aircrews enforcing the SNFZ 
and ultimately the SNFZ itself. Ile coalition's choice of target sets was a 
reaction to Iraq's provocations, and while the coalition derived some benefit 
from attacking Iraqi air defences, it is possible that the Iraqi government was 
able to justify its actions in terms of an ongoing conflict. The nuclear facility 
was a significant target for two reasons: it was a VMD facility, and it was in 
suburban Baghdad. This created a great deal of 'pain'. The loss of the facility 
by force was a far worse option than the presence of inspectors. DESERT 
FOX saw the coalition expand its range of target sets to include RGFC and 
3 See p. 115 above. 
4 See pp. 142-152 above. 
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MID-related sites. However, this was a scheme bome of the tacit 
acknowledgement by the Clinton Administration that UNSCOM had lost 
political support. This, in turn, suggested that Iraq would go without 
supervision until a replacement scheme (albeit this would probably be much 
less intrusive) was developed. The coalition therefore sought to inflict as 
much damage as possible to Iraq's MID programmes in an attempt to retard 
Iraq's rearmament. -5 
Were the means employed sufficiently destructive for the target sets? 
In both cases, the coalition's efforts (particularly those by manned aircraft) 
were hampered by the aircraft payloads, the effects of weather on weapon 
accuracy and battle damage assessments. Despite embarrassing incidents that 
suggested otherwise, the coalition was quite capable of striking and inflicting 
damage on targets. UNSCOM later confirmed the effects on Zaafaraniyah, 
and although the coalition's reporting methodology was suspect, the results of 
DESERT FOX show that the combination of air and unmanned power 
significantly damaged the Iraqi WMD programme. 
Strikes against targets of greater significance was the exception rather 
than the norm due to broader diplomatic processes. When the diplomatic 
conditions appeared to be more favourable for the use of force, i. e. in January 
1993 and to a limited extent, in DESERT FOX, the coalition chose more 
significant target sets. 'Me coalition used threat-based coercion under two 
conditions. The evidence suggests that the means are far less relevant to the 
alteration of the adversary's decision calculus than the political situation, as the 
latter tends to limit the coercets range of options. 
Were the means employed effective for coercion? The answer to this 
question is not clear. First, there are two types of coercion, and each of these 
has a different metric for success, i. e. effective as a threat or effective as a 
penalty. Second, to discern effect in either case means that there must be 
5 See p. 340 above. 
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some relation between the means employed and the credibility of threat and 
this could not be determined. Targeting was sensitive to external political 
influences, limiting the coalition's range of available options, and ultimately 
making it impossible to isolate military success from political success. 
2. Coercion of Iraq 
Over the 1990s, there was a gradual evolution towards the use of 
coercion as an unintended consequence of the NFZs. These started as 
enabling operations in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT II to provide 
security for the Kurds and the Shiýa in Operation SOUTHERN WATCH. 
NFZs were a by-product of 'volatile crises as well as the coalition's 
requirement to maintain a 'forward presence' in the Persian Gulf; this 
'presence' itself was required to address the significant 'distance-time' problem 
identified in Chapter Four. 6 However, due to the flexibility of the coalition's 
air assets, it only involved a simple change of force structure, bomb loads and 
intent to go, as noted in Chapter Seven, from a mission of presence to a 
mission of coercion. NFZs, by themselves, were not effective at coercion. In 
Chapter Ten, it was noted that the change of force packages and the extension 
of the SNFZ (in Operation DESERT STRIKE) were an attempt at implicit 
coercion, but no specific demand was raised. This is also tied to the original 
justification for the NFZs: SCR 688. This resolution was intended to maintain 
international respect for Iraqi sovereignty while protecting particular Iraqi 
minorities. The international community tolerated the existence of the NFZs 
due to the humanitarian concern associated with the protection of Iraqi 
minorities. To tie protective measures for humanitarian purposes to an 
explicit threat would be unacceptable. NFZs relied on an implicit 
communication of threats and demands and were sufficiently controversial to 
see Iraq receive both offers of mitigation and hope. Their utility as a coercive 
tool was limited, but they were invaluable as enablers. 
6 See p. 121 above. 
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Cases 
Ile second major question of this thesis cannot be answered without 
first establishing whether or not coercion was successful in the political sense. 
This is not a matter of whether or not aircraft could locate and service target 
sets, but rather the assessment of the effect on Iraqs leadership based on their 
behaviour. 1his will set the conditions for the exan-dnation of coercion as a 
means of supporting a regime of containment. The evidence from the cases 
wiU be summatised and the evidence wiU be examined in the light of the 
aforementioned criteria (less the last two). The cases under discussion are: 
January 1993 
VIGILANT WARRIOR 
SOUTHERN WATCH (Post-August 1996) 
DESERT FOX 
januag 1993 (Coerdon Success) 
The first attempt at coercion took place in January 1993. Ilic Iraqi 
government was presented with two decisions to make: cooperate with 
UNSCOM or be forcibly disarmed, and it could either tolerate the SNFZ or 
have to fight for the control of its airspace. 
At this time, the state of communications was fair at best. It appears 
that the Iraqi government did not believe the original ultimatum was anything 
either than a bargaining position, and offered paltry concessions in a form of 
haggling. It was not until the missile strike against the Zaafaraniyah nuclear 
facility that the Iraqi government's offers became valuable. This increased the 
coalition's credibility in terms of its threats, but this was somewhat 
constrained. Ot should be noted that the use of air power implies the 
acceptance of risk by the coercer, but that the suppression of enemy air 
defences implies a concern over casualties. ) 
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Iraq's willpower was not easily eroded during this operation. The 
timing of the operation Oust days before the inauguration of President 
Clinton) was one reason, but the Franco-American dispute presented an image 
of disunity. This offered the Iraqi government some hope. However, this 
eroded significantly with the prospect of forcible disarmament and its 
isolation. This isolation led to Iraq's speedy indication of its desire to 
negotiate through offers of increasingly valuable concessions. Coercion 
brought about a grudging (and perhaps feigned) willingness to cooperate in 
the short term. 
1,7GILANT WARRIOR (Coetrion Success) 
VIGILANT WARRIOR was an attempt at threat-based coercion 
through power projection in order to deter an Iraqi action and deny it if 
deterrence failed. Air power was used to monitor the situation and to bring 
forces in from 'over-the-horizon'. Ile exact Iraqi motives remain unknown. 
11-ds makes the analysis of the case more difficult, as Iraqs choice between 
invading Kuwait or not acting remains unknowable without access to the Iraqi 
archives. The nature of the communication, largely indirect or through a third 
party, i. e. the Russian government, further complicates the issue. The speed 
of the coalition's deployment demonstrated its capability to project power into 
the theatre, and this made its threats credible. ne deploymenes speedlikely 
prevented Saddam Hussein from undertaking offensive operations at least 
until Iraq has an arsenal of WMI)s to support such operations. The 
significance of WMI)s thus increased. The erosion of Iraqi willpower is hard 
to judge, as the penalty was the maintenance of the statys quo. In fact, the Iraqi 
government made the situation worse, as its actions in October 1994 renewed 
its isolation,, despite the Russian government's offers of mitigation. 
VIGILANT WARRIOR was not a 'tactical' victory despite Iraq's lack of 
action, but a 'strategic' victory in that Iraqi actions renewed the justification 
for Iraq's containment. While this is a success, it had less to do with the 
coalition's efforts than the Iraqi governmeneschoiceofaction. 
346 
Chapter Twelve - Conclusion 
SO UTHERN WATCH POST-A UG UST 1.996 (Coerdon Failmir) 
DESERT STRIKE was an enabling operation in response to Iraq's 
intervention in the KDP-PUK Civil War in August 1996. Iraq did not have a 
choice, as it had already withdrawn from Irbil when the coalition struck a 
portion of Iraq's air defences. The coalition's action was slow and came off as 
a reprisal as opposed to an act of coercion. This reprisal came in the form of 
air and missile strikes against air defence nodes in southern Iraq in order to 
enable the safe expansion of the SNFZ to the 33rd parallel. The extension 
completed the transformation of the SNFZ into a coercive instrument, but 
the coalition appeared to be ill prepared for actions in northern Iraq, thus 
weakening the credibility of its threats. 
In its original iteration, the SNFZ was intended to act as a means of 
showing presence and monitoring Iraqi operations in southern Iraq while also 
enabling a rapid response to Iraqi provocations, as was aptly demonstrated in 
Chapter Nine. By the end of 1996, a combination of Iraqi provocations in the 
skies- and military operations led the coalition to tailor the forces and the 
SNFZ to be capable of striking Baghdad at the coalition's whim. This was an 
attempt, as noted in Chapter Ten, at coercion with an implicit (and therefore 
weak) threat. It was unclear as to what the desired behaviour was beyond 
compliance. The 'pain' itself was not sufficient to erode Iraqi willpower and 
the knock-on effects of Iraq's seizure of Irbil gave the Iraqi government 
optimism that it could regain control within the NNFZ. 
VVbile the SNFZ extension seemed to imply the coalition's 
preparedness to attack Baghdad, the Iraqi government found hope from the 
French government's refusal to enforce the extension and its concern about 
the abandonment of coalition humanitarian efforts in northern Iraq. The 
Iraqi government saw that the coalition's cohesion and capability were waning, 
and that despite itsrhetoric, was unable to strike the RGFC in northern Iraq. 
The coalition chose to attack air defence assets, a target set of limited 
significance, in a scheme of incremental escalation. This satisfied Clinton 
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Administration criteria but failed as a coercive operation. Despite the threat, 
the Iraqi government became more beffigerent toward UNSCOM in 1997 and 
1998. 
DESERT FOX (Coeraon Failurr) 
DESERT FOX was a definite attempt to coerce Iraq. The Iraqi 
government was presented with the choice of co-operation with UNSCOM or 
disarmament by force of arms. Due to the test period that followed the crisis 
of November 1998, it was dear to the Iraqi government what was expected 
and that this was a punishment for its intransigence. The Iraqi government, 
having good reason to believe that the coalition's operations were unpopular 
with the international community and would be short, chose disarmament by 
force, and offered limited resistance. It did so while waiting for Ramadan to 
occur, in the belief that coalition military operations would cease in order to 
avoid Islarn's condemnation of conducting military strikes during its most 
holy observance period. The prospect of President Clinton's impeachment 
and the lack of credibility that surrounded A his decisions wrecked the 
threat's credibility. Iraq's will power was scarcely eroded. Ibc proverbial 
trigger for the coalition's operations created significant political friction, and 
tl-ýs reduced Iraq's political isolation. 
A combination of international outrage at the lack of authorisation 
and/or consultation and the timing of the operation gave the Iraqi 
government both offers of change (i. e. the replacement of UNSCOTNý and a 
genuine hope. The Iraqi government was also aware that the political 
conditions were such that if military operations occurred, UNSCOM would 
end. It had both offers of mitigation and hope because of the international 
outcry. The 'Pain'became more than bearable. 
The success or fAure of coercion hinges on the erosion of willpower 
and the prevention of external support. In any case where external offers of 
support for Iraq existed, or the Iraqi government could derive hope from 
political support, coercion failed. When the Iraqi governtnent was isolated 
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and could not foresee anydiing but a deterioration of the situation, coercion 
succeeded. 
Assessment 
Coercion was intended to support the containment of Iraq. 
Containment was based on the removal of its WMD capability and the 
maintenance of sanctions to prevent its rearmament and new military 
adventures. Containment was achieved to a point. Sanctions remained in 
place after 1998, but UNSCOM's purpose was never fulfilled as the removal 
of Iraqs WMI)s was not completed. The regime of containment also lost 
credibility over time within the international community. It appeared to the 
international community that the coalition and UN were synonymous, 
although the justifications for action were based on the notion of an impartial 
UN acting as the world judge. The coalition's ability to influence the decision 
began to weaken its political position. 
As the coalition became increasingly frustrated with the situation in 
the late 1990s and sought to increase the pressure on Iraq, other agencies or 
governments became suspicious and/or critical of the coalition's means and 
ultimate ends. Certain members of the coalition began to consider the 
prospects of removing Saddam. Hussein from power, but this was beyond the 
pale for political reasons. This reduced the utility of coercion as a means of 
supporting the containment of Iraq regardless of what was struck or how 
much damage the coalition inflicted on siglificant target sets. The loss of 
consensus within the international community about the containment of Iraq 
led to two things. First, there were more indications of external support (Le. 
public calls for the replacement of UNSCOM or a lifting of sanctions by third 
parties). Second, such statements or proposals offered the Iraqi government a 
good chance that its containment (in the form of diplomatic and economic 
sanctions) might be abandoned. This made it possible for the Iraqi 
government to Eve through any attempt at coerdon. 
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Table 20: Summary of Cases by Criteria 






Iraqi Choice Cooperate with Attack and 
STRIKE) 
Behave or else cooperate 
UNSCOM or be fight, or do not with 
forcibly attack UNSC0'. L%1 
disarmed, and or be 
tolerate the forcibly 
SNFZ or fight disarmed 
for the airspace 
Communications Marginal Marginal Weak Good 
Credibility of Marginal Good Weak Marginal 
Threat 
Erosion of Significant Unclear due to Weak Weak 
Willpower the nature of 
the situation 
Isolation Significant Significant Limited Very 
Limited 
Perception of Significant Significant Significant Significant 
Capability 
Result Success -9uahfied M Failure Failure 
Success 
3. 'Lessons' for the Future 
There are really two audiences when one speaks of 'lessons' of 
coercion. The first are the political and military practitioners of coercion. 
They are interested in how to coerce an adversary successfiffly and how to 
improve the process of coercion. The second audience is composed of 
academýics. This section will address some of the key issues for both. 
'Practitioner' Issues: 
The Limits of Polificaljustifzcalions. ý 
The utility of political justifications is limited by the degree of 
harmony within the international community. Differing perceptions of the 
situation led to public disputes between the American and French 
governments. Examples included the Franco-American dispute in 
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VIGILANT WARRIOR, the issue of different interpretation of the SCRs (as 
seen in Chapters Eight, Nine and Ten) and the concern that containment was 
more important than the plight of the Iraqi people as was demonstrated in the 
French withdrawal from PROVIDE COMFORT II. 
There was also a difference in diplomatic approach to the problem of 
Iraq between the Bush and Clinton Administrations. The Bush 
Administration demonstrated a collective understanding that justifications 
were also constraints to action, but the Clinton Administration(s) did not seem 
to share this belief It is likely that the difference was due to the American 
position in both eras; in the former, it still had to contend with an adversary 
(albeit one in decline) but in the latter, the US was the remaining superpower. 
The two images of the use of force (i. e. the insurance policy or the bank 
account) can be traced to the American position in the international 
community as well. 7 This is related to the notion of the UN as the 'World 
judge'. If the coalition, as the proverbial 'executioner' could influence the 
proverbial 'judge', then the outcomes are suspect and lack credibility within 
the international community. 
These factors created the image that there was a 'tactical seam' within 
the coalition which the Iraqi government could exploit in addition to other 
avenues within the international community. This translated into a lack of 
credibility of the coalition's threats, external offers of mitigation and the 
promýse of an end to Iraq's diplomatic and economic isolation. 
Is ttimmpb sedmctive?. 
This question could easily be rephrased to ask if withdrawal was at all 
possible. Having defeated Iraq in 1991, the coalition became committed to 
Iraq's containment in the absence of a more permanent solution. So long as 
Iraq posed a threat to regional stability, the coalition had to maintain sanctions 
and make military efforts. The Iraqi threat, while reduced in the military sense 
See pp. 72 and 75- 77 above. 
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as identified in Chapter Five, remained in that -Iraq could still menace its 
neighbours; and act as a political spoiler. Similarly, withdrawal would have 
made the Gulf War seem like wasted effort if the region remained unstable. 
After January 1993, it would have exposed the Clinton Administration(s) to a 
traditional (and therefore predictable) Republican argument of a weak 
Democratic leader. Worse yet, it offered the possibility that the US, if not 
involved in that region, might be called upon to assume greater responsibilities 
elsewhere. This is one of the imponderables of democýacies in the present 
era. They may be seduced by an early triumph and will not allow withdrawal 
without significant cost or anguish, which unfortunately leads them into an 
intractable situation. 
'Forward Pirsence. 
'Me value of enabling future military operations cannot be overstated. 
The target state cannot help but perceive the existence and strength of military 
forces in the theatre. This allows the target state to assess the coercer's 
capability to carry out its threat in advance. If a coercer's threats are matched 
with actions, their credibility (in terms of the certainty of resolve) will be 
established in the rninds of the target state's decision-makers. Similarly, it is 
advantageous to demonstrate unambiguously the capacity to 'control'. 8 This 
process, to a certain extent, occurred in DESERT STORM and was 
reinforced in VIGILANT WARRIOR through the deployment of additional 
forces. Forward presence made this possible. 
'Institutional Default Selliqs'- 
In order to coerce an adversary, poficy consonance between the 
choice of target sets and weapons must e3dst. Doctrine guides military action, 
and militaries have a habit of employing weaponry in accordance with the 
prevailing belief. One could go so far as to label these as 'default settings'. In 
the absence of direct guidance, weapons will be employed in doctrinally 
acceptable manners. Unmanned weapons, for example, were conceived to 
8 See p. 43 abovc. 
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strike targets that were either too distant or too well defended for manned 
airpower. In addition to this, the targeting system Mustrated in. Chapter Two 
prescribes a division of responsibility between political and military leadership 
at the strategic level and the CINC at operational level. The necessity for 
policy consonance may require a degree of intervention by the strategic 
political and military leadership reminiscent of the Vietnam era in order to 
ensure that the discrete threats or uses of force achieve the desired outcomes. 
IlAs is anathema to the American military establishment due to the Vietnam 
War experience, but the military's 'default settings' of using weapons are 
focused on 'contror. 9 Coercion is a discrete use of force aimed at influencing 
the adversary's decision calculus in peacetime, and tl-ýs requires 
unconventional approaches to target and weapons selection. 
Target Sets: 
Target selection is not the key variable in the determination of success 
or faRure. Target sets, for the purpose of coerdon, must be suffidently 
significant to prevent failure. From the evidence at hand, it appears that by 
picking theright targets, one merely reduces chances of failure. 'Me cases of 
January 1993, DESERT STRIKE and DESERT FOX provide a useful 
Mustration: 
Table 21: Coercion and Target Sets 
Case Target Set Result 
January 1993 Air defence assets Failure - target not I 
significant 
January 1993 Zaafaraniyah Nuclear facility Success - target significant 
DESERT FOX WNID assets and support Failure - political 
assets environment 
As UNSCOM made progress between 1993 and 1998, Iraq's supply of 
WMDs dwindled and this raised their significance in the eyes of the Iraqi 
government. Yet they were the prime target in DESERT FOX and the 
9 See p. 43 abovc. 
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coalition failed to coerce Iraq. It is still possible to fail to coerce an 
adversary if the right targets are selected, but it is impossible to coerce an 
adversary if insignificant targets are threatened or struck. The appropriation 
selection of target sets is merely a pre-condition for success and not its 
determinant. 
Central Conclusion 
This thesis has demonstrated that the means used for coercion had 
little, if any, discernible effect on the outcome of any given crisis. The political 
and diplomatic context of any given crisis, on the other hand, seemed to 
determine the outcome in advance of the threat or use of force. 
Consequently, the central conclusion of this thesis is that success in coercion 
is contingent on the setting of the appropriate political conditions (ones can 
be supported by the use of force) within the international community. 
Successful coercion borders on 'control' by shaping the adversary's choice, 
without actually imposing one's will by force of arms. 10 It should not be a 
mere reaction to a belligerenes provocations, but a careffilly conceived and 
prepared action executed to support a broad diplomatic plan. Acting in the 
absence of appropriate political conditions due to a crisis is excusable; failing 
to set suitable conditions over time is ineptitude. Coercion is a waste of effort 
and munitions without those diplomatic efforts needed to keep the adversary 
in a psychologically weak position. 
10 See p. 43 above. 
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